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Bank Competition, Earnings Management and 
Profit Persistence 
Abstract 
This thesis examines the impact of competition and earnings 
management on bank earnings persistence by exploiting natural 
experiments (IBBEA and SOX).  
Chapter three examines how competition affects bank earnings 
persistence by exploiting a natural experiment following interstate 
banking deregulation that increased bank competition. We find that 
bank earnings adjustment speed (which equals one minus earnings 
persistence in partial adjustment model) increases after their states 
implement this deregulation. We find the impact from the 
competition on earnings persistence is solid and consistent using 
Lerner index as bank-level competition measure and a battery of 
placebo tests. Despite the negative impact of competition on profit 
persistence, we didn’t find any peculiar situation that alleviates or 
strengthen this tie(regarding profitability, Gaps).   
Chapter four examines the impact of earnings management on 
earnings persistence in US banking industry. Results show earnings 
management have a positive influence. In addition, statistics 
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illustrate managers are more willing to keep a high persistence of 
profit when they are outperformed than the expected to return.  
However, when it comes to the different timing of outside market, 
the effect of earnings management on profit persistence might vary 
significantly. This connection is robust by using SOX as an 
exogenous shock on financial reporting quality of the largest banks. 
Chapter five analyze the economic significance between earnings 
management and competition on earnings persistence. We use a 
battery of tests to determine the most important factor to earnings 
persistence. We also introduce investment sentiment as an 
exogenous variation of market vitality to see how bank profit 
persistence changes. We find both competition and earnings 
management have a significant impact on profit persistence. We 
also discover that competition would increase earnings management. 
Then, if higher competition reduces earning persistence and increase 
earnings management. While we also observe that higher earnings 
management would increase earnings persistence. Therefore, we 
conclude that the effect of the competition on earnings persistence is 
not from earnings management. Furthermore, we find that 
competition impacts on earnings persistence is strong enough to 
overcome the marginal effect that boosted from earnings 
management due to high competition. We additionally found that 
earnings management is sensitive to investment sentiment. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction  
1.1 Motivation of Profit Persistence study in Banking 
Financial crisis raises the recent intense debate on the association 
between accounting changes and financial crisis. For instance, the 
accusation of market value accounting after the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis, along with the economic significance of banks’ liquidity and 
capital provision requirements, reveals the vital economic role of 
bank accounting (Beatty and Liao, 2014). Bank earnings persistence 
plays an important role in maintaining the stability of the whole 
financial system and so has attracted growing debate on the factors 
that drive such a phenomenon (Cumming et al., 2012; Beaver et al., 
2012; Gao and Zhang, 2015; Peterson et al., 2015; Hui et al, 2016; 
Buchner et al., 2016).  
According to economic competition theory, competition contributes 
to the mean reversion of market profitability (decreased earnings 
persistence) in the long term (Stigler, 1961; Mueller, 1977, 1986; 
Berger et al., 2000; Goddard et al., 2011). Namely, competition 
could erode away all excessive returns by attracting new entrants or 
all excessive losses by forcing the improvement of operations or 
exit of the market. Thus, competition could directly reduce earnings 
persistence.  
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However, accounting studies implicitly suggest that earnings 
persistence is a result of earnings management (Sloan, 1993; Pope 
and Wang, 2005; Chen, 2010; Dechow et al., 2010; Skinner and 
Soltes, 2011; Li, 2010; Healy et al., 2015).  
Few studies have attempted to reconcile the differences between 
theories that explain the main driving force of bank earnings 
persistence. It is possible that, as an effective external governance 
mechanism, competition could reduce earnings management via 
increasing the cost of mispricing (Graham et al., 2005; Dechow et 
al., 2010; Burks et al., 2016; Jiang et al., 2016). Hence, the resulted 
reduced earnings persistence is the result of decreased earnings 
management caused by the increased competition. It is thus the 
central focus of this thesis to determine whether the impact of 
competition on bank earnings persistence is direct or indirectly from 
earnings management.  
1.2 Main Contributions  
This thesis contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we 
construct a clean and appealing natural experiment design by using 
the Branching Restriction Index to identify the impact of 
competition on bank earnings persistence. We exploit the cross-state, 
time-varying variations in the removal of interstate bank branching 
prohibitions to identify an exogenous increase in bank competition. 
The introduction of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act (IBBEA) in 1994 by the US authorities relaxed geographical 
restrictions to bank expansion across state borders. This relaxation 
enhances competition by enabling banks to enter into new markets 
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in other states, thereby allowing them to compete with those banks 
in the local market (DeYoung, 2010; Rice and Strahan, 2010). In 
addition, in Section 4.2, we further use a separate deregulation index, 
Early Deregulation Index, which also represents a natural 
experiment design.  
For earnings management, we use the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) as 
a source of exogenous variation in firm earnings management to 
document the causal effect between earnings management and 
earnings persistence. The increasing accounting scandals from the 
early 2000s indicates the prevalence of managers’ earnings 
management behaviors among public companies (Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006; Efendi et al., 2007). In order to alleviate this 
phenomenon, the clawback provision of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) enables the board to recover bonus or other incentive 
compensation paid to CEOs and CFOs when the firm is required to 
restate its financial reports. Several empirical studies indicate that 
this clawback provision is an effective means to prevent earnings 
management and increase accounting quality (Chan et al., 2012; 
Chan et al., 2013; DeHaan et al., 2013). Our identification strategy 
depends on the hypothesis that the SOX Act influenced the largest 
banks more than their smaller counterparts because clawback firms, 
i.e., firms that utilized the clawback provision, are larger than their 
non-clawback counterparts (Chan et al., 2013). 
We investigate the link between changes in bank earnings 
management and changes in earnings persistence, using the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) as a source of exogenous variation in 
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions. Since the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury (2009) mandatorily requires all financial firms to adopt 
the clawback provision, earnings management is expected to 
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experience a significant reduction. Therefore, we also use the 
mandatory adoption of the clawback provision as an instrument of 
earnings management to further eliminate the endogeneity issue of 
earnings management. Chan et al. (2012), Chan et al. (2013) and 
DeHaan et al. (2013) find the evidence that the adoption of 
clawback provision is negatively related to the frequency of 
financial reporting restatements and positively associated with the 
credibility of accounting reports perceived by investors. Our results 
suggest that earnings management exerts a strong positive impact on 
earnings persistence. 
Second, we also examine whether the competition law affects banks 
with different size, level of diversification, management efficiency, 
and level of default risk. We find that the stronger a bank is in 
sustaining earnings, as reflected by large size, better diversification, 
higher managerial efficiency and lower default risk, the lower is the 
impact of competition on bank earnings adjustment speed. Third, we 
further investigate the mechanism of the effect of competition on 
bank earnings persistence, that is, we investigate whether 
competition directly impacts bank earnings adjustment speed or that 
competition reduces earnings management, which in turn, impacts 
earnings adjustment speed. Our evidence rules out this indirect 
channel and indicates that competition directly impacts bank 
earnings adjustment speed. 
1.3 Data source and empirical methodology 
We use a comprehensive dataset of the US banking industry for the 
period between 1986 and 2013 and our final sample includes 15,546 
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unique banks with 226,153 firm-year observations. In our main 
analysis, we focus on the period five years before and five years 
after the year when the IBBEA act was introduced in each state. The 
benefits of studying the banking industry are two-fold: First, our 
focus on a single homogenous industry removes the challenges of 
defining the market where a firm competes, thereby removing the 
potential bias in industry identification that is overly broad or 
unduly narrowly defined. Second, the focus of analyzing the 
banking sector eliminates the concern of conglomerates that operate 
in different industries and thus face competitions in different 
markets.  
We use a partial adjustment model to capture bank earnings 
adjustment speed, which allows earnings targets to be bank-specific 
and to vary over time (see, also, Healy et al., 2014; Flannery and 
Rangan, 2006; De Jonghe and Öztekin., 2015). Earnings adjustment 
speed refers to the speed by which banks adjust earnings to their 
target ROA, and equals one minus earnings persistence. Thus, faster 
adjustment speeds indicate lower earnings persistence. We estimate 
heterogeneous adjustment speeds via a two-stage procedure. In the 
first stage, we obtain a constant adjustment speed λ for each of the 
banks and estimate the target ROA for each bank-year. In the 
second stage, we use the gap between the target ROA and the 
observed realized ROA to obtain a time-varying adjustment speed 
for each bank in each year.  
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1.4 Findings in a nutshell 
We start by investigating whether banks adjust their earnings with a 
faster speed in states that implement the IBBEA and deregulate 
interstate banking within their borders to a great extent. We find that 
an increase in the Branching Restriction Index, which indicates an 
increase in bank competition, leads to an increase in bank earnings 
adjustment speed. This finding is in line with the prediction of the 
economic theory that competition reduces earnings persistence 
(Stigler, 1961).  
We also use the Adjusted Lerner Index as an alternative measure of 
competition and find a positive relation between bank competition 
and earnings adjustment speed. Because deregulation is at the 
market level, we further adopt an instrumental variable approach by 
using deregulation index as an instrument for market competition 
HHI measurement and then regress the earning adjustment speed on 
the predicted HHI. We find that the fitted state HHI has a negative 
and significant impact on earnings adjustment speed. Because a 
higher fitted HHI indicates a lower level of competition, this result 
is consistent with our main finding in the paper. 
These findings hold after controlling for state and time fixed effects, 
a wide array of time-varying bank characteristics, such as size, risk, 
capital-asset ratio, efficiency, and the macroeconomic conditions, 
such as GDP growth, inflation and GDP per capita in each state. We 
also conduct a host of robustness tests to ensure that our findings are 
not driven by potential biases in the sample or alternative 
explanations. In our additional cross-sectional analysis, we find that 
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the impact of bank competition on earnings adjustment speed is 
reduced with the increase of bank’s ability to sustain earnings, 
including size, diversification, managerial efficiency and safety. 
We then discovered a strong correlation between earnings 
management and earnings persistence. This relationship holds by 
applying SOX as an exogenous shock on bank earnings 
management. We find that banks use different ways to of earning 
manipulation in a different circumstance. For example, when banks 
earnings are below the earnings target, they are more likely to use 
earnings management to increase earnings adjustment speed. We 
also find that bank earnings management behavior will be various 
regarding market sentiment.  
Next, we investigate whether the positive impact of competition on 
bank earnings adjustment speed goes through the earnings 
management channel. If this is the case, we would expect a negative 
impact of competition on bank earnings management. This 
expectation is suggested by the literature, which argues that 
competition can act as an external governance mechanism to 
prevent managerial slack and protect the interest of shareholders 
(Dechow et al., 2010), and that competition increases the cost of 
misreporting, thereby curbing earnings management incentives 
(Graham et al., 2005). On the other hand, if the positive impact of 
competition on bank earnings adjustment speed does not go through 
the earnings management channel, we would expect a positive or 
insignificant impact of competition on bank earnings management. 
Some literature argues that increased competition could put higher 
pressure on managers and hence, induces their unethical behavior 
such as earnings management, giving rise to an empirically 
observed positive relation between competition and earnings 
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management (Shleifer, 2004; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Bagnoli and Watts, 2010; Tomy, 2016; 
Dou et al., 2016).  
We conduct two analyses to examine whether competition has a 
positive impact on bank earnings management by using two bank 
earnings management measures. Our first measure of earnings 
management is discretionary loan loss provisions, which has been 
widely used to measure earnings management in the banking 
industry (see, e.g., Beatty et al., 2002; Cohen et al., 2014; Cornett et 
al., 2009; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Beatty and Liao, 2014). In our 
analyses, we find a positive relation between competition and 
earnings management measured as discretionary loan loss 
provisions, which does not support the argument that the impact of 
competition on bank earnings persistence goes indirectly through 
the channel of earnings management. 
Our second measure of earnings management is discretionary 
realized gain and loss from securities available for sale (AFS). Prior 
studies also document that banks could use the securities available 
for sale to smooth earnings (Barth et al., 2015; Dong and Zhang, 
2015). Available for Sale (AFS) securities is the largest category of 
banks’ securities that comprise a sizable proportion of bank assets 
(Nissim and Penman, 2007; Laux and Leuz, 2010). Earnings 
management through realizing gains and losses on AFS securities is 
less costly than through managing accruals or involving in real 
activities because sales of securities are not subject to ex-post 
scrutiny, such as from auditors. These advantages may enable banks 
to continuously manage earnings despite the existence of 
competition. If this is the case, competition does not affect earnings 
management via AFS. However, we do not find a significant 
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relation between competition and earnings management measured 
as available for sale securities. This evidence indicates that the 
impact of competition on bank earnings persistence does not go 
indirectly through the channel of earnings management.   
Chapter 2 provides background and motivation of this study. 
Chapter 3 investigates how competition affects bank earnings 
persistence. Chapter 4 investigates how earnings management 
affects bank earnings persistence. Chapter 5 provides additional 
empirical analysis between competition and earnings management, 
as well as introducing how investment sentiment would affect 
earnings persistence.  Chapter 6 concludes. 
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Chapter 2 
Background 
2.1 Competition in Banking 
Banking as the heart of the financial system of a country sits a vital 
position for the economy. The intensity of competition in the 
banking industry has implications for the level of economic vitality, 
including access to finance, the allocation of capital funds, 
monitoring investments and exerting corporate governance. Banks 
like business firms in other industries must attract outside funding in 
competitive capital markets, face competition in product and labor 
markets. Competition plays a significant role in fostering bank 
efficiency. The role of banks as efficient allocators of scarce capital 
to the economy and as important providers of liquidity make them 
extremely important macro-economically. Because banks 
themselves are opaque in nature(Bushman, 2014), an efficient 
banking market becomes even more vital to economic growth. How 
competition influences on bank profitability? Gilbert(1984) states 
that a monopoly market with a small number of banks may lead to 
high-profit margin as they might collude together either implicitly 
or explicitly. In addition, they might independently use their market 
power to charge price, which means higher abnormal returns. 
However, this positive relationship between banks profitability and 
market concentration does not necessarily reflect collusion. It might 
simply because of efficiency as size are positively correlated with 
efficiency(Goddard et al. 2007).   
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Market competition theory points out that competition could erode 
away all economic excessive returns and losses, in the long run, so 
the market profitability level will converge toward a long-term 
equilibrium (Stigler, 1961; Mueller, 1977, 1986; Berger et al., 2000; 
Goddard et al., 2011). More specific, the excessive profit currently 
possessed by a firm could attract new competitors entering the 
market. Then, the new competing firms enter into the market by 
offering the similar or the same product at a lower price, leading to 
the decrease of profit margins. This process will not stop until the 
firms’ profitability reaches the average profit rate of the market. For 
firms with the profits under the market average will receive 
precaution from investors to reach the market average level in a 
short time. Otherwise, investors will withdraw their investment, 
resulting in the exit of the underperformed firms from the market. 
Thus, competition could directly reduce earnings persistence.   
There is a strong presumption in economics that the profitability is 
mean reverting, the basic logic behind this theory is the 
competition-profit persistence view: successful companies with 
advantages enable them to earn abnormal profits above the average 
are expected to try to maintain this advantages. However, the 
current successful will attract more imitations, which will erode the 
abnormal profits. Schohl(1989)argued that competing firms will 
enter the market by offering comparable products at lower prices, 
thus reducing the profit margins. This is a continuous process until 
the market has met the average value of the economy. By contrast, if 
the profitability of a firm is lower than the market average, there 
will be disinvestment, inducing a possible quit. Hence the long-run 
profitability will converge.   
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Although banks seek to maintain its profitability and strive to 
counter the mean reverting process, they are typically under the 
economic laws of competition (Aghion 2002). The outperformed 
firms are subjected to a lot of new competitors as well as the 
pressure from incumbents.  New firms are that bring innovative 
technology can easily snatch away the abnormal earnings from the 
existing outperformers. The incumbents will benefit from the 
spillover effects through competition, which allows them to adjust 
faster and learn quicker, therefore again reduce the abnormal 
earnings from the existing outperformers.  By contrast, if the 
incumbents cannot survive the process by improving the 
profitability, they will either quit or forced to bankrupt soon, which 
will further accelerate the mean-reverting speed.  
The competitive environment hypothesis is one of the basic ideas in 
mainstream economic theory. When the market is not in equilibrium, 
the firm can earn excess profits due to its comparative advantages. 
The adjustment of resources and output into areas earning excess 
profits and away from areas earning below average profits will, in 
time, tend to bring returns back towards the firm’s cost of capital 
(Jacobson and Hansen, 2001). This adjustment is ‘the competitive 
process’ and the speed at which these abnormal returns dissipate is 
of fundamental importance to the firm because it impacts the value 
of any strategic initiative.  
Based on Mueller(1977), the requirement is the market is 
sufficiently free for exit and entry. With this premise, the abnormal 
profit will be eliminated rapidly and all firms’ profit rates tend to 
converge towards an identical long-run average value. He tests how 
fast the market eliminates the abnormal profits. If the company 
strived to intervene the market competitiveness, in which way, for 
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example, erect entry barriers through increased product 
differentiation, obtain legal protection such as patents, tariffs etc, 
thus preserving the existing monopoly, then the profit persistence 
will be last much longer. Additionally, He finds that the profit rate 
and market share are positively related, it underpins the hypothesis 
that a company with high profitability makes effort to keep their 
monopoly position hence maintain the profit persistence. Similarly, 
Persistence in profits may reflect the existence of impediments to 
product market competition, which generates market power in 
output markets, and informational opacity, which generates market 
power in input markets, Without market power, relatively high 
performance by a firm would be eliminated reasonably quickly as 
other firms enter its local market, imitate its transparent techniques 
or strategies, bid for its most profitable customers, or bid up the 
price of its managerial talent. Similarly, poorly performed firms 
would be forced by competitive pressures to exit the industry or 
imitate the strategies or bid for the customers and managers of the 
firms performing at the high end of the distribution. Such logic 
suggests that a firm’s market power can have significant influences 
on its persistence in excess returns. (Berger.A.N et al,2000). 
Since incumbents in highly concentrated industries might have the 
ability (market power) to prevent entry and therefore might be able 
to enjoy a higher degree of profit persistence (Yamawaki, 1989; 
Gschwandtner and Cuaresma, 2008), bank concentration measure 
might have a positive impact on bank profit persistence. However, 
empirical evidence on this relationship is not clear (see 
Gschwandtner,2005; Yurtoglu, 2004; Kambhampati, 1995; Waring, 
1996; Geroski and Jacquemin, 1988; Scherer and Ross, 1990). 
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One example of creating barriers is Isolating 
mechanisms(Rumelt ,1987), such as information impactedness 
(tacitness) that creates ambiguity on the part of competitors that 
prevents competitor response, organizational structures and 
incentives that make competitors slow to respond, buyer switching 
costs that create loyalty to the brand, the degree of innovativeness 
on the part of the firm and its competitors, and the manner in which 
the firm chooses to exploit its advantage, interact to determine the 
persistence of return. Profitable firms that face lower barriers to 
entry likely to see their profits eroded by competitors, therefore 
leading to a higher speed of mean reverting. Under-performed firms 
are more likely to quit the market voluntarily in order to seek higher 
rents. Because the lower rents in this market lead to an attractive 
situation.  This kind of competition is referred to as product market 
competition. This kind of competition varies significantly across 
industries. For the banking industry, the legal barriers are the major 
determinant of market competition. Most banks are subjected to 
government regulations on capital requirements, loan portfolio, 
securitization and off-balance sheet behavior and other factors. The 
market is also quite opaque since all information within this 
industry is highly confidential which leads to a lower process of 
mean reversion.  
A highly competitive market with low or without entry and exit 
barriers will accelerate the speed of imitations, therefore eliminate 
the economic value.  So if there is intense competition, the 
persistence should be weak, companies those keep generating 
abnormal incomes in a specific period will have lower abnormal 
profits in the subsequent periods. If the competition is less intense, 
the profitability differences between firms may be expected to be 
more persistent(Glen.J et al,2001). There are two cases here: 1) 
profitable firms with firm-specific advantages are likely to be 
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successful in the future, and 2) the current success of a firm may 
have adverse effects on future profitability of the firm because of 
the imitation from competitors. The industry growth rate can be one 
indicator to explain the competition-persistence view, it might be 
more difficult for incumbents to maintain the market share and 
oligopolistic position in a slowed growing industry, on the contrary, 
in a rapid growth industry, the companies can maintain their price 
since the demand is increasing thus keep the profit differentials. It 
might also lead to high profitability persistence because the 
competition of price is low.  
Based on this theory, there are two ways to maintain profit 
persistence, they are either putting efforts toward innovation thus 
obtain technological advantages or impose pressure on the market to 
reduce the competitiveness.  A research from Roberts(1999) 
focusing on the pharmaceutical industry in the US indicating that 
the profit persistence positively correlated with the Innovation, 
which proved the technological advantages help maintain the profit 
persistence. He assumes innovation propensity will positively help 
companies keep abnormal profits, and competition will adversely 
influence the profit persistence. However, he did not find any 
empirical results between profit persistence and competition. In 
addition, the pharmaceutical industry in particular because it is 
heavily depending on the R&D and patent protections.  However, 
from this study, we can assure that the internal breakthrough is a 
valid way to maintain abnormal return. The abnormal return does 
not pertain via the maintain method, the pharmaceutical companies 
use their new innovative products to generate new profits.  This is 
an evident instance about how to keep an out-performed 
profitability level.  For the pharmaceutical industry, the imposing of 
the competition barrier is the patent that generated from the 
company, because of the protect of patenting. Companies can slow 
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the spillover effects that forbid another competitor to mimic the 
products, therefore keep the competitiveness of a specific product. 
The pharmaceutical industry is much simpler than the banking 
because the financial institutions have more competition factors to 
be taken into account. 
‘Quiet Life’ hypothesis (Delis and Tsionas, 2009), on the other hand, 
argues that banks not exposed to competition because of the 
specialty of the banking industry. From his hypothesis, if market 
power prevails, bank managers may pursue objectives other than 
profit maximization, and they do not have incentives to work hard 
to sustain their profits level from the previous year. Hence, market 
power may have an adverse impact on the firm’s profit persistence. 
This is phenomenon is very counterfactual since the behavior of 
bank managers is not plausible in an aggregate way, but it may 
explain some kind of specialty of the banking industry.  In the 
traditional mean reversion study, the capital market effects have 
been considered as a predominant factor in determining the mean-
reverting speed. But for the banking industry, this factor becomes 
ambiguous, because of the banking industry itself dominant the 
effectiveness of capital market somehow. Sometimes, the max 
profitability is not the primary concern of banks. Rather than that, 
the banks may concern more like a capital requirement, risk control 
etc. All these factors make the banking industry hard to predict in 
terms of profit persistence.  So it is rather difficult to predict the 
impact of competition on profit persistence.  
As banks expand the scope of their activities and identify new 
growth opportunities across national borders, they tend to gain 
market power (Arsis, 2009). The increasing market power of banks 
may improve their abilities to create entry barriers, protect its 
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transparent techniques or strategies, bid for its most profitable 
customers, or bid up the price of its managerial talent, and 
consequently increase their abilities to sustain profits from the 
previous year (Berger et al, 2000). The US banking has experienced 
significant changes in regulation, technology, and financial 
engineering techniques. After the financial deregulation on deposit 
prices and geographic expansion, regulators move their attention to 
capital adequacy standards, banks are somehow under heavy 
surveillance after the financial crisis. Before 1981, the US had no 
specific numerical capital adequacy standards, it was the regulators 
responsibility to judge how much capital a bank should hold, after 
1981, the first explicit numerical capital requirements for those 
biggest banks were issued, now the Basel agreements have more 
detailed requirements on each tier of banking assets, obviously, 
regulative agreements will be the impediments to competition, as 
well as increase the barrier on entry . However, the managerial 
assets as loan loss provisions, give the bank managers potential 
space to manipulate the financial reports.   
According to Berger A.N et al(2000), the profit persistence of US 
banking is sensitive to macroeconomic shocks as well as 
impediments to competition and informational opacity.  This 
phenomenon can be summarized in two aspects, firstly, the market 
follows the economic theory that a more competitive environment 
erodes the abnormal profits thus reduce the consistency of the banks’ 
profit. Secondly, banks are pro-cyclicality which means the profit 
persistence should be influenced by the macroeconomic factors, 
presenting upwards(expansion)and downwards(recession) trend 
within the period, if the banks can offset the positive and negative 
effects imposed by the outside macro-factors, it is plausible that 
managers are using accounting methods to hide its ‘true profit’. 
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Schipper(1989) and Healy and Wahlen(1999) state that managers 
can use their discretion in financial reporting to overstate the true 
level of earnings as well as to hide the unwelcomed earnings losses. 
Mostly, the earnings management aims to mislead the outside 
investors, a smoothly positive earnings streams are able to 
consequently influence the stock price. According to Degeorge et 
al.(1999) and Burgastahler et al. (1997), between 1976 and 1994, 
the annual earnings of US firms shows a relatively smoothed single-
peaked, bell-shaped distribution expected in the area of zero 
earnings, it suggests that firms managed to report earnings higher to 
avoid loss when the losses are relatively small. Meanwhile, 
Burgastahler et al. (1997) also find that the US firms employed 
accounting discretion to avoid the small decrease in earnings when 
earnings are positive.  Hence maintain the profit persistence target.  
So the determinants of profit persistence are ambiguous.  
Based on the two facts, how the bank managers strive to maintain 
the persistence of profit is worth digging. On the hand, for example, 
they can impose pressure on the regulators thus enhance the barrier 
of entry and exit, meanwhile, the managers can maintain the 
information disclosure on a limited level thus increase the 
informational opacity. On the other hand, in order to offset the 
cyclical impact from external macroeconomic factors, managers can 
apply financial reporting techniques such as big bath, window-
dressing etc., therefore artificially influence the earnings that 
reported.    
The key two determinants of competition and accounting quality 
will be measured via Lerner-index and specific accounting quality 
indicator respectively. Since the existing empirical studies have 
employed market-level market power proxies such as concentration 
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ratios or Herfindahl indices, while no study, to the author’s 
knowledge, has ever used a bank-level measure of market power to 
account for the possibility that different banks operating in the same 
market might have different market power. This paper is able to fill 
this gap by investigating the impact of bank-level market power on 
profit persistence. Furthermore, the newly introduced comparison of 
accounting quality and market power on profit persistence can give 
a deep inspiration for how the bank managers’ behaviors are 
influences the profit persistence. 
Goddard.J, Liu Hong, Molyneux P, Wilson. J O.S(2011)test the 
competition on banking profitability in a universal scale including 
65 countries resulting in a greater size of GDP, a high rate in GDP 
growth(which implicitly indicates more competitive market) reduce 
the persistence rapidly. Furthermore, the persistence is positively 
correlated with the size of entry barriers, proving that high market 
power help maintains profits persistence. However, empirical 
evidence on this relationship is not clear. Previous studies examined 
the relationship between bank market power and profit persistence 
by measuring market power as bank concentration variables, (for 
example, Gschwandtner,2005; Yurtoglu, 2004; Kambhampati, 1995; 
Waring, 1996; Geroski and Jacquemin, 1988; Scherer and Ross, 
1990; Berger et al, 2000). The higher the concentration ratio, the 
higher market power banks may have. The main advantage of using 
bank-level market power is to allow for heterogeneity. In addition, 
by employing bank-level data, various different factors that 
influence bank short-run profit persistence can be examined. 
On the other hand, incorporating different attitudes into the 
accounting system by the managers is necessary. Tomy.R.E(2012) 
argue that the earning persistence is significantly influenced by the 
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economic cycle since the managers have incentives to apply 
accounting method to ‘change’ profits that reported. He finds that 
firms’ earnings are most persistent during an expansion, least 
persistent during a recession, which implies that managers have 
employed accounting method to influence the earnings in order to 
lead a more persistent profit. However, the firms measured in this 
paper are all manufacturing and consumer durables industries, 
which imply that the samples themselves are pro-cyclicality, it is 
plausible that the impacts from the economic cycle dummies are 
magnified.  It is controversial whether banks are sensitive to those 
factors. Beatty and Liao(2011) tried to find the recession impact on 
banking lending willingness associated with the regulatory capital 
ratios show a profile how the managers tried to revise the assets 
structure in order to meet the capital requirements when the market 
is under recession or expansion. This indicates the bank managers 
have applied accounting techniques to meet targets when the 
economic cycle is changing.   
The intensity of competition in the banking industry has 
implications for the level of economic vitality, including access to 
finance, the allocation of capital funds, monitoring investments and 
exerting corporate governance. Banks like business firms in other 
industries must attract outside funding in competitive capital 
markets, face competition in product and labor markets. 
Competition plays a significant role in fostering bank efficiency. 
The role of banks as efficient allocators of scarce capital to the 
economy and as important providers of liquidity make them 
extremely important macro-economically. However, the relationship 
between competition and earnings persistence is not widely assessed, 
and earnings management would also influence earnings persistence. 
In the next session, we will briefly review the development of 
earnings management in banking.   
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2.2 Earnings Management in Banking 
Banks are different from non-financial firms in terms of financial 
reporting. Ordinary, financial reporting is targeting transparency, 
showing that more disclosure would lead to a better corporate act. 
However, there is ongoing debate arguing whether banks need to be 
as transparent as possible. For example, Freixas and Rochet (2008) 
state that transparency is important for banks to allow depositors 
monitoring borrowers’ quality. In addition, bank opacity would 
induce agency problems and make banks less efficient. The higher 
asymmetric information would increase the financing cost on both 
issuing equity or debt. Bank financial reporting could possibly offer 
a channel to address agency problems arise in the banking industry.  
There are plenty of benefits of being financially transparent. For 
example, it would allow investors to better evaluate the 
fundamentals of each bank, thus mitigate agency problems. A 
regulator from another dimension could monitor banks more 
efficiently via a good financial reporting environment. 
Diamond(1984) argues that banks have incentives to monitor 
borrowers and produce information about credit risks. And 
Calomiris and Gorton(1991) state that the liquidity mismatch 
between assets and liabilities of banks will potentially increase the 
uncertainty of depositors.  The information asymmetry between 
banks and depositors that arises from banks’ delegated monitoring 
role might induce agency problem because banks might not behave 
on behalf of depositors. By contrast, banks may take the extra 
unnecessary risk to benefit themselves rather than depositors. A 
better disclosure system would mitigate asymmetric information 
between depositors and banks.  
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However, transparency might not optimal for banks. Dang et 
al(2013) suggest that banks should be opaque. Banks are unique in 
privately producing debt that is a money-like security that trades at 
par and does not vary in value over time. Banks need to have their 
own private portfolio to keep these money-like debts. Because debts 
need to be information-insensitive to serve as an efficient 
transaction medium. In order to make debt value at par, the 
underlying asset that backing debts should be unrevealed. Hence, 
bank money would not fluctuate in value, which will reduce its 
efficiency in trading. In this context, banks with higher transparency 
would lead to higher cost. A similar real-world example would be 
the selling of diamonds suggested by Holmstrom(2009). He argues 
that if diamonds are all allowed to be inspected by buyers before the 
transaction, the trade would be slowed down and reduce market 
liquidity, which might harmful to market efficiency. This might 
explain why banks had not been required to fully disclose financial 
reports until 1974. In 1974, Securities Amendments Act requires 
banks to issue substantially similar regulations with respect to 
periodic reporting, proxy regulation, and insider trading as those 
adopted by the SEC.  
Depositors may not be informative as banks about the loan quality. 
Then, one potential issue is depositors may panic about their money 
if the macro environment is not healthy or some adverse news are 
disclosed regarding some particular banks. Because banks are 
opaque, depositors have difficulty to monitor banks. A bank run 
would induce adverse consequence, which substantially reduces 
liquidity or a bank. It happens, if depositors withdraw all money 
from banks when they have reasons to believe that there is an 
increased likelihood of bank failure despite they do not know the 
actual incidence of failure.   
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Holod and Peek(2007) find that listed banks with higher 
transparency are better able to issue uninsured large time deposits 
during periods of monetary tightening. Which means banks are less 
financial constrained if they have better financial reporting quality. 
This indicates market values the financial information transparency 
of public banks. Flannery et al. (2004) argue that banks’ opacity to 
outsider investors are peculiar, which might need further regulation 
on them. Banks have undisclosed information of their non-tradable 
loans, this type of information is super difficult for outsiders to 
acquire. A similar evidence is that Moody’s and S&P ratings on 
banks are more different for banks than other firms and this 
disagreement happens when banks hold greater assets in loans and 
trading assets and this disagreement would reduce if banks hold 
higher capital ratio and more physical assets(Morgon, 2002).  This 
finding suggests that rating companies also face difficulty in 
determining a bank’s stability level particularly if the bank holds a 
large stake in loans. The opacity of loan quality becomes a huge 
information barrier between banks and outsider investors. Flannery 
et al (2013) find that, compared to nonfinancial firms, banks higher 
bid-ask spread during the financial crisis, which indicates financial 
regulators could have more impact on economic downturns.  This 
leads out a more scrutiny regulation environment for banks. Loan 
loss provision could also be a potential way for bank managers to 
convey their private information to equity holders and investors. For 
instance, Nichols et al(2009) find that public banks have more 
information asymmetry compared to other banks. Bank managers 
would make loan loss provisions more timely to alleviate opacity 
issues.  In addition, loan loss provision could be applied to 
manipulate earnings, capital or on tax purpose in order to align with 
shareholders’ interest. Literature has found a positive relationship 
between bank market value and loan loss reserves (Beaver et al, 
1989). It indicates that banks managers have the power to 
manipulate earnings to market expectation when they have a higher 
ratio of loan loss provisions. Investors also value this type of extra 
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reserve as a good resort to manipulate earnings, therefore, showing a 
more optimistic market performance. 
Bank regulation has evolved over time. The micro-prudential 
approach has been long employed within the banking industry. To 
prevent individual bank failure is a long time goal aims to protect 
depositors and investors from the cost of distress (Borio, 2003). 
Banks to be regulated on a micro level would encourage banks to 
internalize losses, thereby protecting the deposit insurance fund and 
mitigating moral hazard. Before the recent financial crisis, banks are 
regarded as independent units where systemic risks are assumed to 
be exogenous to the individual banks, and the correlation between 
banks are ignored. The macro-prudential approach has been recently 
getting popular. Banks are endogenous interconnected, to avoid 
system-wide distress with the ultimate objective to avoid reductions 
in GDP become the least goal for regulators. According to Hanson 
et al(2011), the target of systemic macro-prudential approach is to 
limit for excessive social costs associated with multiple financial 
institutions’ value shrinkage caused by a common shock.  
There are raising arguments concerning the measurements on the 
profits persistence. Holian(2010) contends that most of data sources 
that used are accounting-based, which will produce several errors. 
From his study, he applied both EVA(economic value added) model 
and traditional unadjusted accounting measures to compare the 
results.  Stern, Stewart, and Co(1995) argue that the accounting 
profit(net income does not take into consideration the opportunity 
cost of capital), while the EVA method can incorporate the 
opportunity cost of capital. The EVA has a different measurement 
from the basic net income. It can be Obtained by the Net operating 
profits after taxes minus Capital charge (current cost of debt and 
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equity) plus the Adjustments made by Stern Stewart to correct 
accounting distortions. 
Muller(1990) suggest that the outcomes of profit persistence should 
be smaller because of the availability of various accounting 
practices, that will allow managers to polish the profits. The EVA 
method aims to find the true profits. Intuitively, researchers believe 
that the profit persistence of accounting based method will be higher 
than the EVA method based profit persistence. However, the results 
from Holian(1990) suggest that the average persistence is higher 
when applying the Stern Stewart measure of economic profits rather 
than unadjusted accounting measures. It shows that the accounting 
based profits do not bias persistence upward. On the other hand, 
because of the incorporation of  the opportunity cost, the result does 
suggest lower long-term profits in the context of using EVA, this 
research also confirms that the R-square will be higher when using 
the revised EVA rather the raw accounting profit, which also 
confirms that the managers do use accounting practices to 
manipulate the profits.   
After all, the accounting-based measurement of profit persistence 
has a potential bias since the probability of artificial influence in 
relation to accounting practices. Despite the competition–
persistence view, there are also numerical literature investigating the 
impact produced by economic shock/ cycle on accounting quality. 
Intuitively, how managers behave regarding economic factors will 
affect the profit persistence as well. This paper wills mainly focuses 
on the competition to profit persistence.  
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From another dimension of the persistence study, the profit 
persistence studies using accounting oriented methods contend that 
the various factors like macroeconomic cycles will influence the 
profit persistence because the managers have incentives to manage 
earnings in order to meet different targets within various business 
cycles. The profit persistence is affected by firms’ performance and 
accounting system simultaneously. To be specific, the fundamental 
performance can be affected by both systemic and idiosyncratic 
factors.  As influences exerted from external factors like the 
economic recession and inflation are not able to avoid, the managers 
may use the accounting system to manipulate earnings.  
The incentives may be related to taking a big bath during recession 
periods, window-dressing financial statements before a public 
offering, etc(Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Empirical results from 
Collins and Kthari(1989) show a positive relationship between 
profit persistence and stock price changes, and Teoh et al(1998) also 
suggest that the companies tend to manage earnings upwards prior 
issuing equities.  The intuition behind the earnings artificial 
management is that managers will strongly avoid 
underperformances when other competitors are well-performed, by 
contrast, they will write-down large assets in the balance sheet as 
losses when the whole industry is under recession, by this ’big bath’, 
managers can make the subsequent earnings smoother and persistent.  
Findings from Liu and Ryan(2006) support this behavior, they 
found that banks tried to manage the earnings upwards during the 
financial recession by delaying provisions for losses on 
heterogeneous loans, and the banks managed the earnings 
downwards during the expansionary period by accelerating charge-
offs of homogeneous loans. All these manipulations will secure a 
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more smooth earnings curve, thus stabilizing the profit persistence. 
Another research from Beatty and Liao(2011) investigating the 
relationship between lending willingness and delays in expected 
loss incorporating two recession period March 2001 to December 
2001 and  December 2007 to June 2009 show that banks inclined to 
reduce lending during recessionary relative to expansionary periods, 
in addition, banks with small delays have smaller reductions on 
loans. The loan loss provisions rule magnifies the pro-cyclicality of 
banking, which increases the possibility and incentives for bank 
managers to manage profits in order to keep profit persistence.  
Apart from the internal earnings management from bank managers, 
the regulations on the accounting system may change as well. It is 
plausible that banks are willing to disclose more information when 
they are outperforming, in contrast, when it comes to the recession, 
profitability is severely impaired, the transparency and accuracy of 
accounting quality are supposed to be lower than normal level. 
Magee and Bertomeu(2012)argue that the accounting quality 
becomes worst before a recession. All these imply the accounting 
quality has an impact on the profits persistence. However, the 
incentives for managers to manipulate the earnings may differ from 
each other, there are lots of both internal and external factors 
requiring considering when it comes to financial reporting. 
For example, empirical results show that listed U.S firms have 
better accounting quality than those non-listed firms. In order to 
attract cheaper capitals through financial markets, the listed 
companies need to meet the requirements of sophisticated investors 
as well as establish the firms’ reputation. Similarly, if the firm is 
operating in an advanced economic environment with sound 
supervision and regulations, the accounting quality will also 
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increase. Bharath S.T, Sunder.J, and Sunder.S.V(2008) find that the 
accounting quality is positively related to firms’ financing choices. 
To be specific, with poorer accounting quality borrowers preferring 
private debt, bank lending will result in higher cost compared to the 
financial market. Firms with good accounting quality will benefit 
from the effective financial market as the low required rate on debt. 
However, firms with high potential growth will choose private 
funding resources rather than the public funding resources (i.e., 
corporate bond in financial market), this may due the consideration 
on the significant flexibility of the private debt. For example, the 
borrowing contract with a certain bank will be more customizable 
than with public investors. Additionally, the private-debt can be 
renegotiated to some extent before it matures, it is much favorable 
when a firm is growing fast. 
Specific to the banking industry, empirical results show the 
regulation, SFAS 133, on how banks are required to report the value 
of the derivative have a significant impact on the banks’ profit 
persistence(Kilic, E., et al 2012). SFAS 133, which enacted in 1998, 
changed accounting standard for derivatives substantially by 
enforcing recognition of all derivative instruments at their fair 
values and imposing stricter criteria for a derivative to classify as a 
hedge. Consequently, the profits of banks are more volatile 
responding to the uncertainty of the values of derivatives. As a 
result, banks lose the ability to smooth income via derivatives, the 
research finds empirical evidence that banks rely more on loan loss 
provisions to smooth profit. In this context, if the loan loss 
provisions changed significantly, the bank managers have intended 
to artificial smooth its earnings.   
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Other external factors can be auditing, economic shocks, tax-rate 
and so on. The incentives also can be influenced by the ownership 
of the firm in conjunction with size,financial leverage, and industry. 
Isidro and Raonic(2012)find that firms cross-listed generally have 
better information quality than their non-US listed peers. Since 
Cross-listed firm can access cheaper external funds. Similarly, the 
international conglomerates usually have higher accounting quality. 
All of the above factors probably affect the incentives of the firms’ 
earnings manipulations.   
A more deep discussion on the firm reporting incentives and 
institutional factors from Isidro and Raonic(2012) suggest that the 
financial reporting quality increases in the presence of strong 
monitoring mechanisms. It can be represented by ownership 
concentration, analyst scrutiny, effective auditing, external financial 
needs etc. Different incentives from managers and different 
endogenous and exogenous factors will affect the firms-accounting 
quality thus influence the quality of ‘numbers’ that observed from 
the financial reports. Since the main target is to measure the profit 
persistence. The importance of the accounting quality should not be 
ignored.   
Li(2008) investigate how the earnings persistence correlated with 
the accounting readability. In this research, a measurement of 
accounting readability is introduced called FOG. It is developed by 
Robert Gunning, the mechanism is to capture the text complexity as 
a function of syllables per word and words per sentence. The index 
obtained is interpreted as how long (in years) that a formal 
educational reader with average intelligence needs to read the text 
once and understand that piece of writing with its word-sentence 
workload. Li argues that the managers can use the length of annual 
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reports as well as the complicity to hide adverse information thus 
making the annual reports less transparent.  A high Fog index 
referred to a less transparent annual report, by contrast, low Fog 
index will result in the concise description and more 
comprehensible in the report, which indicates high transparency. 
After building a connection with earning persistence and the Fog 
Index, a negative relationship has been founded, suggesting that if 
the manager is trying to hide adverse information using more 
complicated words and longer sentences will lead a lower earnings 
persistence. Earnings forecasting is a big part of investment 
appraisals when considering to invest certain company. Baginsk. 
S.P, Hassell.J.M and Kimbrough M.D(2003) suggest that the 
managers are more likely to announce earnings forecast that 
containing external attributions(56.5%), such as macroeconomic 
changes or governmental issues compared to internal factors like 
strategic changes in price, advertising, new products, cutting cost, 
M&A etc. Additionally, 29.4% of samples that investigated using 
only external attributions rather than internal attributions. Since 
more relevant information released in the report, it will be beneficial 
for analysts and investors to compare different underlying 
companies, hence increase the transparency. 
In hindsight, a bad performance will definitely lead to a low 
earnings persistence, thus managers trying to confuse investors in 
the annual report with more complicated words have no significant 
impact. Conversely, there should be an implication that the 
managers are trying to apply every possible mean to obscure the bad 
results. To some extent, Accounting quality is increasingly crucial 
since the earnings persistence has a large potential to be influenced 
artificially.   
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There has been a long time discussing whether bank opacity is 
beneficial or not. Some argue that banks need to be opaque hence 
preserve each loan value at par without discount. Some argue that 
banks need to be transparent to allow better public monitoring thus 
reducing agency cost. Regulators have gradually imposed stricter 
accounting standards to improve accountability of banks. When 
banks manipulate their financial statements, this can increase bank 
opacity and interfere with private governance and official regulation 
of banks.  Banks are found to manipulate earnings in order to 
smooth earnings, match capital target and reduce tax and so 
on(Beatty and Liao, 2011; Jiang, et al 2016). Distortion of financial 
statement will reduce capital allocation efficiency hence drag down 
economic growth. Competition, on the other hand, is also a long-
term topic in banking. The intensity of competition in the banking 
industry has implications for the level of economic vitality, 
including access to finance, the allocation of capital funds, 
monitoring investments and exerting corporate governance. Banks 
like business firms in other industries must attract outside funding in 
competitive capital markets, face competition in product and labor 
markets. Competition plays a significant role in fostering bank 
efficiency.  
How bank competition affects financial quality is under-researched. 
Barth(2009) found that banks allocate capital more efficiently in 
countries that penalize top management team more for manipulation 
in financial reports. However, they do not examine the relationship 
between bank earnings management and competition. Jiang et 
al(2016) examined the connection between competition and 
earnings management, using interstate deregulation as a competition 
shock in the US from 1994, they found first competition could 
mitigate earnings management by reducing agency problem. Second, 
competition would increase bank transparency by facilitating peer-
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firm comparisons. According to Holmstrom (1982), if competition 
encourages more bank entry and more similarity among banks, they 
are easier to mimic with each other thus could establish a more 
accurate benchmark in terms of financial accounting. Hence, a 
competitive market would allow investors and officials to detect 
earnings management easier ex-post, and this would reduce banks’ 
incentive to manipulate financial reports ex-ante (Dichev et al. 
2013).  Due to high competition, peer-comparison has an effective 
impact on earnings management detection. Third, banks might 
reduce earnings management to lower financing cost. Studies show 
that financial accountability has a strong positive effect on reducing 
financing cost in both equity and debt(Graham, Liu and Qiu 2008; 
Lo 2015).  
However, it is still possible that banks would be more opaque due to 
an increase of competition. Shleifer(2004) finds that stronger 
competition can stimulate executives to behave unethically, which 
including more earnings management. Competition would also 
increase the banks M&A activities, which spur higher earnings 
manipulation. For example, bank managers might use more earnings 
management to protective themselves from being acquired even if 
this manipulation increase the cost of capital(Armstrong, et al 2012). 
Also, high competition would also induce managers to report less 
poor outcomes. Therefore, how competition would impact on 
earnings management could go either way.  In Jiang et al(2016), a 
gravity model of competition was used to measure the exogenous 
shock on competition of each state. They found that competition has 
a strong impact on earnings management and this effect is negative 
and significant. This indicates that competition would reduce 
earnings management. Their results are robust after considering the 
effect of deregulation itself on financial quality. As well as using 
restatement as alternative measures. However, this study mainly 
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uses loan loss provisions as potential earnings management 
measures. It is still worthwhile to research bank earnings persistence.  
The recent financial crisis draws attention on the dark side of bank 
financial accounting. Flannery et al (2013) find that banks are 
unusually opaque during the financial crisis.  The bank's equity 
trading behaviors are more volatile during the crisis period. 
Meanwhile, they discovered that banks’ financial accounting 
composition has a significant impact on banks’ equity opacity. It is 
still difficult to discover which specific subject of accounting 
standard would explain this type of opacity. During the financial 
crisis period, market participants become unsure about the portfolios 
held by financial institutions. They lose confidence in evaluating the 
intrinsic value of portfolio based on traditional methods. Because 
during the crisis, the insolvency risk rises as the whole economy has 
a downward trend. For example, the market is extremely illiquid 
because the interbank lending market froze during the financial 
crisis. A key issue in over-cautions about counterparty risk is 
opacity. When financial institutions are unable to read enough 
information about counterparties, the lending markets halt(Pritsker, 
2010).  
Credit flows from banks to firms are not efficient when there is a 
substantial amount of impaired assets in the bank’s balance sheet. 
Because there is a strong asymmetric information problem between 
outsiders and insiders in terms of determining the asset value. In 
addition, this type of asymmetric information would lead market 
participants to undervalue banks’ assets pool overall, thus lowering 
the overall bank assets value. In result, this would increase the cost 
of financing by overstating the underinvestment problem(Myers and 
Majlfuf, 1984). During the financial crisis, the US government 
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implemented a troubled asset relief program and public-private 
investment program to increase the possibility that banks have 
enough reserve to keep credit flows. In addition, after 2009, a stress 
testing was implemented to particularly test the insolvency risk of 
the systemic important banks. After stress testing result release, 
market participants have stronger confidence in investment banks, 
which resulting in a lower financing cost. Most large financial 
institutions are able to issue equities after the announcement of 
stress test results. Banks might issue equity to either meet regulatory 
requirements or as an extra reserve of capital. 
There is a possibility that bank opacity makes a huge contribution to 
the recent financial crisis. Recent studies show that rating agencies 
have more disagreement in terms of banks rather nonfinancial firms 
(Morgan, 2002). Bank assets composition has a strong connection 
with rating disagreement. Some argue that disagreements increase 
because of the different status of capital ratio. Also, Hirtle(2006) 
discovered a strong market reaction after CEOs have certified 
financial statements. Stock price increases significantly as they 
perceive this as a signal of reduction in opacity. Morgan(2010) state 
that banks are neither totally opaque nor totally transparent. In 
addition, rating agencies normally issue a lower credit rating for 
unsolicited banks compared to those solicited ones. Because it is 
much more difficult for a rating agency to acquire information from 
unsolicited banks.  
Banks might have lots of earnings management during the financial 
crisis, and indeed much of government’s interventions during the 
financial crisis. Since the government face difficulties in judging 
solvent and insolvent institutions. Flannery et al(2013) apply three 
different factors to test bank opacity. First, the bid and ask spread of 
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a bank would reflect informative of an asset. Since a higher spread 
indicates that traders hold information that unknown to each other. 
A market maker, therefore, quotes a wider spread to protect herself 
from losing money when engaging into uninformed counterparties. 
This bid-ask spread difference might be more significant for banks 
since banks involve underwriting and loan monitoring, which is 
particularly difficult for external investors to observe. Second, they 
use the extent to which trades have a permanent effect on a stock’s 
price as an indicator of information opacity. If the trade is more 
transparent, then the price changes upon stock would less likely to 
reverse. Specifically, if traders are informed, they will move the 
stock price towards its intrinsic values. However, if the traders are 
not informed, they are not able to influence stock price permanently. 
In another word, if the information is more opaque, then its impact 
on stock price would be more permanent. Kyle(1985) states that 
insiders have more information about an asset’s future payoffs.  
Third, they employ trading volume to indicate opacity among banks. 
However, there is no expectation of the relationship between trading 
volume and financial accounting quality. When a bank is more 
opaque, the trading would increase, because there is more 
disagreement between traders. On the other hand, if more 
information is disclosed, trading can be stopped because price 
precisely reflects all information. 
Loan loss provisions are so far the most reliable subject in financial 
accounting to allow banks to manipulate earnings. The change in the 
effect of loan loss provision on regulatory capital calculations 
during the pre-BASEL and BASEL period affect the bank earnings 
management in financial accounting.  In the pre-BASEL period, 
there is an opposite effect of the loan loss provision on earnings vs 
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capital requirement imposed by regulators. Thus, if a bank has low 
capital ratio they could easily increase loan loss provision to make a 
higher capital ratio, on the contrary, banks might report lower 
earnings. Beatty(1995) discovers a negative correlation between 
capital ratio and loan loss provisions in the pre-BASEL period. This 
suggests that bank use loan provisions match capital requirement.  
The capital adequacy requirement was first adopted in early 1990, 
the initial requirement is only the minimum capital ratio. Since more 
loan loss provision was related to a higher capital ratio. The 
regulatory capital counts in loan loss allowances. After BASEL 
enacting, loan loss allowance was not considered into capital 
adequacy calculation anymore. So Tier 1 capital decrease with loan 
loss provisions in the new regime, and loan loss allowance was 
counted into Tier2 capital. In this context, banks with low capital 
might reduce provisions to avoid violation of minimum capital 
requirement. The negative correlation between earnings 
management using discretionary loan loss provisions and regulatory 
capital is more pronounced after the BASEL accord. Also, Beatty et 
al(2002) found that public banks tend to use discretionary loan loss 
provisions more to beat earnings forecast. This indicates that banks 
have different incentives in terms of earnings manipulation. 
The change of financial reporting in banking has a strong impact on 
earnings manipulation incentives. It makes the measurement of 
earnings management difficult across time. Most common widely 
applied model is discretionary loan loss provision model. There 
have been multiple models to estimate earnings management, most 
of them are cross-sectional models. But different models have 
different assumptions of control variables, which explain the 
variation of loan loss provisions. For example, some are considered 
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loan charge-offs and loan loss allowance as exogenous variables 
that could explain the loan loss provisions. On the other hand, some 
are considered loan loss allowance and charge-offs as discretionary 
parts of banks. So far, there is no consensus on which model is the 
best measure of earnings management. Discretionary loan loss 
provision model is the most prominent model in measuring earnings 
management. But it is still possible that banks use other reporting 
discretion to manage reported earnings and regulatory capital. Also, 
it is possible that banks use gains and loss from available for sale 
securities to manipulate earnings. And the one time change in 
accounting for post-retirement benefits also could provide an 
opportunity to find accounting discretions.  
Due to the particularity of banks, earnings management for bank 
researchers has been mainly focused on discretionary loan loss 
provisions. But it is worth noting that banks could use other 
methods to manipulate earnings. It becomes increasingly popular to 
study earnings management from realized gain and loss from 
available for sale securities in banks. A on-going research by Barth 
et al.,(2017) show that banks use AFS realized gains and losses to 
manage earnings and regulatory capitals.  AFS is the largest 
category of securities on the balance sheet of a bank. Banks are 
detected by using AFS to avoid reporting losses, smoothing 
earnings and take a big bath if needed. This item has been widely 
showed that banks would also put their discretion and achieve the 
target in some way. The opportunistically application of earnings 
management via AFS is a general phenomenon.  
Accounting Standard Codification (320) suggests a new treatment 
of available for sale securities in 1993.  Prior that time, investments 
securities were measured using the amortization method. Upon that, 
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each bank needs to disclose the fair value of all investment 
securities. But banks were not required to report their income or 
losses of those securities, they will be finally realized as the gain or 
loss into earnings. ASC 320 requires all entities, including banks, to 
separate securities into three different ways. First, banks need to 
report securities that plan to sell in the near future into Trading 
securities. Secondly, banks need to report securities that plan to hold 
to maturity in to hold to maturity. Thirdly, banks need to report 
securities that are not for trading or hold either as available for sale 
securities. This act also allows banks to switch HTM securities to 
available for sale securities. Now, available for sale securities 
becomes the biggest securities categories.  There are two parts of 
AFS: realized gains and losses are reported into income statement 
that would impact on financial earnings; unrealized gains and losses 
are reported in other comprehensive income that would not affect 
net income. The way of realization could be various, for example, 
banks could sell securities or dispose of them. Securities could also 
be impaired that is deemed other than temporary. However, 
unrealized gains and losses of AFS would no affect final earnings of 
a bank. Regarding capital requirement, unrealized gains and losses 
from AFS debt or equities are not considered from Tier 1 capital but 
realized one does.  Therefore, it is possible that banks manipulate 
realized gains or losses from AFS to meet capital requirement. It is 
better for banks to manipulate earnings using AFS rather than 
trading or HTM. That is because the trading category is measured at 
fair value and HTM is too costly and risky. 
After ASC 320, securities are now required to all reported as fair 
value, while they are subjected to changes in fair value recognition, 
and this recognition is realized in the comprehensive income rather 
than the income part. Therefore, ASC 320 does not disallow banks 
to manipulate earnings by selectively reporting realized gains and 
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loses. The difference is that the realized gains and losses will go to 
net income directly or comprehensive income on the other hand. 
AFS does not only affect earnings through realization but also affect 
regulatory capital. Barth et al(2017) find that banks with low 
regulatory capital will realize more net gains from AFS, in order to 
increase the capital. Furthermore, banks, in general, will use 
available for sale securities to manipulate earnings make it more 
persistent, which is consistent with traditional earnings management 
literature. It is interesting to find out that banks will still smooth 
earnings disregard of high or low regulatory capital.  
Whether banks use AFS to take a big bath is also tested in their 
paper. Empirically, if banks are earnings positively, they would like 
to use AFS for smoothing earnings, while if they are losing earnings, 
AFS is more likely to be manipulated for a big bath. In addition, big 
bath has been constrained if banks have a low regulatory capital, 
thus indicating that a negative connection between capital 
requirement and earnings management.  
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Chapter 3 
Competition and bank profit persistence 
 
3.1 Abstract 
We examine the impact of competition on bank earnings persistence 
by exploiting a natural experiment following interstate banking 
deregulation that increased bank competition. We find that bank 
earnings adjustment speed increases after their states implement this 
deregulation. We find the impact from the competition on earnings 
persistence is solid and consistent using Lerner index as bank-level 
competition measure and a battery of placebo tests. Despite the 
negative impact of the competition on profit persistence, we didn’t 
find any particular situation that alleviates or strengthen this 
tie(regarding profitability, Gaps).   
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3.2 Introduction 
Bank earnings persistence is an important phenomenon and has 
attracted growing debate on the factors that drive such a 
phenomenon (Cumming et al., 2012; Beaver et al., 2012; Gao and 
Zhang, 2015; Peterson et al., 2015; Hui et al, 2016; Buchner et al., 
2016). the competition explanation born by the economics literature 
advocates the view of market competition, which gives rise to mean 
reversion in profitability (Mueller, 1986; Healy and Wahlen, 1999). 
Firms’ ability to sustain earnings is limited by their market power, 
where the greater market competition firms face, the weaker 
earnings persistence will be. In this paper, our main contribution is 
to implement new approaches for identifying the causal impact of 
competition on firm earnings persistence, with a particular focus on 
banks. Our paper is also motivated by the recent debate on the 
association between accounting changes and financial crisis, such as 
the accusation of market value accounting after the 2007-2009 
financial crisis, along with the economic significance of banks’ 
liquidity and capital provision requirements, which reveals the vital 
economic role of bank accounting (Beatty and Liao, 2014). 
We exploit the cross-state, cross-time variations in the removal of 
interstate bank branching prohibitions to identify an exogenous 
increase in bank competition. The introduction of the Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) in 1994 by the US 
authorities relaxed geographical restrictions to bank expansion 
across state borders. This relaxation enhances competition by 
enabling banks to enter into new markets in other states, thereby 
allowing them to compete with those banks in the local markets 
(DeYoung, 2010; Rice and Strahan, 2010).  
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Our approaches have significant advantages over those employed by 
the extant research.  The main drawback of prior research on the 
influence of competition on earnings persistence is that they are 
hardly able to establish a causal relationship between competition 
and earnings persistence. These studies quantify competition by 
using measures such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the 
Lerner Index (see, e.g., Berger et al., 2000; Goddard et al., 2004; 
Goddard et al., 2011; Healy et al., 2014). Importantly, simply taking 
competition as an exogenous variable in a regression model can be 
seriously misleading because the earnings ability of a bank may 
affect its competitive position and its survival. For example, 
persistent earnings may entice new entrants into the market and 
hence, increase competition. On the other hand, persistent earnings 
may enhance the capability of existing firms in preventing new 
entrants into the market, thereby curbing additional competition. 
Moreover, omitted variables in a model could influence both 
competition and earnings persistence. We deal with the endogeneity 
concern by exploiting an exogenous shift in bank earnings 
persistence as a result of interstate bank branching deregulation. 
Following Rice and Strahan (2010), we create a variable called 
IBBEA restriction index, which increases with the extent of 
interstate branching deregulation restrictions in a state. Hence, an 
increase in the IBBEA restriction index indicates a decrease in bank 
competition.  
We use a comprehensive dataset of the US banking industry for the 
period between 1986 and 2013 and our final sample includes 15,546 
unique banks with 226,153 firm-year observations. In our main 
analysis, we focus on the period of five years before and five years 
after the year when the IBBEA act was introduced in each state. The 
benefits of studying the banking industry are two-fold: First, our 
focus on a single homogenous industry removes the challenges of 
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defining the market where a firm competes, thereby removing the 
potential bias in industry identification that is overly broad or 
unduly narrowly defined. Second, the focus of analyzing the 
banking sector eliminates the concern of conglomerates that operate 
in different industries and thus face competitions in different 
markets.  
We start by investigating whether banks adjust their earnings with a 
faster speed in states that implement the IBBEA and deregulate 
interstate banking within their borders to a great extent. We find that 
an increase in the branching restriction index, lead to a decrease in 
bank earnings adjustment speed. This evidence indicates a negative 
relationship between competition and earnings persistence, which is 
in line with the prediction of the economic theory. These findings 
hold after controlling for bank and time fixed effects, a wide array 
of time-varying bank characteristics, such as size, risk, capital-asset 
ratio, efficiency, and the macroeconomic conditions, such as GDP 
growth, inflation and GDP per capita in each state. Thus, our main 
findings support that both effects matter for earnings persistence of 
banks. Next, we conduct a host of robustness tests to ensure that our 
findings are not driven by potential biases in the sample or due to 
alternative explanations, and we find that they do not.  
In addition to our major contribution in identifying the causal 
impact of competition on bank earnings adjustment speed, we 
examine an alternative potential explanation of our main findings 
that competition leads to higher bank earnings adjustment speed. 
Market competition can act as an external governance mechanism to 
prevent managerial slack and protect the interest of shareholders 
(Dechow et al., 2010).  
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3.3 Literature Review  
Economic scholars tend to believe that competition could directly 
impact earnings persistence. Economic competition theory points 
out that competition could erode away all economic excessive 
returns and losses in the long run, so the market profitability level 
will converge toward a long-term equilibrium (Stigler, 1961; 
Mueller, 1977, 1986; Berger et al., 2000; Goddard et al., 2011). 
More specific, the excessive profit currently possessed by a firm 
could attract new competitors entering the market. Then, the new 
competing firms enter into the market by offering the similar or the 
same product at a lower price, leading to the decrease of profit 
margins. This process will not stop until the firms’ profitability 
reaches the average profit rate of the market. For firms with the 
profits under the market average will receive precaution from 
investors to reach the market average level in a short time. 
Otherwise, investors will withdraw their investment, resulting in the 
exit of the underperformed firms from the market. Thus, 
competition could directly reduce earnings persistence.   
There is a strong presumption in economics that the profitability is 
mean reverting, the basic logic behind this theory is the 
competition-profit persistence view: successful companies with 
advantages enable them to earn abnormal profits above the average 
are expected to try to maintain this advantages. However, the 
current success will attract more imitations, which will erode the 
abnormal profits. Schohl(1989)argued that competing firms will 
enter the market by offering comparable products at lower prices, 
thus reducing the profit margins. This is a continuous process until 
the market has met the average value of the economy. By contrast, if 
the profitability of a firm is lower than the market average, there 
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will be disinvestment, inducing a possible quit. Hence the long-run 
profitability will converge.   
Although firms seek to maintain its profitability and strive to 
counter the mean reverting process, they are typically under the 
economic laws of competition (Aghion 2002). The outperformed 
firms are subjected to a lot of new competitors as well as the 
pressure from incumbents.  New firms are that bring innovative 
technology can easily snatch away the abnormal earnings from the 
existing outperformers. The incumbents will benefit from the 
spillover effects through competition, which allows them to adjust 
faster and learn quicker, therefore again reduce the abnormal 
earnings from the existing outperformers.  By contrast, if the 
incumbents cannot survive the process by improving the 
profitability, they will either quit or forced to bankrupt soon, which 
will further accelerate the mean-reverting speed.  
The competitive environment hypothesis is one of the basic ideas in 
mainstream economic theory. When the market is not in equilibrium, 
the firm can earn excess profits due to its comparative advantages. 
The adjustment of resources and output into areas earning excess 
profits and away from areas earning below average profits will, in 
time, tend to bring returns back towards the firm’s cost of capital 
(Jacobson and Hansen, 2001). This adjustment is ‘the competitive 
process’ and the speed at which these abnormal returns dissipate is 
of fundamental importance to the firm because it impacts the value 
of any strategic initiative.  
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Based on Mueller(1977), the requirement is the market is 
sufficiently free for exit and entry. With this premise, the abnormal 
profit will be eliminated rapidly and all firms’ profit rates tend to 
converge towards an identical long-run average value. He tests how 
fast the market eliminates the abnormal profits. If the company 
strived to intervene the market competitiveness, in which way, for 
example, erect entry barriers through increased product 
differentiation, obtain legal protection such as patents, tariffs etc, 
thus preserving the existing monopoly, then the profit persistence 
will be last much longer. Additionally, He finds that the profit rate 
and market share are positively related, it underpins the hypothesis 
that a company with high profitability makes effort to keep their 
monopoly position hence maintain the profit persistence. Similarly, 
Persistence in profits may reflect the existence of impediments to 
product market competition, which generates market power in 
output markets, and informational opacity, which generates market 
power in input markets, Without market power, relatively high 
performance by a firm would be eliminated reasonably quickly as 
other firms enter its local market, imitate its transparent techniques 
or strategies, bid for its most profitable customers, or bid up the 
price of its managerial talent. Similarly, poorly performed firms 
would be forced by competitive pressures to exit the industry or 
imitate the strategies or bid for the customers and managers of the 
firms performing at the high end of the distribution. Such logic 
suggests that a firm’s market power can have significant influences 
on its persistence in excess returns. (Berger.A.N et al,2000). 
Since incumbents in highly concentrated industries might have the 
ability (market power) to prevent entry and therefore might be able 
to enjoy a higher degree of profit persistence (Yamawaki, 1989; 
Gschwandtner and Cuaresma, 2008), bank concentration measure 
might have a positive impact on bank profit persistence. However, 
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empirical evidence on this relationship is not clear (see 
Gschwandtner,2005; Yurtoglu, 2004; Kambhampati, 1995; Waring, 
1996; Geroski and Jacquemin, 1988; Scherer and Ross, 1990). 
One example of creating barriers is Isolating 
mechanisms(Rumelt ,1987), such as information impactedness 
(tacitness) that creates ambiguity on the part of competitors that 
prevents competitor response, organizational structures and 
incentives that make competitors slow to respond, buyer switching 
costs that create loyalty to the brand, the degree of innovativeness 
on the part of the firm and its competitors, and the manner in which 
the firm chooses to exploit its advantage, interact to determine the 
persistence of return. Profitable firms that face lower barriers to 
entry likely to see their profits eroded by competitors, therefore 
leading to a higher speed of mean reverting. Under-performed firms 
are more likely to quit the market voluntarily in order to seek higher 
rents. Because the lower rents in this market lead to an attractive 
situation.  This kind of competition is referred to as product market 
competition. This kind of competition varies significantly across 
industries. For the banking industry, the legal barriers are the major 
determinant of market competition. Most banks are subjected to 
government regulations on capital requirements, loan portfolio, 
securitization and off-balance sheet behavior and other factors. The 
market is also quite opaque since all information within this 
industry is highly confidential which leads to a lower process of 
mean reversion.  
A highly competitive market with low or without entry and exit 
barriers will accelerate the speed of imitations, therefore eliminate 
the economic value.  So if there is intense competition, the 
persistence should be weak, companies those keep generating 
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abnormal incomes in a specific period will have lower abnormal 
profits in the subsequent periods. If the competition is less intense, 
the profitability differences between firms may be expected to be 
more persistent(Glen.J et al,2001). There are two cases here: 1) 
profitable firms with firm-specific advantages are likely to be 
successful in the future, and 2) the current success of a firm may 
have adverse effects on future profitability of the firm because of 
the imitation from competitors. The industry growth rate can be one 
indicator to explain the competition-persistence view, it might be 
more difficult for incumbents to maintain the market share and 
oligopolistic position in a slowed growing industry, on the contrary, 
in a rapid growth industry, the companies can maintain their price 
since the demand is increasing thus keep the profit differentials. It 
might also lead to high profitability persistence because the 
competition of price is low.  
Based on this theory, there are two ways to maintain profit 
persistence, they are either putting efforts toward innovation thus 
obtain technological advantages or impose pressure on the market to 
reduce the competitiveness.  A research from Roberts(1999) 
focusing on the pharmaceutical industry in the US indicating that 
the profit persistence positively correlated with the Innovation, 
which proved the technological advantages help maintain the profit 
persistence. He assumes innovation propensity will positively help 
companies keep abnormal profits, and competition will adversely 
influence the profit persistence. However, he did not find any 
empirical results between profit persistence and competition. In 
addition, the pharmaceutical industry is particular because it is 
heavily depending on the R&D and patent protections.  However, 
from this study, we can assure that the internal breakthrough is a 
valid way to maintain abnormal return. The abnormal return does 
not pertain via the maintain method, the pharmaceutical companies 
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use their new innovative products to generate new profits.  This is 
an evident instance about how to keep an out-performed 
profitability level.  For the pharmaceutical industry, the imposing of 
the competition barrier is the patent that generated from the 
company, because of the protect of patenting. Companies can slow 
the spillover effects that forbid another competitor to mimic the 
products, therefore keep the competitiveness of a specific product. 
The pharmaceutical industry is much simpler than the banking 
because the financial institutions have more competition factors to 
be taken into account. 
‘Quiet Life’ hypothesis (Delis and Tsionas, 2009), on the other hand, 
argues that banks not exposed to competition because of the 
specialty of the banking industry. From his hypothesis, if market 
power prevails, bank managers may pursue objectives other than 
profit maximization, and they do not have incentives to work hard 
to sustain their profits level from the previous year. Hence, market 
power may have an adverse impact on the firm’s profit persistence. 
This is phenomenon is very counterfactual since the behavior of 
bank managers is not plausible in an aggregate way, but it may 
explain some kind of specialty of the banking industry.  In the 
traditional mean reversion study, the capital market effects have 
been considered as a predominant factor in determining the mean-
reverting speed. But for the banking industry, this factor becomes 
ambiguous, because of the banking industry itself dominant the 
effectiveness of capital market somehow. Sometimes, the max 
profitability is not the primary concern of banks. Rather than that, 
the banks may concern more like a capital requirement, risk control 
etc. All these factors make the banking industry hard to predict in 
terms of profit persistence.  So it is rather difficult to predict the 
impact of competition on profit persistence.  
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As banks expand the scope of their activities and identify new 
growth opportunities across national borders, they tend to gain 
market power (Arsis, 2009). The increasing market power of banks 
may improve their abilities to create entry barriers, protect its 
transparent techniques or strategies, bid for its most profitable 
customers, or bid up the price of its managerial talent, and 
consequently increase their abilities to sustain profits from the 
previous year (Berger et al, 2000). The US banking has experienced 
significant changes in regulation, technology, and financial 
engineering techniques. After the financial deregulation on deposit 
prices and geographic expansion, regulators move their attention to 
capital adequacy standards, banks are somehow under heavy 
surveillance after the financial crisis. Before 1981, the US had no 
specific numerical capital adequacy standards, it was the regulators 
responsibility to judge how much capital a bank should hold, after 
1981, the first explicit numerical capital requirements for those 
biggest banks were issued, now the Basel agreements have more 
detailed requirements on each tier of banking assets, obviously, 
regulative agreements will be the impediments to competition, as 
well as increase the barrier on entry . However, the managerial 
assets as loan loss provisions,  give the bank managers potential 
space to manipulate the financial reports.   
According to Berger A.N et al(2000), the profit persistence of US 
banking is sensitive to macroeconomic shocks as well as 
impediments to competition and informational opacity.  This 
phenomenon can be summarized in two aspects, firstly, the market 
follows the economic theory that a more competitive environment 
erodes the abnormal profits thus reduce the consistency of the banks’ 
profit. Secondly, banks are pro-cyclicality which means the profit 
persistence should be influenced by the macroeconomic factors, 
presenting upwards(expansion)and downwards(recession) trend 
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within the period, if the banks can offset the positive and negative 
effects imposed by the outside macro-factors, it is plausible that 
managers are using accounting methods to hide its ‘true profit’. 
Schipper(1989) and Healy and Wahlen(1999) state that managers 
can use their discretion in financial reporting to overstate the true 
level of earnings as well as to hide the unwelcomed earnings losses. 
Mostly, the earnings management aims to mislead the outside 
investors, a smoothly positive earnings streams are able to 
consequently influence the stock price. According to Degeorge et 
al.(1999) and Burgastahler et al. (1997), between 1976 and 1994, 
the annual earnings of US firms shows a relatively smoothed single-
peaked, bell-shaped distribution expected in the area of zero 
earnings, it suggests that firms managed to report earnings higher to 
avoid loss when the losses are relatively small. Meanwhile, 
Burgastahler et al. (1997) also find that the US firms employed 
accounting discretion to avoid the small decrease in earnings when 
earnings are positive.  Hence maintain the profit persistence target.  
So the determinants of profit persistence are ambiguous.  
Based on the two facts, how the bank mangers strive to maintain the 
persistence of profit is worth digging. On the hand, for example, 
they can impose pressure on the regulators thus enhance the barrier 
of entry and exit, meanwhile, the managers can maintain the 
information disclosure on a limited level thus increase the 
informational opacity. On the other hand, in order to offset the 
cyclical impact from external macroeconomic factors, managers can 
apply financial reporting techniques such as big bath, window-
dressing etc., therefore artificially influence the earnings that 
reported.    
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The key two determinants of competition and accounting quality 
will be measured via Lerner-index and specific accounting quality 
indicator respectively. Since the existing empirical studies have 
employed market-level market power proxies such as concentration 
ratios or Herfindahl indices, while no study, to the author’s 
knowledge, has ever used a bank-level measure of market power to 
account for the possibility that different banks operating in the same 
market might have different market power. This paper is able to fill 
this gap by investigating the impact of bank-level market power on 
profit persistence. Furthermore, the newly introduced comparison of 
accounting quality and market power on profit persistence can give 
a deep inspiration for how the bank managers’ behaviors are 
influences the profit persistence. 
Goddard.J, Liu Hong, Molyneux P, Wilson. J O.S(2011)test the 
competition on banking profitability in a universal scale including 
65 countries resulting in a greater size of GDP, a high rate in GDP 
growth(which implicitly indicates more competitive market) reduce 
the persistence rapidly. Furthermore, the persistence is positively 
correlated with the size of entry barriers, proving that high market 
power help maintains profits persistence. However, empirical 
evidence on this relationship is not clear. Previous studies examined 
the relationship between bank market power and profit persistence 
by measuring market power as bank concentration variables, (for 
example, Gschwandtner,2005; Yurtoglu, 2004; Kambhampati, 1995; 
Waring, 1996; Geroski and Jacquemin, 1988; Scherer and Ross, 
1990; Berger et al, 2000). The higher the concentration ratio, the 
higher market power banks may have. The main advantage of using 
bank-level market power is to allow for heterogeneity. In addition, 
by employing bank-level data, various different factors that 
influence bank short-run profit persistence can be examined. 
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On the other hand, incorporating different attitudes into the 
accounting system by the managers is necessary. Tomy.R.E(2012) 
argue that the earning persistence is significantly influenced by the 
economic cycle since the managers have incentives to apply 
accounting method to ‘change’ profits that reported. He finds that 
firms’ earnings are most persistent during an expansion, least 
persistent during a recession, which implies that mangers have 
employed accounting method to influence the earnings in order to 
lead a more persistent profit. However, the firms measured in this 
paper are all manufacturing and consumer durables industries, 
which imply that the samples themselves are pro-cyclicality, it is 
plausible that the impacts from the economic cycle dummies are 
magnified.  It is controversial whether banks are sensitive to those 
factors. Beatty and Liao(2011) tried to find the recession impact on 
banking lending willingness associated with the regulatory capital 
ratios show a profile how the managers tried to revise the assets 
structure in order to meet the capital requirements when the market 
is under recession or expansion. This indicates the bank managers 
have applied accounting techniques to meet targets when the 
economic cycle is changing.   
This paper aims to measure the impact of market power and 
earnings management on the profit persistence from a bank level 
perspective. The Partial adjustment model is applied for the main 
stage analysis. The paper is organized as follows: regarding profit 
persistence studies so far, section2 discuss the mainstream of 
literature from both competition and accounting quality perspectives.  
Section 3 presents the methodology that adopted within each stage 
of research. Section 4 summarizes data and section 5 states the 
results we found from estimations. Section 5 concludes the findings. 
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3.4 Methodology 
This paper will use a two-step approach to conduct the analysis. The 
first step will focus on the persistence of profits, here the partial 
adjustment model is applied to determine the profit persistence 
level. Full model will be explained next. Then in the second step, 
we run regressions on these calculated profit persistence coefficients 
against a vector of bank-specific determinant factors, including 
market power, initial profitability, bank size, growth, managerial 
efficiency (cost to income ratio), diversification, etc., while 
controlling for macro-economic condition variables, such as real 
GDP growth, inflation rate, etc. 
3.4.1 The identification strategy of competition 
Prior studies use different measures, such as country survey index, 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, and the Lerner Index, to measure 
competition at the country, industry, firm or product level (Healy et 
al., 2014; Goddard et al., 2004; Goddard et al., 2011; Berger et al., 
2000). These measures, however, cannot address the endogeneity 
issues between competition and earnings persistence because 
unobservable cross-sectional heterogeneity could impact both 
competition and earnings persistence, which is the simultaneity 
effect. On the other hand, earnings persistence may, in fact, cause 
competition, which is the reverse causality effect. For example, 
persistent earnings may indicate better business operations, 
continuous profits, increasing stock prices and lower debt costs (Lin 
et al., 2013) and hence, can attract new competitor entrants. 
Alternatively, persistent earnings may increase the capability of 
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existing firms in preventing new entrants into the market, resulting 
in less competition.   
We use Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, which 
relaxes geographical restrictions on bank expansion crossing state 
borders enacted by the US authorities in 1994, as an exogenous 
shock to document the causality between competition and earnings 
persistence. This deregulation increases competition by reducing 
entry barriers in most US states and creates growth opportunities for 
banks through geographic diversification (Goetz et al., 2013). 
Differences in the extent of entry barrier reduction in each state 
create variations in the potential increase in banking competition in 
each state. It is important that interstate bank deregulation is 
exogenous to bank earnings persistence. Interstate banking 
restrictions shielded banks from competition before the1970s but 
since the late 1970s, innovations in technology and finance diminish 
the effect of these restrictions.  
Then, developments in data processing, telecommunications, and 
credit scoring erode the popularity of local banks, leading to the 
lower willingness of banks to make efforts to maintain restrictive 
regulations. There is no empirical evidence, in turn, to show that 
banks’ earnings persistence affects the timing of deregulation. Thus, 
this Act of interstate bank deregulation tends to be a disordered act 
that provides a valuable research laboratory for assessing the 
influence of competition on banks’ earnings persistence. There are 
also several studies applying IBBEA as an exogenous shock to firm 
financing (Rice and Strahan, 2010; Wu, 2016), firm innovation 
(Cornaggia et al., 2015; Amore et al., 2013), bank liquidity (Shenoy 
and Williams, 2015) and market valuation of bank holding 
companies (Goetz et al., 2013).  
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Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) was 
passed in 1994 and completed in 1997. It allows bank holding 
companies to acquire banks across states (effective in 1995) and to 
expand across states (effective in 1997) (Rice and Strahan, 2010). 
Regarded as the watershed event, IBBEA indicates the end of an era 
of geographic restrictions on bank expansion which could trace back 
to the 19th century (Rice and Strahan, 2010). However, in the 
meantime, this Act also allows states to erect barriers to branch 
expansion. Some states make use of this provision by prohibiting 
out-of-state banks from opening or acquiring branches, by requiring 
the minimum age of bank branches that could be acquired, or by 
mandating the maximum amount of deposits that banks could hold. 
Therefore, IBBEA increases banks’ competition in each state while 
the magnitude of increased competition in each estate is different, 
due to the provision of IBBEA. Thus, following Johnson and Rice 
(2008), we use branching restriction index to capture the magnitude 
of competition change in each state. To be specific, the IBEEA is an 
ordinal index that ranges from 0 to 4, 0 means the highest 
competition while 4 indicates lowest competition.   
3.4.2 Bank level competition: Adjusted Lerner index 
The Lerner index is a widely employed measure of market power 
that reveals the degree to which a bank can enhance its marginal 
price beyond its marginal cost (Jiménez et al., 2013). Higher index 
values indicate greater market power. Compared with another 
commonly used measure of bank competition, such as HHI, C5 and 
the Rosse–Panzar measure, the Lerner index is a bank-level measure 
of competition, rather than a country-level measure of competition. 
This advantage is important because banking markets could be local 
in nature, leading to the inaccuracy of measuring competition at the 
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national level. We thus adopt the Lerner Index as our alternative 
measure of bank competition, consistent with recent work on bank 
competition (Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2007; Berger et al., 
2009; Beck et al., 2013; Fungáčová et al., 2014; Ryan et al., 2014). 
We further adjust the Lerner Index by subtracting it from 1 to 
indicate the bank level competition. 
The Lerner index is computed as the ratio of the difference between 
the price of output and marginal cost to the price. The price of 
output refers to the average price of bank production measured by 
total assets, defined as the ratio of total revenues to total assets. The 
marginal cost is predicted on the basis of a translog cost function 
with one output factor (total assets) and three input price factors 
(labor price, physical capital price, and borrowed funds price). Then, 
we add bank- and year-fixed effects into our cost function to control 
of heterogeneity of our sample. Input prices are subject to symmetry 
and linear homogeneity restrictions. The cost function is specified 
as:  
LnTCit= "# +"%&'()*% Witj+%( ")+&',(+*%()*% itj-&',itk+.%&'/0it+%(-.((&'/0i
t)2+ -.()&'/0()*%- itLnWitj+2%3/ + %( 2(3/( +243/5'()*% Witj+-263TLnTAit+78    (3) 
Where LTC represents the logarithm of bank’s total costs, Tai is the 
total assets, W1 represents the price of purchased funds equals 
interest expenses/ total deposits and short-term funding, W2 is the 
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price of labor and physical capital equals non-interest expense/ fixed 
assets. T is the time trend that captures the technology influence 
about total cost over the time. From the SFA estimation, a string of 
coefficients is obtained from equation (3), which are going to be 
applied in the following formula to estimate the each bank-years 
marginal cost. 
Then the Marginal cost can be estimated from the following formula: 
MCTAit=(.% + .(5'/0it+ .()5',()*% itj+263/)9:839;83                                                         
(4) 
Finally, the Lerner index can be calculated from equation (2). The 
Lerner index should range from 0 to 1 when it is 0, it means the 
Price is equal to marginal cost, and the underlying bank will have no 
market power. On the contrary, if Lerner equals 1, in other words, 
the marginal cost is equal to 0, representing the underlying bank 
gains the greatest market power. After the estimation of marginal 
costs and the calculation of the price of output, we compute the 
Lerner index for each bank and thus derive a direct measure of bank 
competition for the main estimations. 
3.4.3 The partial adjustment model 
In the partial adjustment model, the banks’ current return level 
(ROA) is a weighted average of its target ROA ratio: 
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ROAit-ROAit-1=  (ROA*it-ROAit-1)+-783                       (3) 
Where ROAit is the return on total asset for bank I at year t. the 
ROA*it is the target return on total asset for bank I at year t.  The  
means the proportional adjustment during one year for bank I, in 
this context, lambda captures how the sample banks are operating 
away from its expected returns. Alternatively, ROA is predicted to 
mean revert to a target level which is ROA* here.  Since our main 
interest is to see how the market competition could influence the 
profit persistence level, the partial adjustment model gives us a 
perfect match to capture each bank’s persistence level.  here is the 
adjustment speed for banks towards target rate, we can simply use 
(1- ) to represent our main persistence measure.  By applying the 
dynamic property of the partial adjustment model, we could 
estimate each bank’s profit persistence level at a time-varying frame.   
Because the expected ROA is unknown in our model, we follow 
Healy, et al(2014) to use a cross-section model to estimate each 
bank’s target ROA.  Then, The ROA* can be determined by: 
ROA*it = .8Xit+Uit+783                      (4) 
Where Xit-1 is a vector of the bank and macroeconomic 
characteristics that can influence the ROA. By considering each 
bank has different idiosyncratic factors that would potentially affect 
the target ROA. We further control the bank fixed effects. In the 
model, The Uit is the fixed effects to control for unobserved firm 
λi
λi
λi
λi
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heterogeneity. Substituting eq(4) into eq(3) and rearranging yields, 
it becomes the following specification: 
ROAit= .8Xit+(1- )ROAit-1+ (Uit)+ 783            (5)           
From equation(5), it can be seen that In the partial adjustment model, 
the bank’s current ROA is a weighted average (with the  between 
0 and 1) of its expected ROA*, and the ROA of its previous period, 
as well as the unobservable fixed effects and random shocks. 
Regarding the adjustment speed, if the  is small, it means the 
adjustment speed is slow, representing a long time for a bank to 
return to its target after a shock the bank’s ROA. On the other hand, 
the (1- ) term before the lag value of ROA in equation (5) is 
treated as an inertial fact in the partial adjustment model. In our 
study, it is the profit persistence level. The smaller the  is, the 
bigger the (1- ) will be, if the bank’s speed of adjustment is equal 
to 0, it means the profit persistence coefficient ‘(1- )will be equal 
to 1, indicating an unchanged profit level forever. However, if the 
(1- ) equals 0, there is not any relationship between the current 
and last period profit, hence there is no persistence in profits. 
In the partial adjustment model, the expected return(ROA*) is 
unavailable and it is not necessarily constant over time. Here we 
follow Fama and French(2006) to build a model to estimate the 
expected ROA.  
λi λi λi
λi
λi
λi
λi
λi
λi
λi
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The cross-sectional model for estimating ROA* can be summarized 
as: 
ROA*it = .# + .% Income Diversificationit + .( Non-Performing 
Loansit+ .4Revenueit +-.6Capital Ratioit +-.<Sizeit +-.=Management 
Efficiencyit   +-.>Loansit +-783          (6) 
Where Income Diversification is the non-interest income to total 
revenue ratio, the variable of Non-performing Loans is the non-
performing loans to total asset ratio, revenue is total revenue to total 
asset ratio and the capital ratio is the total equity to total assets ratio, 
size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Management Efficiency 
is calculated via total costs divided by total revenues and Loans is 
the total net loans over total assets. We follow Healy et al(2014) to 
construct our variables, ensuring that the expect ROA measured is 
suitable for the next stage analysis. 
Our estimation of expected ROA differs from the standard partial 
adjustment model, which is widely used in the capital structure 
measure of the future target of the capital ratio(Flannery and Rangan 
2006). Following the proposal from Healy.P etc(2014), the current 
explanatory variables are used to measure the expected current ROA. 
Differs from the measure of target capital ratio, the current period 
variables should be sufficient to predict the current period expected 
ROA, as long as the expected ROA does not contain the abnormal 
profits, the model will hold. We then plug the explanatory variables 
from equation (6) into equation (5), then the coefficient can be 
measured within one step. We use Fama-Macbeth regression to 
analyze the first stage partial adjustment model, while the estimated 
coefficients are further extracted for determining ROA*.  
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Under the assumption of partial adjustment model, the adjustments 
will be conducted if there is a gap between the expected ROA and 
the actual ROA. Here we use GAP to define the difference between 
them:  
GAPit-1= ROA*it-ROAit-1                                                                      (7) 
In the basic form of Partial adjustment model, the adjustment speed 
is fixed for all the banks across time. In another word, the 
persistence level for banks is firm and time-invariant. In order to test 
whether our competition measures could affect the profit persistence 
level, we need to relax the adjustment speed, and allow it to be firm 
and time variant. we, therefore, modify the partial adjustment model 
by inserting a vector of characteristics to allow the adjustment speed 
to become a dynamic indicator: 
ROAit-ROAit-1=( +-2it-1Z )GAPit-1+-783                       (8) 
Here we assume the lambda is dynamic, it can vary over time and 
banks. From equation(5), we know that the profit persistence is 
determined by the adjustment speed( ), and the persistence 
coefficients is calculated as (1- ), since we assume the partial 
adjustment speed can be influenced by the potential internal and 
external factors, similarly, we can obtain a set of different profit 
persistence coefficients that vary over year and bank.   
λi
λi
λi
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GAPit-1 is calculated as the result of ROA*it-ROAit-1, Z is a vector of 
the bank-level and macroeconomic characteristics. 2 is a vector of 
coefficients, it is the interaction term directly tests how the 
adjustment speed is influenced by the bank’s particular variables 
representing market power(Lerner), deregulation index(IBBEA). 
The estimated coefficients represent the incremental mean reversion 
associated with those three particular indicators. The standard errors 
are clustered both in the firm and year levels to control for serial 
correlation.  To explore which factors are related to the bank-level 
differences upon the adjustment speed. Firstly, we estimate the 
expected ROA from equation(6) to get the GAP, which is calculated 
as ROA*it-ROAit-1. Secondly, we employ equation(8) to test the 
impact from the potential determinants on lambda.   
In addition to those two primary factors that we interested, several 
bank-level control variables and macroeconomic determinants are 
included. All variables are introduced as follows: 
Bank ΔLLP= change loan loss provisions. According to (Kilic, E., 
et al,2012), the bank's managers are able to use hedge derivatives 
and LLP to smooth income. After the SFAS 133, stricter standard 
on accounting required the value of derivatives to be marked to 
market, so banks are inclined to reply more on LLP to smooth the 
profit. The changes in LLP can capture the behavior of banks. It is 
also an indicator that the profit of persistence can be artificially 
affected by accounting methods. 
Bank size = log(total assets). Previous findings are ambiguous on 
the relationship between firms size and profit persistence. A big 
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firm might have reached its present size because of constant 
superior performance; however, there is also evidence of the 
inefficiency of large firms (Yurtoglu, 2004; Gschwandtner, 2005). 
Bank risks = Z-score. We measure bank risk by the Z-score – the 
sum of ROA and equity to assets ratio divided by the standard 
deviation of ROA (the lower the Z-score value, the greater is the 
bank risk). Berger et al. (2000) suggest that high risk positively 
affects earnings persistence during economic expansion periods and 
negatively influences earnings persistence during economic 
recession periods. Firms with low profitability are forced to take 
risks to try to raise their profitability levels and firms with persistent 
profits seem to be associated with lower risk. Mueller (1986) finds 
that the profits of companies with persistently above-normal returns 
seem to vary less over the business cycle than do the profits of the 
average firm and the profits of persistently below-normal companies 
exhibit greater than normal pro-cyclical variability.  
Bank growth = growth rate of the bank assets. We expect a positive 
sign on the growth coefficient as suggested by Yurtoglu (2004). The 
positive relationship between can be explained because high growth 
banks have the better ability as management.  The return is normally 
upward trending, which makes the bank easier to catch their target 
and make the return more persistent. 
Managerial Efficiency = cost to income ratio. With common 
wisdom, we expect that more efficient banks tend to have higher 
profit persistence. This is because higher managerial efficiency 
indicates the higher capability of banks to maintain their 
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profitability. Please be noted, the Managerial Efficiency ratio is 
reversely correlated with the management. Because a higher ratio 
indicates high cost related to income, therefore, we believe this ratio 
is negatively correlated with persistence rate. 
Diversification = non-interest income divided by total revenue 
reflects a business expansion opportunity for banks, contributing to 
an increased ability of banks to sustain their profitability. By 
diversifying into non-traditional banking businesses, banks have 
more sources of income, such as a fee or trading income, rather than 
solely relying on loan business. Hence, banks may have more ability 
to sustain their profits from the previous year. However, theoretical 
and empirical evidence on this is not clear and never examined. 
Therefore, we have no expectation on this relationship. (De Young 
and Rice, 2004; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). 
For macroeconomic-level controls, we apply inflation (Angelini and 
Cetorilli, 2003; Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Boyd et al, 2001; 
Goddard et al., 2011), GDP growth and GDP per capita (Albertazzi 
and Gambacorta, 2009; Goddard et al., 2011). Goddard et al. (2011) 
find that inflation is positively related to earnings persistence of 
banks because under a high inflation environment, the prices of 
financial services, such as interest rates, become less informative 
(Claessens and Laeven, 2004), thereby offering banks more pricing 
power as well as earning manipulation opportunities, resulting in 
higher earnings persistence. GDP growth and GDP per capita could 
help banks increase the persistence of their earnings because GDP 
growth provides banks more business opportunities (Albertazzi and 
Gambacorta, 2009; Goddard et al., 2011). 
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The banking market is less likely to be competitive when it is 
subject to high inflation, as the prices of financial services, such as 
interest rates, are less informative (Claessens and Laeven, 2004), 
and will, in turn, exacerbate credit market frictions (Boyd et al, 
2001). The banks can whether manager to reduce the GAP between 
the expected to profit or maintain their current profitability, the 
impact of inflation can be two sides. A positive relationship is 
expected between real GDP growth and business opportunities for 
banks. Similar, GDP per capita is expected to have a positive impact 
on earnings persistence. The increased business opportunities may 
help banks to sustain their profits. Therefore an association might be 
expected between growth in GDP and the persistence of profit. On 
the other hand, the availability of business opportunities might lead 
to an intensification of competition, in which case a negative 
relationship would be expected between GDP growth and the 
persistence of profit. 
3.5 Data 
To explore the impact of competition on earnings persistence, we 
combine data from several sources. We obtain bank-specific data on 
banks’ balance sheets and income statements from Federal Reserve 
Report of Condition and Income (Call Reports). We link the bank-
specific data to branching restriction index of each state (Johnson 
and Rice, 2008) and macroeconomic information from the World 
Bank database. Finally, our full sample includes 15,546 banks with 
a total of 226153 firm-year observations from 51 states over the 
period of 1986-2013. However, in our main analysis, we focus on 
the ten-year period in which no more than five years are distant 
from the IBBEA introduction year in each state.  
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In the first stage analysis, the dependent variable lambda and three 
independent variables are estimated for the second estimation. To be 
specific, lambda stands for the profit persistence level for each bank. 
Then, Z-score represents the individual bank’s risk, with higher 
value means greater stability. In terms of banks’ market power, the 
Lerner Index measures each bank’s market power ranges from 0 to 
1, banks with high Lerner Index are considered to have strong 
market-power.  
3.6 Summary statistics  
Table 1 displays summary statistics of variables based on the 
IBBEA ten-year window. Appendix I shows the definitions of the 
variables. We winsorize all variables except Size at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles to mitigate the influence of outliers. The mean value of 
target ROA is 1.048% and the mean value of realized ROA is 
0.974%, resulting in a positive GAP of 0.09%. These figures are 
consistent with studies that use the Call Reports database (Beatty et 
al., 2002; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). Branching Restriction Index 
ranges from zero to four and the mean value of this index is 2.06, 
indicating that the US states overall apply IBBEA but create on 
average two barriers for interstate branching. Adjusted Lerner Index 
is equal to 0.8, which is in line with that reported by Cohen et al. 
(2014) and Kothari et al. (2005). The absolute mean value of 
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions (i.e., earnings management) is 
0.44, indicating that earnings management accounts for 0.278% of 
total assets (= 0.44 multiplied by the mean value of Loan to the 
asset).  
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The average Z-score of US banks is around 24. On average, US 
banks lend 63% of their assets as loans and hold 9.8% equity to 
assets ratio. The average size of US banks is 11.3 billion dollars, 
and the average asset growth is equal to 8.7%. The average value of 
costs to income ratio, a proxy for banks’ managerial efficiency, is 
equal to 79.2%. The US banks, on average, generate around 10% of 
total revenue from non-interest income. Both the GDP growth and 
Inflation range from 2% to 3%.  
Regarding the Lerner Index. The correlation coefficient between 
Price and the Marginal cost is as high as 0.79, implying a high direct 
linear relationship between them. According to table1, the Price 
moves from -23% to 665%, with a mean value, stay around 7.7%. 
Besides, the Marginal Cost also deviated significantly with a range 
of (0.005%---333%), however, the average figure of Marginal Cost 
is close to Price(4.6%). After the basic calculation, the Lerner Index 
is obtained, with an average value of 0.30. The highest value is 0.60.  
In addition, in Appendix 2, we input the summary statistics for 
different states across all the sample period. In which, N indicates 
the total observation for each state, Persistence of ROA is estimated 
using the first stage estimation(equation 6), and the detail results 
will be discussed in the very following section. The persistence 
level here is static and not dynamic, it means the statistics here 
illustrate the overall persistence rate across the sample period. 
ROA* is target ROA that also estimated via first stage regression. 
GAP is the estimated using ROA*it-ROAit-1. And finally, the 
Branching Restrictions is the IBBEA index that indicates the state 
level competition intensity. Take New York as an example, the 
persistence level is around 56.31 %, comparing to the overall 
average of 54.67%. New York banks have a slightly higher 
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persistence degree.  Meanwhile, the ROA is 0.87% which is lower 
than the all-state average of 0.97%. Target ROA has been over 1%, 
showing that most banks in New York have not met their 
expectation of profitability. Therefore we got a positive GAP 
around 0.1%. The states with the highest persistence ratio are 
Vermont (72.9%) and with the lowest ratio is Dis of 
Columbia(26.2%).  Overall, the ROA for each state is close to 1%, 
the standard deviation is mighty small, and the target ROA is as 
expected slightly higher than the realized ROA, showing that bank 
does set their profitability target progressive based on the realized 
ones.  Most of the statistics are estimates that collected from first 
stage regression, therefore in the next stage, the first stage analysis 
will be explained and discussed.  
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics for banks during the period of five years before and five years 
after the year when the IBBEA act was introduced in each state. ROA* is estimated using the first 
stage of the partial adjustment model, ROAit =λi훽iXit-1 + (1- λi) ROAit-1+ 휀it, GAPit=ROA*it-1-ROAit-1.  
ΔROA= ROAit-ROAit-1. We use Fama-Macbeth regression to estimate the ROA* in the first stage. 
Appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Name Observations Mean Std.dev Minimum Maximum 
Target ROA(ROA*) 77929 1.048 0.530 -2.834 2.424 
ROA 77929 0.974 0.723 -4.440 2.961 
GAP 77929 0.091 0.766 -2.908 4.520 
ΔROA 77929 0.030 0.682 -7.401 7.401 
Discretionary Loan 
Loss Provisions 77929 0.435 0.270 0.011 1.319 
Branching 
Restriction Index 77929 2.060 1.907 0.000 4.000 
Adjusted Lerner 
Index 77929 0.793 0.085 0.557 0.962 
Z-score 77929 24.132 17.069 0.428 83.816 
Capital Ratio 77929 9.799 3.460 3.992 36.872 
Loan to Total Asset 77929 63.118 20.751 13.274 148.805 
Size 77929 11.339 1.296 8.679 15.734 
Total Assets Growth  77929 8.686 15.879 -18.691 125.575 
Managerial 
Efficiency 77929 79.205 8.741 54.076 104.290 
Income 
Diversification 77929 10.131 7.519 0.492 53.253 
Inflation 27 2.463 0.763 0.879 3.793 
GDP Growth 27 2.746 1.585 -3.109 4.869 
GDP Per Capita 27 10.307 0.304 9.822 10.819 
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Table 2 
Correlation Matrix 
This table reports the correlation covariance. * denotes the 5% significance level. An appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
  
Branching 
Restrictions 
Index 
Adjusted 
Lerner 
Index 
Z-score Capital ratio 
Loan to 
total asset Size 
Total 
Assets 
Growth  
Managerial 
efficiency 
Income 
diversificati
on 
Inflation GDP growth  
GDP per 
capita 
Branching 
Restrictions 
Index 
1            
Adjusted 
Lerner Index 0.2671* 1           
Z-score 0.0267* -0.1880* 1          
Capital ratio 0.1970* -0.2949* 0.3399* 1         
Loan to total 
asset 0.2542* -0.1127* -0.2191* -0.1983* 1        
Size 0.3104* -0.2629* -0.0026 -0.1127* 0.3062* 1       
Total Assets 
Growth  0.0390* -0.0134* -0.1349* -0.0899* 0.5593* 0.1602* 1      
Managerial 
efficiency -0.2891* 0.2225* -0.1934* -0.2947* -0.1186* -0.2862* -0.0205* 1     
Income 
diversification 0.1889* -0.1233* -0.1554* 0.0560* 0.0389* 0.2982* 0.0499* -0.1032* 1    
Inflation -0.4282* 0.2250* -0.0239* -0.1188* -0.0893* -0.1314* -0.0162* 0.2305* -0.1297* 1   
GDP growth  -0.1653* -0.0259* 0.0101* -0.0389* -0.0445* -0.1141* 0.0231* -0.0117* -0.0621* -0.0031 1  
GDP per capita 0.3786* -0.3077* 0.0115* 0.2171* 0.2440* 0.3250* 0.0155* -0.3318* 0.2311* -0.3904* -0.3128* 1 
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3.7 First stage estimation 
We estimate the expect ROA via equation (6), and the GAPit-1(ROA*it-
ROAit-1) is obtained. Table 3 shows the results of the first stage regression 
results. In column (1), We follow Flannery (2006), Healy (2014) to use 
Fame-Macbeth regression to estimate ROA. Additionally, We use OLS 
estimation to test the first stage regression. In order to control for the bank 
level specific unobservable characteristics, we control for bank fixed effects 
and firm fixed effects using two different strategies. Finally, The fitted 
value of the regression has been obtained.  All the coefficients of ROA are 
positive and significant at 1% level, showing all the banks have a positive 
static profit persistent level. When using the Fama-Macbeth strategy, the 
persistent degree is highest. On average, banks can maintain 51% of the 
profit. From column (2) and (3), the average profit persistent level is only 
39%.  Results from controls variables show that most bank individual 
factors have a significant impact on ROA: Loans, Diversification, 
Managerial Efficiency, Total assets etc. For example, Revenue shows 
significant positive coefficient on ROA, the impact on average is statistical 
and economically significant at 1% level. Loans have a negative impact on 
ROA, banks with loan business focused normally have lack of profitability. 
Interestingly, greater size will lead to lower profitability. On the other hand, 
we found that diversification is beneficial to bank profitability. Also, banks 
with higher Managerial Efficiency(lower cost to income ratio) would result 
in higher ROA. Finally, if a bank grows fast, the ROA will together show a 
growth trend.  Comparing to the other two columns, the sign of coefficients 
before variables are the same, while the magnitudes are slightly different. 
Overall, all these 3 columns show similar outcomes. Then I only use the 
results from Fama-Macbeth to gauge the Target ROA. Please note, we also 
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tried used regression results that applied in column 2 and 3 to get the fitted 
value of ROA to make a comparison, the estimated ROA is very similar, 
and therefore we mainly use Fama-Macbeth results into our subsequent 
results. The estimates are presented in summary statistics.  
The first row of table 1 shows the basic summary statistics of Target ROA, 
Comparing Target ROA(the estimated expected ROA) to ROA(reported 
ROA), Target ROA has a slightly higher mean value than ROA(1.04% vs 
0.97%). The Target ROA has a value between -2.8% to 2.4%, while ROA 
has a wider range from -4.4% to 2.9%, this might be due to the random 
shocks. Thus, the ROA has a greater standard deviation than Target ROA 
(0.72% vs 0.53%).  Based on the comparison between ROA* and realized 
ROA, we believe our estimation is accurate and efficient. Because (1) banks 
normally will set a higher target then the actually ROA, and the target is 
slightly higher than the realized one(mean: 1.04% vs 0.97%) shows that the 
target is not a random set. (2) the realized ROA has a wider bandwidth than 
the expected ROA since, in reality, performance can be affected by external 
random shocks, therefore it is reasonable that target ROA has a smaller 
range of values. (3) According to the profit persistence theory, the bank is 
willing to smooth ROA to keep a lower volatility on ROA, which in results 
show a lower standard deviation of ROA. In an ideal situation, the abnormal 
return should be last as long as possible, therefore we observe that the target 
ROA has a lower standard deviation compared to the realized ROA.  
After ROA and target ROA comparison, we move forward to the GAP and 
DROA, In detail, DROAit is calculated as ROAit-ROAit-1, and the GAPit-1 is 
calculated as Target ROAit-ROAit-1.  From table 4, GAP ranges from -2.9% 
to 4.5%, on the other hand, DROA has a value between -7.4% and 7.4%. 
Interestingly, DROA has a smaller standard deviation than GAP. At least 
half of DROA is below 0, however, less than 50% of the GAP has a 
negative value. Furthermore, there is a significant constraint magnitude of 
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the mean value of DROA compared to GAP (0.03% vs 0.09%). This might 
be evidence that banks are smoothing their profits. However, the situation 
can be ambiguous since banks can be either objective to the 
target(TARGET ROA) or to the profit persistence. If the banks are 
operating worse than expectations, they should adjust fast to reach the target, 
conversely, if the banks are operating better than expectations, they might 
strive to smooth their profits. 
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Table 3 
First Stage Partial Adjustment Model 
This table reports the results of the first stage partial adjustment model assuming a static earnings adjustment 
speed. ROAit =λi훽iXit-1 + (1- λi) ROAit-1+ 휀it, (1- λi) is the level of persistence of ROA. In column (1), We 
We follow Flannery (2006), Healy (2014) to use Fame-Macbeth regression to estimate ROA. Additionally, 
two additional analysis have been incorporated. We use OLS estimation to test the first stage regression. In 
order to control for the bank level specific unobservable characteristics, we controls for bank fixed effects 
and firm fixed effects using two different strategies. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 
10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. In this regression, we use the original values of these 
ratios instead of percentages. Appendix presents the definitions of variables.!
Dependent Variable ROAt+1 
  Fama-Mecbeth  OLS OLS 
    ROA 0.512*** 0.392*** 0.380*** 
 
(22.06) (64.21) (61.69) 
Revenue 0.001*   0.000*** 0 
 
(1.74) (3.99) (0.09) 
Leverage 0 0.008*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.37) (10.00) (5.69) 
Loans -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(-4.54)    (-33.47) (-24.84) 
Total Assets -0.001**  -0.001*** -0.000* 
 
(-2.21)    (-10.21) (-1.95) 
Diversification 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(3.42) (12.17) (11.4) 
Managerial Efficiency -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 
(-13.97)    (-42.56) (-37.22) 
Growth Rate of Total Assets  0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 
(6.11) (29.47) (21.62) 
Constant -0.001** 0.000 0.005*** 
 
(-2.02) (0.59) (11.26) 
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects No Yes Yes 
    Max VIF  4.58 4.32 
N 77929 77929 77929 
adj. R-sq   0.431 0.409 
 
Following the previous conjecture, we further investigate the adjustment 
speed in various situations: 1) If the GAP<0 (GAPit-1=ROA*it-ROAit-1), the 
expected ROA is lower than the real ROA, indicating the banks are 
outperforming, when the banks are performing better than the expected 
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outcomes, they should slow the adjustment speed hence keep a high 
persistent profit preventing it revert to the mean level. We treat this 
situation as superior performance, in this context, the bank should have a 
strong incentive to maintain current profitability whether apply for 
accounting method or benefits from its current market power. 
2)In contrast, if the GAP>0, the banks are underperforming, the banks 
should accelerate adjustment speed to catch the expect ROA. Assuming the 
expect ROA is the benchmark of the bank, then if the managers are 
pursuing the benchmark performance as their first target, they should strive 
to narrow the gap when the real performance is below the benchmark. 
Based on those conjectures, here we propose the first two hypotheses: 
a) if the ROA is bigger than the expect ROA(GAP<0), the banks are 
outperforming, then banks should maintain a high persistence of profit. 
b), if the ROA is smaller than the expect ROA(GAP>0), the banks are 
underperforming, then banks should accelerate the adjustment speed to 
narrow the GAP. 
Additionally, within the hypotheses, the persistence coefficient from (1) 
should higher than that from (2). Since the motivation of bank managers 
have changed. We apply the OLS regression on equation (5) to estimate the 
profit persistence coefficients. In this specification, coefficients for ROA 
are the persistence coefficients.   
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Table 4 
First Stage Partial Adjustment Model: GAP>0 vs GAP<0 
This table reports the results of the first stage partial adjustment model assuming a 
static earnings adjustment speed. ROAit =λi훽iXit-1 + (1- λi) ROAit-1+ 휀it, (1- λi) is the 
level of persistence of ROA. In column (1),We u se OLS estimation to test the first 
stage regression. In order to control for the bank level specific unobservable 
characteristics, we controls for bank fixed effects and firm fixed effects using two 
different strategies. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 
1% significance levels, respectively. In this regression, we use the original values of 
these ratios instead of percentages. Appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
 Dep: ROAt+1 GAP<0   GAP>0   
 Coef. t Coef. t 
ROA 0.770 25.55 0.107 7.93 
Revenue 0.005 9.09 0.005 7.71 
Leverage -0.009 -3.91 -0.006 -2.19 
Loans 0.004 1.32 0.029 7.01 
Total Assets -0.005 -8.95 -0.005 -7.57 
Growth Rate of Total Assets  -0.003 -9.62 -0.004 -5.33 
Diversification -0.001 -1.27 -0.007 -3.53 
Managerial Efficiency -0.032 -15.60 -0.040 -20.17 
Constant 0.050 21.58 0.055 18.70 
Time Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  
Bank Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  
Max VIF 4.33 
 
3.98 
 N 39394 39021 
adj. R-sq 0.856   0.751   
 
Table 4 describes the regression results for testing the hypothesis regarding 
different GAP values. Please note, all the results are only based on first 
stage regression. The first column is for the subgroup that banks are 
outperforming, indicating the ROA has surpassed the expected ROA 
(GAP<0). The profit persistence coefficient is around 0.77. Further, there is 
a significant positive relationship between ROA and SALE, resulting 0.48% 
increase in ROA if SALE rises 1%. On the other hand, total liabilities, total 
loans, total assets, LLP, managerial efficiency show the negative significant 
impact on ROA. For example, a one percent increase in total liabilities, total 
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loans leads to a decrease in ROA by 0.9% and 0.1% respectively. These 
results are consistent with our hypothesis because the banks expect to save 
more abnormal return in terms of significant outperformance. Negative 
GAP shows that banks’ target ROA is lower than obvious ROA.  77% 
persistence level is significantly higher than 10.7%, indicating when banks 
outperforming, and they are more willing to slow down the adjustment 
speed.  On the other hand, when we observe ROA is from the 
underperformance side, the persistent level is significantly lower. This 
result again confirms the hypothesis if banks can beat their expected ROA, 
they will change swiftly, therefore showing that banks are less likely to 
maintain their profit.  
Secondly, the column with GAP>0 shows the regression results where 
banks have ROA lower than the expect ROA. Differ to the first column, the 
Fixed asset has significant impact on the ROA, one percent increase in a 
fixed asset can level up the ROA by 2.8%, the influence is much stronger 
than other variables. However, when the GAP<0, there is no statistical 
significance on fixed assets in this context.  Comparing to the persistence 
coefficient in the first column, 0.10 is smaller than 0.47. It verifies our 
hypotheses that banks endeavor to maintain the profit persistence when they 
are outperforming. The sample size is similar to the first column (39021vs 
39394), the average R-square is slightly smaller (75% vs 85%).  
Additionally, both total liabilities and total loans become less significant, 
while diversification becomes statistical significant showing 0.7% negative 
impact on ROA if rises 1%. 
Most importantly, when banks are underperforming (GAP>0), the profit 
persistence level is considerable small, representing just 0.10. It means the 
adjustment speed is 0.9(1-0.1), it is extraordinary fast and indicating the 
banks constantly narrow the gap between ROA and expected ROA. In 
comparison with the first column, where profit persistence coefficient stays 
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around 0.77, which is nearly 5 times of 0.1, in return, the adjustment speed 
is much slower (0.23 vs 0.9). Therefore, we can conclude that when the 
ROA is below the expect ROA, banks make more efforts to close gap rather 
than smooth earnings. Thus, the choice depends on the market. However, if 
the ROA is higher than the expect ROA, banks shift their target to maintain 
the earnings rather than match the long-term expect ROA.  
The first stage regression shows that bank reacts actively to the target return. 
When banks are outperforming, they prone to actively manage their return 
to maintain the profit to be persistent. On the contrary, when banks are 
underperforming, they tend to slow down the profit persistent level, 
resulting in a lower profit persistent level.  However, this stage only 
evaluates the static overall bank profit persistent level. In the following 
stage, I will assume the profit persistent rate varies over time and bank 
specific.   
The first stage analysis has confirmed that the banks keep profit persistence 
at a certain level. On the economic theory, basic banks are prone to keep 
abnormal return, showing a high persistent profit rate. On average, we 
found that banks have a 50% profit persistence rate. After gauging the 
Target ROA using the Fama-Macbeth regression model, we found that 
Target ROA has a higher mean value than ROA(1.04% vs 0.97%). The 
Target ROA has a min and max value between -2.8% to 2.4%, while ROA 
has a wider range from -4.4% to 2.9% and the ROA has a greater standard 
deviation than Target ROA (0.72% vs 0.53%).  These results suit with our 
expectation well because we believe banks would like to set a higher target 
while keeping the profitability as stable as possible.  Secondly, via the 
hypothesis, we subsequently use our estimated target ROA to 
retrospectively test how banks react to positive and negative GAP. The 
results are reasonably rationale. If the GAP is positive, which means the 
realized ROA is lower than the target ROA, Banks are more willing to 
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accelerate the adjustment speed. It shows banks are unwilling to keep the 
persistent profit if the target is not achieved. Following similar logic, we 
found that if the realized ROA is higher than the target ROA, Banks are 
more willing to reduce the adjustment speed. In this context, profit 
persistence is far more welcome because banks are keen to keep the 
abnormal return.  
3.8 Second stage estimation 
In the second stage, we apply the model stated as equation(8) to estimate the 
impact from market power on adjustment coefficients. Before the 
interaction with GAP, we further standardize all the variables for better 
interpretation.    
The main hypotheses: 
      1), Competition reduces profit persistence rate. 
To test the main hypotheses, we use the following modified model to 
estimate the impact of Competition (IBBEA index): 
ROAit-ROAit-1=( +!"it-1Z )GAPit-1+!#$%                       (8) λi
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Where: =( +!"it-1Z ) 
Here we assume the lambda is dynamic, it can vary over time and banks. 
From equation(5), we know that the profit persistence is determined by the 
adjustment speed( ), and the persistence coefficients is calculated as (1-
), since we assume the partial adjustment speed can be influenced by the 
potential internal and external factors, similarly, we can obtain a set of 
different profit persistence coefficients that vary over year and bank. Again, 
a high adjustment speed indicates a low degree of profit persistence. 
GAPit-1 is calculated as the result of ROA*it-ROAit-1, Z is a vector of the 
bank-level and macroeconomic characteristics. " is a vector of coefficients, 
it is the interaction term directly tests how the adjustment speed is 
influenced by the bank’s particular variables representing market 
power(Lerner) or IBBEA, is our main interest. The estimated coefficients 
represent the incremental mean reversion associated with those three 
particular indicators.  
Table 5 reports the regressions results for the second stage estimation of 
Equation (7). We consider the time period from 1989 to 2002, a ten-year 
window of the introduction of IBBEA, which lasts for three years from 
1994 to 1997. We standardize all variables in the regression, except for 
Branching Restrictions Index because this index is an ordinal variable rather 
than a continuous variable. The coefficient of Branching Restrictions Index 
is negative and significant. Since a higher Branching Restrictions Index 
value indicates higher competition, a negative regression coefficient of 
Branching Restrictions Index indicates that banks in more competitive 
markets tend to adjust their earnings at a higher speed. As shown in Column 
(1) of Table 4, one inter-quartile increase of Branching Restriction Index 
λi λi
λi
λi
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leads to an increase in earnings adjustment speed by 0.094%. This result is 
in accordance with economic competition theory that competition directly 
impacts earnings persistence through eroding away economic excessive 
returns and losses in the long run (Stigler, 1961).  
We also use the Lerner Index as an alternative measure of market power, 
which has been widely used in the banking literature (see, Maudos and 
Guevara, 2007; Angelini and Cetorelli, 2003; Fonseca and González, 2010; 
Jiménez et al., 2013; Delis and Tsionas, 2009; Bikker and Haaf, 2002). As a 
non-structural indicator, the Lerner index reflects the capacity of price 
power and is calculated as the difference between price and marginal cost as 
a percentage of the price. The regression results in Table 4 show that the 
adjusted Lerner index has a significantly positive impact on earnings 
adjustment speed. One standard deviation increase of bank 
competition(adjusted Lerner Index), leads to the increase of adjustment 
speed by 1.4% (0.170*0.085). This result is consistent with our findings 
above.  
In addition, we find that the coefficients of Capital Ratio are significant and 
positive, indicating that banks with higher capital ratio adjust earnings faster. 
Size shows a significantly negative impact on the adjustment speed, 
suggesting that larger banks tend to have more persistent earnings than their 
smaller counterparts. A one standard deviation increase in Size decreases 
the adjustment speed by 0.324% (0.054*0.06).  
Z-score does not have a substantial impact on profit persistence. Column (3) 
shows one standard deviation increase in Z-score leads to a decrease of 1.12% 
in profit persistence. It shows that regression results are safer banks can 
preserve more consistent earning stream. Similar results have been found 
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from column 2. We also find that high managerial efficiency is beneficial to 
profit persistence. For instance, Efficiency helps smooth earnings in two 
ways, first, intensive management in accounting reports subjects in the 
financial reports enable managers to manipulate earnings, hence smooth 
earnings.  Second, active management in noninterest income reduce the 
overall risk of operations, unexpected losses and earnings might offset 
internal therefore the profits can be more persistence. In terms of assets 
structure, we find banks with more loans issued have a lower profit 
persistence level. In addition, larger banks have more persistent earnings, 
possibly because they usually have more market power.  In the regression 
we consistently control time and bank fixed effects, the R-square is around 
70% showing that our regression model has considerable explanatory power.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
!
84!
Table 5 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed: a ten-year window of IBBEA  
 We assume λi to be dynamic, so it varies across banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent variables. This 
table presents the OLS results for parameter Z in Partial Adjustment Model: (ROAit - ROAit-1 = ( λi + γit-1Z ) 
GAPit-1 + 휀it ,G APit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1) by the ten-year period in which no more than five years are distant 
from the IBBEA introduction year. Column(1) use Brthe anching Restrictions Index to measure competition and 
Column (2) use Lerner Index to measure competition. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
Branching Restrictions -0.071*** 
 ! (-18.33)  Lerner Index 
 
-0.349*** 
  
(-6.82) 
Z-score -0.058*** -0.056*** 
! (-12.25) (-12.08) Capital Ratio -0.201*** -0.178*** 
! (-3.27) (-2.95) Loan to Total Asset 0.049*** 0.057*** 
! (11.66) (12.64) Size -0.062*** -0.073*** 
! (-11.57) (-13.51) Total Assets Growth Rate -0.011*** -0.014*** 
! (-3.25) (-3.87) Managerial Efficiency 0.025*** -0.326*** 
! (7.61) (-6.27) Income Diversification 0.000 0.010*** 
! (0.03) (2.73) GDP Growth Rate -0.075*** -0.062*** 
! (-25.29) (-21.25) Inflation -0.056*** -0.071*** 
! (-16.63) (-21.95) GDP Per Capita -0.354*** -0.261*** 
! (-43.49) (-45.37) Constant 0.823*** 0.672*** 
! (88.14) (184.43) Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Max VIF 4.67 4.41 
N 77929 77929 
adj. R-sq 0.709 0.707 
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3.9 The placebo test  
In the placebo test part, we conducted several robust tests. Table 6 reports 
the regression results. In column(1), we insert a dummy called Before(4,1) 
into the baseline regression. The IBBEA index is still negative and 
significant. The Before(4,1) is a dummy variable that equals one before the 
deregulation for each state, otherwise 0. The reason is to control for any 
proactive movements by banks. One possibility is that the banks can 
potentially foresee the deregulation. If this phenomenon is possible, then the 
setting of IBBEA will be affected. After controlling Before(4,1), we 
exclude the potential confounding effect. And the coefficient is still 
negative significant. In the second column(2), we falsified to build up an 
index, which Branching Restrictions Index variable is the actual index for 
one year prior to the actual deregulation.  
We found that the falsified index is insignificant, showing that the negative 
sign of the coefficient is not a random result by IBBEA index.  In the third 
column, we further interact IBBEA with large bank dummy. The underlying 
reason is that we believe that large banks may be less likely to be affected 
by competition, because big banks normally have significant local market 
power, and they have more power to preserve abnormal returns. Results fit 
our expectation, we found that IBBEA*Large Bank dummy has a negative 
significant coefficient, the coefficient is 0.139 which is greater than the one 
for those small banks(0.068), it shows that the large banks are more capable 
to preserve the abnormal results, and the persistence level is higher.  In the 
last column,  we use full data sample rather than the 10-year window. The 
result is still negative and significant. Furthermore, in all the columns, we 
have inserted a controlled variable called early deregulation index. The 
detailed early deregulation index definition is presented in the appendix. In 
brief, Early Deregulation Index represents the wave of deregulation before 
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IBBEA.  This index equals zero prior to the earlier of the year of intra- or 
inter-state deregulations, one if the state deregulates either full intra-state 
branching through acquisition and de novo branching or inter-state banking 
and two if the state deregulates both types of branching expansions. The 
years of these deregulations are gained from Kroszner and Strahan (1999). 
By including the early deregulation index, we controlled the impact of early 
intrastate deregulation. Finally, in the placebo tests, all the tests have been 
successfully passed.  
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Table 6 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed:  Placebo Tests 
We assume λi to be dynamic, so it varies across banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent variables. 
This table presents the placebo tests of the OLS results for parameter on Z in Partial Adjustment Model (ROAit - 
ROAit-1 = ( λi + γit-1Z )GAPit-1 + 휀it, GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1). Column (1) shows the results controlling for the 
four years prior to the deregulation year. Before (4, 1) is a dummy variable equal to one for yea ar -4 to -1 relative 
to the deregulation year. Columns (2) display the results under which Branching Restrictions Index variable is the 
actual index for one year prior to the actual deregulation. Column (3) displays the regression results for both large 
banks and their smaller counterparts. Column (4) presents the regression results using the full sample. t-statistics 
are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the 
definitions of variables. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Branching Restrictions  
Index -0.094*** -0.007   -0.071*** 
 (22.64)    (-1.36)    (18.33) 
Before (4,1) 0.125    
 (0.08)    
Branching Restrictions 
Index*Large Banks   -0.139***  
   (-12.40)     
Branching Restrictions 
Index*(1-Large Banks)   -0.068***  
   (-13.55)     
Early Deregulation Index -0.015** -0.019** -0.011** -0.017** 
 (-2.04) (-2.31) (-1.98) (-2.21) 
Z-score -0.078*** -0.032*** -0.066 -0.058*** 
 (-15.98) (-5.68) (-1.51)    (-12.25) 
Leverage Ratio -0.002 0.017*** 0.002***    -0.201*** 
 (-0.36) (3.79) (3.26)    (-3.27) 
Loan to Total Asset 0.058*** 0.000  0.066 0.049*** 
 (13.33) (0.02)   (1.57)    (11.66) 
Size -0.067*** -0.076*** -0.054*** -0.062*** 
 (-13.03) (-8.93) (-11.68)    (-11.57) 
Total Assets Growth  -0.011*** 0.004   -0.019 -0.011*** 
 (-3.27) (1.14) (1.14)    (-3.25) 
Managerial Efficiency 0.027*** 0.038*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 
 (7.99) (9.60) (7.84)    (7.61) 
Income Diversification -0.001 -0.007* -0.000    0.000 
 (-0.21) (-1.90)  (-0.01)    (0.03) 
GDP Growth  -0.055*** 0.001 -0.033 -0.075*** 
 (-17.66) (0.29) (-1.58)    (-25.29) 
Inflation -0.088*** -0.019*** -0.016 -0.056*** 
 (-25.17) (-3.51) (-1.62)    (-16.63) 
GDP Per Capita -0.230*** -0.121*** -0.008 -0.354*** 
 (-46.70) (-37.27) (-0.56)    (-43.49) 
Constant 0.630*** 0.857*** 0.095*** 0.823*** 
 (185.49) (85.79) (9.76)    (88.14) 
Max VIF 5.43 4.97 5.44 5.99 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 226153 77929 77929 226153 
adj. R-sq 0.6931 0.8083 0.7099 0.709 
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3.10 The Mechanism 
The previous sections have established causality between competition and 
the speed of bank earnings adjustments. In this subsection, we attempt to 
strengthen the interpretation of this relation by exploring the impact of 
banks’ heterogenous abilities in sustaining earnings, which affects their 
earnings adjustment speed. The hypothesis is that the impact of competition 
on bank earnings adjustment speed should be less strong for banks with a 
higher level of ability to sustain their previous years’ earnings.  
Specifically, we expect that banks with the larger size, a higher level of 
diversification, more efficient in management and lower level of default risk 
have a higher level of ability to sustain earnings. The large size of banks 
usually indicates banks’ comprehensive strength, which may help banks 
increase their earnings persistence. According to De Young and Rice (2004) 
and Stiroh and Rumble (2006), product diversification reflects banks’ 
business expansion, which increases banks’ attractiveness to customers. 
Further, income diversification effectively reduces earnings volatility 
caused by a particular external event. Banks’ safety and soundness could 
reduce banks’ default risk caused by a particular external shock. Efficient 
bank management not only reduces operating costs but also makes timely 
and effective strategies to mitigate loss caused by external changes or is 
even able to find opportunities in external crises (Lin and Zhang, 2009; 
Shehzad et al., 2010).  
 
!
!
89!
In the empirical analysis, we introduce four variables into our regression 
model that explains the variation in earnings adjustment speed, namely size, 
diversification, managerial efficiency, and Z-score, and their interaction 
terms with our competition measure Adjusted Lerner Index in the model. 
We use firm-level competition measure, Adjusted Lerner Index, rather than 
state-level competition measure, IBBEA Index, in accordance with the firm-
level measures of bank size, diversification, managerial efficiency and Z-
score. It is worth noting that the Adjusted Lerner index is calculated using 
1- Lerner index. The reason behind the adjusted Lerner index is that we 
want higher index value indicates a higher level of competition, which will 
make readers easier to compare the results with the IBBEA index.  
Table 7 presents the regression results. The relations between the four 
interaction terms and earnings adjustment speed are all negative and 
significant. These findings support our hypothesis and indicate that the 
relation between competition and the speed of bank earnings adjustments is 
less strong for banks with the larger size, a higher level of diversification, 
more efficient in management and lower level of default risk.  
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Table 7 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed: Mechanism 
This table investigates the potential mechanism between earnings adjustment speed with bank competition. 
The Branching Restrictions measure is a state level competition measure. Followed by Rice and 
Strahan(2010), Branching Restrictions is an index that captures the level of interstate branching restrictions 
for each state. The Lerner index is a bank-level indicator of bank competition, by adopting the stochastic 
frontier analysis approach, it is calculated as the difference between price and marginal cost as a percentage 
of prices, the detailed methodology of Lerner measure is described in the appendix. Earnings Management is 
calculated by applying the discretionary loan loss provision model (Liu and Ryan, 2006). The absolute value 
of the error term is regarded as the discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP) and the degree of Earnings 
Management.  All other variables are defined in the appendix. *, **, *** represents the significance level of 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Adjusted Lerner Index*Income 
Diversification 0.006* 
   
 
(1.73) 
   Adjusted Lerner Index*Size -0.092*** 
  
  
(-3.63) 
  Adjusted Lerner Index*Managerial Efficiency 2.198*** 
  
   
(5.66) 
 Adjusted Lerner Index*Z-score 
 
-0.009*** 
    
(-4.53)    
Adjusted Lerner Index 0.342*** 0.256*** 0.327*** 0.388*** 
 
(6.68) (4.27) (5.96) (7.43)    
Z-score -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.068*** -0.101*** 
 
(-12.85) (-13.16) (-14.38) (-10.13)    
Capital Ratio -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003    
 
(-0.44) (-0.44) (-0.63) (-0.53)    
Loan to Total Asset 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.057*** 0.072*** 
 
(12.49) (12.61) (9.64) (12.67)    
Size -0.071*** -0.046*** -0.076*** -0.072*** 
 
(-12.87) (-4.83) (-13.63) (-13.02)    
Total Assets Growth Rate -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.014*** -0.020*** 
 
(-4.94) (-4.94) (-3.27) (-4.97)    
Managerial Efficiency 0.310*** 0.325*** 0.318*** 0.355*** 
 
(5.98) (6.19) (5.79) (6.75)    
Income Diversification -0.001 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 
 
(-0.20) (3.08) (3.52) (2.96)    
GDP Growth Rate -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.069*** -0.070*** 
 
(-21.35) (-21.40) (-21.64) (-21.47)    
Inflation -0.077*** -0.076*** -0.075*** -0.078*** 
 
(-22.56) (-22.23) (-22.40) (-22.91)    
GDP Per Capita -0.274*** -0.277*** -0.269*** -0.276*** 
 
(-39.06) (-39.38) (-37.55) (-39.42)    
Constant 0.666*** 0.902*** 0.710*** 0.627*** 
 
(72.55) (14.51) (108.38) (48.51)    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Max VIF 5.55 4.87 4.41 4.33 
N 226153 226153 226153 226153 
adj. R-sq 0.7072 0.7074 0.7089 0.7073    
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3.10.1 How competition affect earnings persistence in different profitability  
Then, we estimate the coefficients in terms of different profitability of 
banks. Tier 1-3 represents banks whose profitability is below 25%, 25%-75% 
and above 75% of all samples respectively. We found that among all the 
other banks, profitability is not a key issue that influences the relationship 
between earnings persistence and competition. Because all the coefficients 
are negative and significant before branching index, showing that the 
competition consistently exerts a negative impact on profit persistence level. 
The only difference is the magnitude of coefficients. A number of prior 
studies find the evidence that numerous companies report small positive 
abnormal earnings while rare companies report small negative abnormal 
earnings (Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997), indicating that the 
small positive abnormal earnings are the ideal profitability for managers.  
Apart from Branching restriction index, we also use Lerner index to check 
whether the results are consistent, the results are available in the appendix, 
we found similar results that market power has a significant impact on 
preserving profit persistence among all tiers of profits. This result once 
again verifies our main hypothesis that competition is the driver of earnings 
persistence.  
 
 
!
!
92!
Table 8 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed And Profitability  
This table presents the OLS results for Partial Adjustment Model (ROAit - ROAit-1 = ( λi + γit-1Z ) GAPit + #it ,GAPit = ROA*it-1 
- ROAit-1) by applying Branching Restriction index. We assume that λi to be dynamic, so it varies among banks and over time. Z is 
a vector of all independent variables. We classify sample into 4 subsamples in terms of profitability to see the impact from earnings 
management and competition on profit persistence. Followed by Rice and Strahan(2010), Branching Restrictions is an index that 
captures the level of interstate branching restrictions, which is an alternative indicator of competition. Earnings Management is 
calculated by applying the discretionary loan loss provision model (Liu and Ryan, 2006). The absolute value of the error term is 
regarded as the discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP) and the degree of Earnings Management.  All other variables are defined in 
the appendix. *, **, *** represents the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
  Profitability(ROA) 
  below 25% 25%-50% 50%-75% 
above 
75% 
Branching Restrictions -0.090*** -0.083*** -0.056*** -0.051*** 
 
(-11.38) (-11.85) (-9.32) (-7.47)    
Z-score -0.125*** -0.038*** -0.021*** -0.022*** 
 
(-10.99) (-4.66) (-2.92) (-3.01)    
Leverage Ratio -0.004 -0.027** -0.025*** 0.001 
 
(-0.68) (-2.42) (-3.08) (0.2) 
Loan to Total Asset 0.068*** 0.111*** 0.119*** 0.041*** 
 
(7.91) (11.64) (10.32) (4.77) 
Size -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.071*** -0.059*** 
 
(-7.95) (-5.20) (-6.39) (-5.13)    
Total Assets Growth Rate -0.011* -0.037*** -0.046*** -0.007 
 
(-1.79) (-5.96) (-5.03) (-1.08)    
Managerial Efficiency 0.023*** 0.053*** 0.045*** 0.019**  
 
(3.09) (5.1) (3.98) (2.4) 
Income Diversification -0.004 0.000 0.003 0.012**  
 
(-0.87) (-0.03) (0.34) (2.44) 
GDP Growth Rate -0.092*** -0.080*** -0.066*** -0.050*** 
 
(-17.11) (-10.62) (-9.67) (-6.68)    
Inflation -0.074*** -0.086*** -0.070*** -0.034*** 
 
(-11.32) (-11.51) (-9.67) (-5.16)    
GDP Per Capita -0.405*** -0.439*** -0.366*** -0.300*** 
 
(-25.81) (-24.83) (-20.11) (-15.70)    
Constant 0.809*** 0.836*** 0.804*** 0.799*** 
 
(37.46) (46.59) (56.24) (39.37) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Max VIF 4.13 5.42 5.87 4.32 
N 46038 56833 61482 61744 
adj. R-sq 0.760 0.745 0.743 0.626 
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3.10.2 Competition on profit persistence: Positive and Negative Gaps 
We further investigate the adjustment speed in various situations. 1) When 
banks are underperforming (GAP > 0), the banks prone to accelerate 
adjustment speed to close the gap. As expected, the results in Table 9 show 
that Branching index has a significant negative impact on adjustment speed 
(-0.057). This outcome is compliant with the opinion that when firms 
experience negative surprises in earnings, the stock prices of the firms will 
suffer a decrease, which is a precaution from investors asking for firms to 
reach the market average returns shortly (Skinner & Sloan, 2001; Kinney et 
al., 2002).  
2) Similarly, when banks are performing better than their expectation (GAP 
< 0), Competition still remains a significant factor that erode the abnormal 
returns.  Whenever the banks have negative or positive unexpected returns. 
This signal suggests the persistently positive relationship between market 
power and profit persistence, complying with the economic competition 
theory (Stigler, 1961).  In addition, we find that the impact of market power 
on profit persistence for banks with positive unexpected returns (GAP < 0) 
is smaller than those with negative unexpected returns (GAP > 0) (-0.057 vs 
-0.042).  It indicates that banks under less competitive market can preserve 
the excessive return longer. This outcome sticks to the empirical results of 
Cefis (2003) that firms with continuous profits above the average economic 
rate show a large probability to remain their profits above the average rate. 
we then replace our Branching restriction index with Lerner index.  We 
continue to find consistent results that market power has a significant 
impact on preserving profit persistence among disregard of positive or 
negative ROA Gaps. This result once again verifies our main hypothesis 
that competition is the driver of earnings persistence.  
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Altogether, these results show that the effect of the market power of 
individual banks is decided by the whole banks in the market rather than the 
managers of individual banks. Hence, the market power is objective and its 
effect on the profit persistence is constant regardless of different economic 
situations, complying with the economic competition theory (Stigler, 1961).  
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Table 9 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed Under Different 
Scenarios 
This table presents the OLS results for Partial Adjustment Model (ROAit - ROAit-1 = ( λi 
+ γit-1Z ) GAPit + 휀it ,G APit = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1) by applying Branching Restriction 
index regarding to different situations(GAP>0 vs GAP<0), Positive GAP means 
underperformance and negative GAP means outperformance. We assume that λi to be 
dynamic, so it varies among banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent 
variables. Followed by Rice and Strahan(2010), Branching Restrictions is an index that 
captures the level of interstate branching restrictions, which is an alternative indicator of 
competition. All other variables are defined in the appendix. *, **, *** represents the 
significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
  GAP>0 GAP<0 
Branching Restrictions -0.057*** -0.042*** 
 
(-11.09) (-7.11)    
Z-score -0.004 -0.116*** 
 
(-0.68) (-12.46)    
Leverage Ratio -0.005 0.007 
 
(-1.13) (1.27) 
Loan to Total Asset 0.062*** -0.003 
 
(9.13) (-0.39)    
Size -0.051*** -0.074*** 
 
(-5.34) (-9.65)    
Total Assets Growth Rate -0.023*** 0.021*** 
 
(-5.52) (3.84) 
Managerial Efficiency -0.004 0.072*** 
 
(-1.09) (11.99) 
Income Diversification 0.018*** -0.039*** 
 
(5.45) (-6.43)    
GDP Growth Rate -0.049*** -0.068*** 
 
(-8.49) (-11.91)    
Inflation -0.119*** 0.019*** 
 
(-21.74) (3.38) 
GDP Per Capita -0.383*** -0.197*** 
 
(-25.28) (-14.22)    
Constant 0.850*** 0.738*** 
 
(54.33) (51.39) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Max VIF 4.55 5.31 
N 128584 97513 
adj. R-sq 0.659 0.613 
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3.10.3 The impact of competition on Available for Sale Securities (AFS securities)   
After the announcement of Accounting Standard Codification (ASC) 320, it 
is increasingly popular that banks use available for sale securities to manage 
earnings due to the large size of this item and lower cost of managing this 
item (Nissim and Penman, 2007; Laux and Leuz, 2010). ASC 320 specifies 
that AFS securities be measured at fair value in the statement of financial 
position, with changes in fair value recognized in other comprehensive 
income. Following Barth et al. (2015) and Dong and Zhang (2015), we also 
use realized gains and losses of AFS securities model to measure bank 
earnings management.  
AFS Securities = &' Net Incomeit +&( Competitionit +&) Net Income х 
Competitionit +Z-scoreit+ Capital Ratioit + Loan to Total Assetit +Sizeit+ 
Total Assets Growth Rateit+ Managerial Efficiencyit + Income 
Diversificationit + GDP Growth Rateit+ Inflationit + GDP Per Capitait + ε 
where AFS securities is arealized gains and losses on AFS securities and 
Net Income is net income before taxes and gains and losses on AFS 
securities, both deflated by beginning-of- quarter total assets. Competition 
is IBBEA Index or Adjusted Lerner Index. If banks employ AFS securities 
to maintain persistent earnings, the coefficient on Net Income &', should be 
negative and if banks under more competition realize more gains from AFS 
securities, the coefficient on Competition, &( , is positive. Our interested 
coefficient is &) , the interaction variable, Net Income X Competition. It 
tests whether earnings smoothing is more pronounced for banks under 
higher competition. A negative &) implies that competition would directly 
intensify banks earnings smoothing behavior.  
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Prior research documents that banks tend to use the item of AFS securities 
to smooth earnings (Barth et al., 2015; Dong and Zhang, 2015). AFS 
securities are the largest category of banks’ securities and contain a sizable 
proportion of bank assets (Nissim and Penman, 2007; Laux and Leuz, 2010). 
Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) Topic 320 specifies that AFS 
securities be measured at fair value in the statement of financial position, 
with changes in fair value recognized in other comprehensive income. 
Hence, the accounting treatment for gains and losses from AFS securities 
provides banks a chance to engage in earnings management by selling these 
securities and realizing selected gains and losses. Realizing gains and losses 
on AFS securities is an attractive way to smooth earnings due to its lower 
cost compared with accruals or real activity manipulation (Barth et al., 
2015).  
Therefore, it is plausible that the impact of bank competition on earnings 
persistence could be indirect through the channel of earnings management 
by manipulating AFS securities, rather than accruals. In order to eliminate 
this possibility that could bias our main results, we examine the impact of 
bank competition on realized gains and losses of AFS securities in Table 10. 
In both columns of Table 10, net income before tax is negatively related to 
realized gains and losses of AFS securities. This finding suggests that banks 
use AFS securities to persist earnings, consistent with Barth et al. (2015). 
Column (1) of Table 10 shows that the coefficients of Branching 
Restrictions Index and the interaction term of Branching Restrictions Index 
and Net Income are insignificant. Similarly, Column (2) of Table 10 shows 
that the coefficients of the Adjusted Lerner Index and the interaction term of 
Adjusted Lerner Index and Net Income are negative and significant. It 
suggests that when a bank has greater market power, the bank is more likely 
to use AFS to smooth earnings. However, the negative coefficient on the 
Lerner index shows that banks with more market power will have lower 
AFS. These results indicate that bank competition does not have a 
significant impact on realized gains and losses of AFS securities. Thus, we 
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rule out this channel of earnings management and further confirm our main 
findings that bank competition has a direct rather than indirect impact on 
bank earnings persistence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
!
99!
 
 
Table 10 
The impact of Competition on Bank Realized gain/loss of AFS  
This table investigates whether competition induces banks earnings management using realized gain/loss of 
available for sale securities. The dependent variable is Realized gain/loss of AFS scaled by total assets. NI is 
net income before tax and realized gain/loss of AFS scaled by total assets. The Branching Restrictions 
measure is a state level competition measure. Followed by Rice and Strahan(2010), Branching Restrictions 
is an index that captures the level of interstate branching restrictions for each state. The Lerner index is a 
bank-level indicator of bank competition, by adopting the stochastic frontier analysis approach, it is 
calculated as the difference between price and marginal cost as a percentage of prices, the detailed 
methodology of Lerner measure is described in the appendix. All other variables are defined in the appendix. 
*, **, *** represents the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
Dependent Variable Realized gain/loss of AFS 
 
NI -0.048*** -0.054*** 
 
(-26.62) (-20.70)    
Branching Restrictions Index 0.000 
 
(0.16) 
NI*Branching Restrictions Index -0.000 
 
(-0.83) 
Lerner -0.012*** 
  
(-9.95)    
NI*Lerner -0.020**  
  
(-2.44)    
Z-score -0.000*** -0.001*** 
 
(-2.91) (-3.28)    
Capital Ratio 0.000 0.000    
 
(0.22) (0.23)    
Loan to Total Asset -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 
(-6.34) (-4.74)    
Size 0.005*** 0.000    
 
(2.73) (0.35)    
Total Assets Growth Rate 0.000*** 0.000    
 
(3.43) (1.24)    
Managerial Efficiency -0.003*** -0.009*** 
 
(-23.05) (-7.73)    
Income Diversification -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-7.84) (-5.66)    
GDP Growth Rate 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 
(8.72) (10.74)    
Inflation -0.008*** -0.007*** 
 
(-8.00) (-7.23)    
GDP Per Capita -0.003*** -0.001*** 
 
(-6.67) (-9.94)    
Constant 0.001 0.015*** 
 
(1.51) (9.84)    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Max VIF 5.41 3.28 
N 146338 146338    
adj. R-sq 0.1123 0.1172    
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3.11 Conclusion 
This article evaluates the impact of the competition on profit persistence in 
US banking, using bank-level data spanning 11 years. We document that 
competition has a significant negative impact on bank profit persistence 
both at the market level and individual level in a dynamic fashion.  Our 
design has successfully addressed the causal relationship between bank 
profit persistence and competition, and our measure of persistence 
innovatively allow for varying in terms of bank and time.  
We contribute to bank and profit persistence literature streams in two ways: 
first, we investigate how profit persistence varies whether the profitability 
positively or negatively deviates from the expected return. Bank managers 
concern less on profit persistence when the banks’ returns are under the 
expected to return, while stronger profit persistence has been found if the 
returns are above the expected return.  
Secondly, the partial adjustment statistical results show that both market 
power and IBBEA index have a significant positive impact on profit 
persistence. Our findings assist the regulator in distinguishing, to what 
extent, the market power or the internal accounting techniques determine 
the profit persistence. From an academic point of view, this article 
introduces the artificial impact of traditional profit persistence researches.   
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Our findings are useful for scholars and practitioners, who seek to 
understand bank earnings persistence. The implication for policy makers is 
to pay attention to form a healthy competition environment for existing 
banks while at the same time encourage information disclosure quality. As a 
result, investors could obtain more valuable information regarding banks 
performance and the banking industry could become more stable, 
contributing to the stability of the financial system.  
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Appendix1 
Definition of Variables 
Variable Name Definition 
Competition Measures  
Branching Restrictions 
Index 
The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) is an 
exogenous shock of competition. Followed by Rice and Strahan (2010), 
Branching Restriction Index captures the level of interstate branching 
restrictions for each state. Before 1994, the index in each state equals to 
zero, while, after 1994, this index ranges from zero to four. The index equals 
to four for states that are most open to out-of-state entry. Then, we minus 
one to the index when a state has any of the four barriers: requiring a 
minimum age of 3 or more years on the acquiring banks; not allowing de 
novo interstate branching; not permitting the acquisition of single branch or 
portions of an institution; mandating a deposit cap on branch acquisitions 
less than 30%. Thus, 4 means the highest competition and 0 means the 
lowest competition 
 
Adjusted Lerner Index 
The Adjusted Lerner index equals 1 minus Lerner Index, the Lerner index is 
a bank-level indicator of bank competition. By adopting the stochastic 
frontier analysis approach, the Lerner index is calculated as the difference 
between price and marginal cost as a percentage of prices.  Higher Adjusted 
Lerner index indicates greater bank competition. 
Bank-controls  
Z-score 
The Z-score is an accounting-based bank-level indicator of financial 
stability. It is measured by the sum of return of total assets and capital ratio 
over the standard deviation of return of total assets. Higher Z-score indicates 
greater financial stability.  
Capital Ratio The ratio of total equity to total assets 
Bank Size The natural logarithm of total assets 
Total Assets Growth  The yearly total assets growth rate 
Managerial Efficiency The ratio of total cost to total income 
Income Diversification The ratio of non-interest income to total operating income 
Loans to total assets.  The ratio of total loans to total assets 
Early Deregulation Index 
Early Deregulation Index represents the wave of deregulation before 
IBBEA.  This index equals zero prior to the earlier of the year of intra- or 
inter-state deregulations, one if the state deregulates either full intra-state 
branching through acquisition and de novo branching or inter-state banking 
and two if the state deregulates both types of branching expansions. The 
years of these deregulations are gained from Kroszner and Strahan (1999). 
Macro-controls  
GDP Growth  Annual GDP growth rate 
Inflation Annual inflation growth rate 
GDP per capita GDP divided by the number of the people in the country 
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Appendix 2 
 Static Profit Persistence Level for Each State  
This tables report the Static Profit Persistence Level for Each State and mean of key indicators, The ROA* is estimated using first stage 
partial adjustment model, ROAit =λi&iXit-1 + (1- λi)ROAit-1+ #it, For each state, (1- λi) is the level of persistence of ROA, 
GAPit=ROA*it-1-ROAit-1. We use Fama-Macbeth regression to estimate the static profit persistence level for each state. Followed by Rice 
and Strahan(2010), Branching Restrictions is an index that captures the level of interstate branching restrictions, which is an indicator of 
competition in statthe e level, this index ranges from 0 to 4, 0 means highest competition and 4 means lowethe st competition. The absolute 
value of the error term is regarded as the discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP) and the degree of Earnings Management.  All other 
variables are defined in the appendix.  
STATE N Persistence of ROA ROA ROA* GAP Branching Restrictions 
Alabama 4370 51.102% 1.020% 1.080% 0.088% 1.986 
Alaska 154 47.948% 1.150% 1.239% -0.119% 1.429 
Arizona 758 51.537% 0.785% 1.004% 0.278% 1.890 
Arkansas 5110 50.087% 1.040% 1.118% 0.093% 2.279 
California 7408 43.408% 0.805% 1.001% 0.267% 1.853 
Colorado 5674 55.155% 0.966% 1.059% 0.100% 2.568 
Connecticut 726 49.656% 0.536% 0.789% 0.151% 2.005 
Delaware 632 51.525% 1.630% 1.126% -0.413% 1.810 
Dist Of Columbia 174 26.204% 0.634% 0.953% 0.282% 2.169 
Florida 6136 53.644% 0.780% 0.946% 0.170% 2.090 
Georgia 7837 56.488% 1.030% 1.101% 0.058% 2.471 
Hawaii 228 48.319% 0.890% 0.887% -0.059% 2.611 
Idaho 409 54.630% 0.800% 1.013% 0.219% 1.768 
Illinois 20161 55.930% 0.954% 0.997% 0.051% 2.129 
Indiana 4975 58.113% 0.909% 0.978% 0.091% 1.902 
Iowa 11757 53.150% 1.040% 1.091% 0.118% 1.962 
Kansas 10858 50.329% 0.916% 0.982% 0.077% 1.865 
Kentucky 6471 57.459% 1.060% 1.090% 0.045% 2.910 
Louisiana 4333 51.837% 0.937% 1.012% 0.065% 2.034 
Maine 428 67.119% 0.930% 1.039% 0.106% 1.486 
Maryland 1837 66.005% 1.020% 1.214% 0.183% 1.495 
Massachusetts 1188 57.291% 0.776% 0.934% 0.133% 1.981 
Michigan 4549 61.085% 0.963% 1.049% 0.115% 1.671 
Minnesota 12934 55.667% 1.000% 1.082% 0.094% 1.948 
Mississippi 2711 57.020% 1.020% 1.067% 0.046% 2.055 
Missouri 10573 58.505% 0.988% 1.074% 0.119% 1.905 
Montana 2635 49.902% 1.070% 1.199% 0.144% 2.833 
Nebraska 7966 49.136% 1.020% 1.068% 0.087% 2.172 
Nevada 537 60.487% 1.270% 1.161% 0.030% 1.118 
New Hampshire 582 56.269% 0.769% 0.864% -0.027% 2.921 
New Jersey 1822 50.278% 0.816% 0.956% 0.198% 1.751 
New Mexico 1537 58.011% 1.100% 1.106% 0.044% 2.034 
New York 2976 56.311% 0.876% 1.094% 0.101% 1.812 
North Carolina 1497 53.807% 0.788% 0.945% 0.194% 1.247 
North Dakota 3130 53.593% 1.010% 1.061% 0.084% 2.193 
Ohio 5543 63.684% 1.030% 1.059% 0.062% 1.536 
Oklahoma 8313 58.175% 1.030% 1.037% 0.013% 2.253 
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Oregon 922 50.550% 1.110% 1.215% 0.253% 2.007 
Pennsylvania 5083 59.691% 1.020% 1.040% 0.058% 1.662 
Rhode Island 163 53.532% 0.938% 1.050% 0.095% 1.505 
South Carolina 1731 59.614% 0.890% 1.084% 0.175% 1.645 
South Dakota 2681 54.696% 1.170% 1.105% -0.025% 1.825 
Tennessee 5281 55.645% 0.985% 1.074% 0.113% 2.194 
Texas 21225 54.358% 0.919% 0.989% 0.041% 2.296 
Utah 1164 46.383% 1.440% 1.338% 0.059% 1.503 
Vermont 464 72.970% 0.936% 1.005% 0.022% 1.841 
Virginia 3340 57.712% 1.000% 1.106% 0.116% 1.464 
Washington 1863 47.864% 0.928% 1.037% 0.167% 2.088 
West Virginia 2804 59.620% 0.999% 1.062% 0.066% 2.165 
Wisconsin 9154 60.877% 1.010% 1.096% 0.111% 2.017 
Wyoming 1349 55.855% 1.090% 1.122% 0.046% 2.116 
Total 226153 
     
             Average 54.671% 0.976% 1.055% 0.090% 1.970 
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Appendix Table 8B 
 Determinants of profit adjustment speed regarding different profit quintiles 
This table presents the OLS results for Partial Adjustment Model by splitting the sample by profitability. The unit of analysis is the firm-year. The 
Lerner index is a bank-level indicator of bank competition, by adopting the stochastic frontier analysis approach, the Lerner index is calculated as the 
difference between price and marginal cost as a percentage of the price. All other variables are defined in the appendix. *,**,*** represents the 
significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
  ROA in Tier1 
(below 25%) 
  ROA in Tier2 
(25%-50%) 
  ROA in Tier3 
(50%-75%) 
  ROA in Tier4 
(above 75%) 
  
         
  Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
         
GAP 0.608*** 50.69 0.652*** 76.06 0.685*** 95.1 0.702*** 60.26 
Market Power 
(Lerner Index) 
-0.327*** (-4.11) -0.276* (-1.73) -0.310** (-2.02) -0.399*** (-4.88) 
Z-score -0.126*** (-10.96) -0.054*** (-6.80) -0.044*** (-6.85) -0.032*** (-4.31) 
Leverage ratio -0.006 (-0.95) -0.030*** (-2.72) -0.027*** (-3.37) 0 (-0.04) 
Loan to total asset 0.077*** 8.48 0.114*** 11.72 0.117*** 9.5 0.042*** 4.55 
Size -0.068*** (-9.84) -0.061*** (-5.13) -0.077*** (-6.91) -0.072*** (-6.35) 
Total Assets 
Growth rate 
-0.013** (-2.12) -0.037*** (-5.46) -0.040*** (-3.77) -0.006 (-0.97) 
Managerial 
efficiency 
-0.306*** (-3.82) -0.213 (-1.32) -0.251 (-1.61) -0.364*** (-4.55) 
Income 
diversification 
0.005 0.86 0.007 0.73 0.009 1.16 0.020*** 4.17 
GDP growth rate -0.075*** (-14.32) -0.062*** (-8.01) -0.051*** (-7.66) -0.036*** (-4.78) 
Inflation -0.091*** (-14.49) -0.107*** (-14.27) -0.081*** (-11.16) -0.045*** (-6.85) 
GDP per capita -0.282*** (-27.27) -0.320*** (-23.60) -0.282*** (-19.91) -0.220*** (-18.08) 
constant -0.001*** (-3.44) 0.000 1.08 -0.001*** (-3.20) -0.001*** (-5.10) 
Time fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Bank fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Max VIF 6.45  4.22  3.69  5.10  
N 46163  56921  61554  61816  
adj. R-sq 0.75  0.73  0.73  0.62  
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Chapter 4 
Earnings management and Bank profit 
persistence 
4.1 Abstract 
This chapter examines the impact of earnings management on the 
persistence of profit in US banking industry. Results show earnings 
management have a positive influence. In addition, statistics 
illustrate managers are more willing to keep a high persistence of 
profit when they are outperformed than the expected return.  
However, when it comes to the different timing of outside market, 
the effect of earnings management on profit persistence might vary 
significantly. 
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4.2 Introduction 
Earnings management is a hot topic in perspective of accounting 
literature. (Beatty and Liao, 2014; Goddard.J, Liu Hong, Molyneux 
P, Wilson. J O.S,2011; Dechow et al., 2010; Cumming et al., 2012; 
Beaver et al., 2012; Gao and Zhang, 2015; Peterson et al., 2015; Hui 
et al, 2016; Buchner et al., 2016). It is a core area that detects 
accounting quality. Earnings management has been widely 
researched via non-financial firms. It is important to mention that 
financial firms are less mentioned in accounting literature. During 
the last decade, bank financial accounting has been experienced 
considerable development, especially after the financial crisis 
(Beatty and Liao, 2014).  
In accounting perspective, earnings persistence is a natural result of 
earnings management. Because persistent earnings would lead to a 
more stable income stream, resulting in a higher stock price, lower 
financing cost, and lower risk. Tomy.R.E(2012) argue that the 
earning persistence is significantly influenced by the economic 
cycle since the managers have incentives to apply accounting 
method to ‘change’ profits that reported. He finds that firms’ 
earnings are most persistent during an expansion, least persistent 
during a recession, which implies that mangers have employed 
accounting method to influence the earnings in order to lead a more 
persistent profit. However, the firms measured in this paper are all 
manufacturing and consumer durables industries, which imply that 
the samples themselves are pro-cyclicality, it is plausible that the 
impacts from the economic cycle dummies are magnified.  It is 
controversial whether banks are sensitive to those factors. Beatty 
and Liao(2011) tried to find the recession impact on banking 
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lending willingness associated with the regulatory capital ratios 
show a profile how the managers tried to revise the assets structure 
in order to meet the capital requirements when the market is under 
recession or expansion. This indicates the bank managers have 
applied accounting techniques to meet targets when the economic 
cycle is changing.   
The newly introduced comparison of accounting quality and market 
power on profit persistence can give a deep inspiration for how the 
bank managers’ behaviors are influences the profit persistence. This 
chapter aims to measure the impact of earnings management on the 
profit persistence from bank level perspective. By employing Partial 
adjustment model, we could observe the dynamic consequence of 
how earnings management impact on earnings persistence. 
We use discretionary loan loss provisions to gauge earnings 
management from all US commercial banks. Beatty and Liao(2014) 
state that earnings management via loan loss provision is the most 
prominent channel for banks, which accounts for more than 60% of 
total discretionary accruals. The other one widely accepted banking 
earnings management measure is to discretionary realized gain or 
loss from available for sale securities. Discretionary accruals from 
this item accounts around 15%-20%. 
Using the main stream DLLP model, we found banks earnings 
management has a significant negative impact on earnings 
persistence. These effect on average is robust to bank and year fixed 
effect. We further exploit SOX act as an exogenous shock to 
identify the causality relationship between bank earnings 
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management and earnings persistence. SOX act requires all NYSE 
listed banks to have a minimum independent ratio of 50%. There are 
fruitful literature find that board independence would lead to a better 
monitoring thus reduce earnings management. We borrow this 
evidence and hypothesize that large listed banks would reduce 
earnings management significantly after SOX act. Using a 
difference in difference strategy, we found that large banks drop the 
earnings persistence rate more after SOX compared to other banks. 
This helps us document the causal relationship between bank 
earnings management and earnings persistence.   
We further check whether banks with the lowest profitability level 
are the least likely to manipulate their earnings. Previous studies 
document that during recessions, managers may report earnings 
downward at their maximum possible, or the so-called ‘big bath’ 
(Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004), where managers are motivated to 
use earnings management to discretely present an extreme drop in 
earnings during financial crisis periods. We thus expect that lowest 
profitable banks are the least likely to manipulate their earnings, and 
we find similar findings showing that banks have different 
incentives when ROA is under different quintile. Further, if banks 
are outperforming, they tend to use earnings management to pertain 
current earnings. On the other hand, if banks are underperforming, 
they intended to use earnings management to increase earnings 
adjustment speed, resulting in a more volatile stream of earnings.!we 
also test whether banks apply earnings management differently 
when actual earnings deviate positively or negatively from earnings 
expectation.  
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The rest paper is organized as follows: regarding profit persistence 
studies so far, section2 discuss the main stream of literature from 
earnings management perspectives.  Section 3 presents the 
methodology that adopted within each stage of research. Section 4 
summarizes data and section 5 states the results we found from 
estimations. Section 5 concludes the findings. 
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4..3 Literature Review 
4.3.1 Do banks need to be transparent? 
Banks are different from non-financial firms in terms of financial 
reporting. Ordinary, financial reporting is targeting transparency, 
showing that more disclosure would lead to a better corporate act. 
However, there is ongoing debate arguing whether banks need to be 
as transparent as possible. For example, Freixas and Rochet (2008) 
state that transparency is important for banks to allow depositors 
monitoring borrowers’ quality. In addition, bank opacity would 
induce agency problems and make banks less efficient. Higher 
asymmetric information would increase financing cost on both 
issuing equity or debt. Bank financial reporting could possibly offer 
a channel to address agency problems arise in banking industry.  
There are plenty benefits of being financially transparent. For 
example, it would allow investors to better evaluate fundamentals of 
each bank, thus mitigate agency problems.  
Regulator from an other dimension, could monitor banks more 
efficiently via a good financial reporting environment. 
Diamond(1984) argues that banks have incentives to monitor 
borrowers and produce information about credit risks. And 
Calomiris and Gorton(1991) state that the liquidity mismatch 
between assets and liabilities of banks will potentially increase 
uncertainty of depositors.  The information asymmetry between 
banks and depositors that arises from banks’ delegated monitoring 
role might induce agency problem because banks might not behave 
on behalf of depositors. By contrast, banks may take extra 
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unnecessary risk to benefit themselves rather than depositors. A 
better disclosure system would mitigate asymmetric information 
between depositors and banks.  
However, transparency might not optimal for banks. Dang et 
al(2013) suggest that banks should be opaque. Banks are unique in 
privately producing debt that is a money-like security that trades at 
par and does not vary in value over time. Banks need to have their 
own private portfolio to keep these money-like debts. Because debts 
need to be information-insensitive to serve as an efficient 
transaction medium. In order to make debt value at par, the 
underlying asset that backing debts should be unrevealed. Hence, 
bank money would not fluctuate in value, which will reduce its 
efficiency in trading. In this context, banks with higher transparency 
would lead to higher cost.  
A similar real world example would be the selling of diamonds 
suggested by Holmstrom(2009). He argues that if diamonds are all 
allowed to be inspected by buyers before transaction, the trade 
would be slowed down and reduce market liquidity, which might 
harmful to market efficiency. This might explain why banks had not 
been required to fully disclose financial reports until 1974. In 1974, 
Securities Amendments Act requires banks to issue substantially 
similar regulations with respect to periodic reporting, proxy 
regulation, and insider trading as those adopted by the SEC.  
Depositors may not be informative as banks about the loan quality. 
Then, one potential issue is depositors may panic about their money 
if macro environment is not healthy or some adverse news are 
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disclosed regarding some particular banks. Because banks are 
opaque, depositors have difficulty to monitor banks. A bank run 
would induce adverse consequence, which substantially reduces 
liquidity or a bank. It happens, if depositors withdraw all money 
from banks when they have reasons to believe that there is an 
increased likelihood of bank failure despite they do not know the 
actual incidence of failure.   
Holod and Peek(2007) find that listed banks with higher 
transparency are better able to issue uninsured large time deposits 
during periods of monetary tightening. Which means banks are less 
financial constrained if they have better financial reporting quality. 
This indicates market values the financial information transparency 
of public banks. Flannery et al.(2004) argue that banks’ opacity to 
outsider investors are peculiar, which might need further regulation 
on them. Banks have undisclosed information of their non-tradable 
loans, this type of information is super difficult for outsiders to 
acquire. A similar evidence is that Moody’s and S&P ratings on 
banks are more different for banks than other firms and this 
disagreement happens when banks hold greater assets in loans and 
trading assets and this disagreement would reduce if banks hold 
higher capital ratio and more physical assets(Morgon, 2002).   
This finding suggests that rating companies also face difficulty in 
determining a bank’s stability level particularly if the bank holds 
large stake in loans. The opacity of loan quality becomes a huge 
information barrier between banks and outsider investors. Flannery 
et al (2013) find that, compared to nonfinancial firms, banks higher 
bid-ask spread during financial crisis, which indicates financial 
regulators could have more impact on economic downturns.  This 
leads out a more scrutiny regulation environment for banks. Loan 
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loss provision could also be a potential way for bank managers to 
convey their private information to equity holders and investors. For 
instance, Nichols et al(2009) find that public banks have more 
information asymmetry compared to other banks. Bank managers 
would make loan loss provisions more timely to alleviate opacity 
issues.  In addition, loan loss provision could be applied to 
manipulate earnings, capital or on tax purpose in order to align with 
shareholders’ interest. Literature has found a positive relationship 
between bank market value and loan loss reserves (Beaver et al, 
1989). It indicates that banks managers have the power to 
manipulate earnings to market expectation when they have a higher 
ratio of loan loss provisions. Investors also value this type of extra 
reserve as a good resort to manipulate earnings therefore showing a 
more optimistic market performance. 
Bank regulation has evolved over time. Micro-prudential approach 
has been long employed within banking industry. To prevent 
individual bank failure is a long time goal aims to protect depositors 
and investors from cost of distress (Borio, 2003). Banks to be 
regulated on micro level would encourage banks to internalize 
losses, thereby protecting the deposit insurance fund and mitigating 
moral hazard. Before the recent financial crisis, banks are regarded 
as independent units where systemic risks are assumed to be 
exogenous to the individual banks, and correlation between banks 
are ignored. Macro-prudential approach has been recently getting 
popular. Banks are endogenous inter connected, to avoid system-
wide distress with the ultimate objective to avoid reductions in GDP 
become the least goal for regulators. According to Hanson et 
al(2011), the target of systemic macro-prudential approach is to 
limit for excessive social costs associated with multiple financial 
institutions’ value shrinkage caused by a common shock.  
!
!
115!
4.3.2 The arguments about financial reporting quality 
There are raising arguments concerning the measurements on the 
profits persistence. Holian(2010) contends that most of data sources 
that used are accounting-based, which will produce several errors. 
From his study, he applied both EVA(economic value added) model 
and traditional unadjusted accounting measures to compare the 
results.  Stern, Stewart and Co(1995) argue that the accounting 
profit(net income does not take into consideration the opportunity 
cost of capital), while the EVA method can incorporate the 
opportunity cost of capital. The EVA has a different measurement 
from the basic net income. It can be Obtained by the Net operating 
profits after taxes minus Capital charge (current cost of debt and 
equity) plus the Adjustments made by stern Stewart to correct 
accounting distortions. 
Muller(1990) suggest that the outcomes of profit persistence should 
be smaller because of the availability of various accounting 
practices, that will allow managers to polish the profits. The EVA 
method aims to find the true profits. Intuitively, researchers believe 
that the profit persistence of accounting based method will be higher 
than the EVA method based profit persistence. However, the results 
from Holian(1990) suggest that the average persistence is higher 
when applying the Stern Stewart measure of economic profits rather 
than unadjusted accounting measures. It shows that the accounting 
based profits do not bias persistence upward. On the other hand, 
because of the incorporation of  the opportunity cost, the result does 
suggest lower long-term profits in the context of using EVA, this 
research also confirms that the R-square will be higher when using 
the revised EVA rather the raw accounting profit, which also 
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confirms that the managers do use accounting practices to 
manipulate the profits.   
After all, the accounting-based measurement of profit persistence 
has a potential bias since the probability of artificial influence in 
relation to accounting practices. Despite the competition–
persistence view, there are also numerical literature investigating the 
impact produced by economic shock/ cycle on accounting quality. 
Intuitively, how managers behave regarding economic factors will 
affect the profit persistence as well. This paper wills mainly focuses 
on the competition to profit persistence.  
4.3.3 The earnings persistence and earnings management  
From another dimension of the persistence study, the profit 
persistence studies using accounting oriented methods contend that 
the various factors like macroeconomic cycles will influence the 
profit persistence because the managers have incentives to manage 
earnings in order to meet different targets within various business 
cycles. The profit persistence is affected by firms’ performance and 
accounting system simultaneously. To be specific, the fundamental 
performance can be affected by both systemic and idiosyncratic 
factors.  As influences exerted from external factors like economic 
recession and inflation are not able to avoid, the managers may use 
the accounting system to manipulate earnings.  
The incentives may be related to taking a big bath during recession 
periods, window-dressing financial statements before a public 
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offering, etc(Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Empirical results from 
Collins and Kthari(1989) show a positive relationship between 
profit persistence and stock price changes, and Teoh et al(1998) also 
suggest that the companies tend to manage earnings upwards prior 
issuing equities.  The intuition behind the earnings artificial 
management is that managers will strongly avoid 
underperformances when other competitors are well-performed, by 
contrast they will write-down large assets in the balance sheet as 
losses when the whole industry is under recession, by this ’big bath’, 
managers can make the subsequent earnings smoother and persistent.  
Findings from Liu and Ryan(2006) support this behaviour, they 
found that banks tried to manage the earnings upwards during the 
financial recession by delaying provisions for losses on 
heterogeneous loans, and the banks managed the earnings 
downwards during the expansionary period by accelerating charge-
offs of homogeneous loans. All these manipulations will secure a 
more smooth earnings curve, thus stabilizing the profit persistence. 
Another research from Beatty and Liao(2011) investigating the 
relationship between lending willingness and delays in expected 
loss incorporating two recession period March 2001 to December 
2001 and  December 2007 to June 2009 show that banks inclined to 
reduce lending during recessionary relative to expansionary periods, 
in addition, banks with small delays have smaller reductions on 
loans. The loan loss provisions rule magnifies the pro-cyclicality of 
banking, which increases the possibility and incentives for bank 
managers to manage profits in order to keep profit persistence.  
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Apart from the internal earnings management from bank managers, 
the regulations on accounting system may change as well. It is 
plausible that banks are willing to disclose more information when 
they are outperforming, in contrast, when it comes to the recession, 
profitability is severely impaired, the transparency and accuracy of 
accounting quality are supposed to be lower than normal level. 
Magee and Bertomeu(2012)argue that the accounting quality 
becomes worst before a recession. All these imply the accounting 
quality has impact on the profits persistence. However, the 
incentives for managers to manipulate the earnings may differ from 
each other, there are lots of both internal and external factors 
requiring considering when it comes to financial reporting. 
For example, empirical results show that listed U.S firms have 
better accounting quality than those non-listed firms. In order to 
attract cheaper capitals through financial markets, the listed 
companies need to meet the requirements of sophisticated investors 
as well as establish the firms’ reputation. Similarly, if the firm is 
operating in an advanced economic environment with sound 
supervision and regulations, the accounting quality will also 
increase. Bharath S.T, Sunder.J, and Sunder.S.V(2008) find that the 
accounting quality is positively related to firms’ financing choices. 
To be specific, with poorer accounting quality borrowers preferring 
private debt, bank lending will result in higher cost compared to the 
financial market. Firms with good accounting quality will benefit 
from effective financial market as low required rate on debt. 
However, firms with high potential growth will choose private 
funding resources rather than the public funding resources (i.e., 
corporate bond in financial market),this may due the consideration 
on the significant flexibility of the private debt. For example, the 
borrowing contract with a certain bank will be more customizable 
than with public investors. Additionally, the private-debt can be 
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renegotiated to some extend before it matures, it is much favourable 
when a firm is growing fast. 
Specific to banking industry, empirical results show the regulation, 
SFAS 133, on how banks are required to report the value of the 
derivative have significant impact on the banks’ profit 
persistence(Kilic, E., et al 2012). SFAS 133, which enacted in 1998, 
changed accounting standard for derivatives substantially by 
enforcing recognition of all derivative instruments at their fair 
values and imposing stricter criteria for a derivative to classify as a 
hedge. Consequently, the profits of banks are more volatile 
responding to the uncertainty of the values of derivatives. As a 
result, banks lose the ability to smooth income via derivatives, the 
research finds empirical evidence that banks rely more on loan loss 
provisions to smooth profit. In this context, if the loan loss 
provisions changed significantly, the bank managers have intended 
to artificial smooth its earnings.   
Other external factors can be auditing, economic shocks, tax-rate 
and so on. The incentives also can be influenced by the ownership 
of the firm in conjunction with size,fianancial leverage and industry. 
Isidro and Raonic(2012)find that firms cross-listed generally have 
better information quality than their non-US listed peers. Since 
Cross-listed firm can access cheaper external funds. Similarly, the 
international conglomerates usually have higher accounting quality. 
All of above factors probably affect the incentives of the firms’ 
earnings manipulations.   
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A more deep discussion on the firm reporting incentives and 
institutional factors from Isidro and Raonic(2012) suggest that the 
financial reporting quality increases in the presence of strong 
monitoring mechanisms. It can be represented by ownership 
concentration, analyst scrutiny, effective auditing, external financial 
needs etc. Different incentives from managers and different 
endogenous and exogenous factors will affect the firms-accounting 
quality thus influence the quality of ‘numbers’ that observed from 
the financial reports. Since the main target is to measure the profit 
persistence. The importance of the accounting quality should not be 
ignored.   
Li(2008) investigate how the earnings persistence correlated with 
the accounting readability. In this research, a measurement of 
accounting readability is introduced called FOG. It is developed by 
Robert Gunning, the mechanism is to capture the text complexity as 
a function of syllables per word and words per sentence. The index 
obtained is interpreted as how long (in years) that a formal 
educational reader with average intelligence needs to read the text 
once and understand that piece of writing with its word-sentence 
workload. Li argues that the managers can use the length of annual 
reports as well as the complicity to hide adverse information thus 
making the annual reports less transparent.  A high Fog index 
referred to a less transparent annual report, by contrast, low Fog 
index will result in concise description and more comprehensible in 
the report, which indicates high transparency. After building 
connection with earning persistence and the Fog Index, a negative 
relationship has been founded, suggesting that if the manager is 
trying to hide adverse information using more complicated words 
and longer sentences will lead a lower earnings persistence. 
Earnings forecasting is a big part of investment appraisals when 
considering to invest certain company. Baginsk. S.P, Hassell.J.M 
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and Kimbrough M.D(2003) suggest that the managers are more 
likely to announce earnings forecast that containing external 
attributions(56.5%), such as macro-economic changes or 
governmental issues compared to internal factors like strategic 
changes in price, advertising, new products, cutting cost, M&A etc. 
Additionally, 29.4% of samples that investigated using only external 
attributions rather than internal attributions. Since more relevant 
information released in the report, it will be beneficial for analysts 
and investors to compare different underlying companies, hence 
increase the transparency. 
In hindsight, a bad performance will definitely lead to a low 
earnings persistence, thus managers trying to confuse investors in 
the annual report with more complicated words have no significant 
impact. Conversely, there should be an implication that the 
managers are trying to apply every possible mean to obscure the bad 
results. To some extend, Accounting quality is increasingly crucial, 
since the earnings persistence has large potential to be influenced 
artificially.   
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4.4 Methodology 
This paper will use two-step approach to conduct the analysis. The 
first step will focus on the persistence of profits, here the partial 
adjustment model is applied to determine the profit persistence 
level. Full model will be explained next. Then in the second step, 
we run regressions on these calculated profit persistence coefficients 
against a vector of bank-specific determinant factors, including 
market power, initial profitability, bank size, growth, managerial 
efficiency (cost to income ratio), diversification, etc., while 
controlling for macro-economic condition variables, such as real 
GDP growth, inflation rate, etc.  
4.4.1 Earnings Management Measure: Discretionary loan loss 
provision 
Discretionary loan loss provision becomes the most common 
vehicle to manipulate bank earnings after the launch of Statements 
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (short for SFAS 133), 
which requires firms to measure total assets and liabilities at fair 
value on the balance sheet (Liu and Ryan, 2006). We hence follow 
Beatty and Liao (2014), Cohen et al. (2014), Cornett et al. (2009) 
and Cheng and Warfield (2005) to use the discretionary loan loss 
provision (DLLP) model to measure bank earnings management. 
The absolute value of the residual from estimating equation (1) as 
shown below represents the degree of each bank’s earnings 
management. The error term represents the unexplained component 
of the regression and hence is treated as the Discretionary Loan 
Loss Provisions (DLLP). 
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The loan loss provision is crucial to banks. In banking literature, 
loan loss provision is the heart of examination of accruals. In 
contrast to non-financial firms, which tends to study overall accruals, 
total current accruals or total earnings. Loan loss provision is the 
foundation of measuring bank performance, because loan loss 
provision is not only about loan loss of a bank, but also reflecting 
information asymmetry degree.  According to Beatty Liao(2014), 
information asymmetry is the heart of bank, and loan loss provision 
explains much of variability in total accruals of a bank. Specifically, 
loan loss provision accounts for 56% of total accruals, while it also 
explains 34% of variation of total accruals.  
A good virtue of using loan loss provision to measure earnings 
management is the reliability. When using LLP, the discretion 
accruals estimated is less subjective to measurement issues than 
measures that combine many accounts are combined in an 
aggregated accrual measure.  Another issue with banking study is 
data availability. To detect the total operating accruals for banks has 
been more challenging than ordinary companies. Because banks are 
lack of statement of cash flows in either regulatory or databases. On 
the other hand, regulators require detailed information related to 
bank loan loss provision, they do not require a statement of cash 
flows. It is obvious that bank regulators regard loan loss provisions 
more importantly compared to cash flow statements.   
Bank cash flow statements are less attractive to loan loss provision 
reports in the eye of bank regulators. However, a recent focus on 
bank cash flow arises from investors. For example, the market 
analyst forecasts on cash flow for banks have been increased from 
2.8% in 1995 to 34.5% in 2005, the figure for nonfinancial firms 
was 14.3% in 1995 and 57.1% in 2005. It indicates a strong 
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emphasis from market analysts on cash flow statement for banks 
during the last decade compared to other industries.  
The development of loan loss provision is also vital particularly to 
US banks. Before 1993, FAS 5 instructed bank in terms of how to 
report impaired all receivables and loans. Since the adoption of FAS 
114 in 1995, regulator offered a more detailed guidance for banks 
specifically on those potential losses from loan defaults. It clarifies 
the importance of reporting both collectivities of interests and 
principal on loans. FAS 114 requires impairment recognition when 
a loss is probable based on the past events and conditions at 
financial statement date. The possible loss calculation is based on 
the present value of loans which accounting for all future cash flows.  
Loan loss provision not only affects bank accruals, but also affect 
bank regulatory capitals. According to Basel accord, loan loss 
allowance is included in primary capital, a one-dollar increase in the 
loan loss provision increased regulatory capital by the tax rate 
multiplied by one dollar. Therefore, banks might increase loan loss 
provision to meet regulatory standard.  
In this study, we use Discretionary loan loss provision model to 
estimate bank earnings management. We hence follow Beatty and 
Liao (2014), Cohen et al. (2014), Cornett et al. (2009) and Cheng 
and Warfield (2005) to use the discretionary loan loss provision 
(DLLP) model to measure bank earnings management. This model 
states as follows: 
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Loan Loss Provisionit = !"# Sizeit + !"$  ΔLoan Charge-
offsit !+!"& ΔLoansit !+!"' ΔNon-performing Loansit !!!+!"( ΔNon-
performing Loansit-1 +!")ΔNon-performing Loansit+1 + ε+,   (1)               
Where Sizeit is the natural logarithm of total assets, ΔLoan Charge-
offsit represents the difference in total loan charge-offs between 
periods t and t-1, ΔLoansit represents the difference in total loans 
between periods t and t-1, ΔNon-performing Loansit reflects the 
change in non-performing loans between periods t and t-1, ΔNon-
performing Loansit-1 reflects the change in non-performing loans 
between periods t-1 and t-2, and ΔNon-performing Loansit+1 
represents the change in non-performing loans between periods t+1 
and t. All the variables except Size in Equation (1) are deflated by 
the book value of total assets of each bank.  
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4.4.2 The partial adjustment model 
In the partial adjustment model, the banks’ current return level 
(ROA) is a weighted average of its target ROA ratio: 
ROAit-ROAit-1=  (ROA*it-ROAit-1)+!-+.                       (3) 
Where ROAit is the return on total asset for bank i at year t. the 
ROA*it is the target return on total asset for bank i at year t.  The  
means the proportional adjustment during one year for bank i, in 
this context, lambda captures how the sample banks are operating 
away from its expected returns. Alternatively, ROA is predicted to 
mean revert to a target level which is ROA* here.  Since our main 
interest is to see how the market competition could influence the 
profit persistence level, the partial adjustment model gives us a 
perfect match to capture each bank’s persistence level.  here is the 
adjustment speed for banks towards target rate, we can simply use 
(1- ) to represent our main persistence measure.  By applying the 
dynamic property of partial adjustment model, we could estimate 
each bank’s profit persistence level at a time-varying frame.   
Because the expected ROA is unknown in our model, we follow 
Healy, et al(2014) to use a cross-section model to estimate each 
bank’s target ROA.  Then, The ROA* can be determined by: 
λi
λi
λi
λi
!
!
127!
ROA*it = "+Xit+Uit+-+.                      (4) 
Where Xit-1 is a vector of bank and macroeconomic characteristics 
that can influence the ROA. By considering each bank has different 
idiosyncratic factors that would potentially affect the target ROA. 
We further control the bank fixed effects. In the model, The Uit is 
the fixed effects to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
Substituting eq(4) into eq(3) and rearranging yields, it becomes the 
following specification: 
ROAit= "+Xit+(1- )ROAit-1+ (Uit)+ -+.            (5)           
From equation(5),it can be seen that In the partial adjustment model, 
the bank’s current ROA is a weighted average (with the  between 
0 and 1) of its expected ROA*,and the ROA of its previous period, 
as well as the unobservable fixed effects and random shocks. 
Regarding the adjustment speed, if the  is small, it means the 
adjustment speed is slow, representing a long time for a bank to 
return to its target after a shock the bank’s ROA. On the other hand, 
the (1- ) term before the lag value of ROA in equation (5) is 
treated as an inertial fact in the partial adjustment model. In our 
study, it is the profit persistence level. The smaller the  is, the 
bigger the (1- ) will be, if the bank’s speed of adjustment is equal 
to 0, it means the profit persistence coefficient ‘(1- )’will be equal 
to 1, indicating an unchanged profit level forever. However, if the 
(1- ) equals 0, there is not any relationship between current and 
last period profit, hence there is no persistence in profits. 
λi λi λi
λi
λi
λi
λi
λi
λi
λi
!
!
128!
In the partial adjustment model, the expected return(ROA*) is 
unavailable and it is not necessarily constant over time. Here we 
follow Fama and French(2006) to build a model to estimate the 
expected ROA.  
The cross-sectional model for estimating ROA* can be summarized 
as: 
ROA*it = "/ + "# Income Diversificationit + "$ Non-Performing 
Loansit + "& Revenueit + !"' Capital Ratioit + !"( Sizeit 
+!")Management Efficiencyit   +!"0Loansit +!-+.          (6) 
 
 
 
Where Income Diversification is the non-interest income to total 
revenue ratio, the variable of Non-Performing Loans is the non-
performing loans to total asset ratio, revenue is total revenue to total 
asset ratio and the capital ratio is the total equity to total assets ratio, 
size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Management Efficiency 
is calculated via total costs divided by total revenues and Loans is 
the total net loans over total assets. We follow Healy et al(2014) to 
construct our variables, ensuring that the expect ROA measured is 
suitable for the next stage analysis. 
Our estimation of expected ROA differs from the standard partial 
adjustment model, which is widely used in the capital structure 
measure of the future target of capital ratio(Flannery and Rangan 
2006). Following the proposal from Healy.P etc(2014), the current 
explanatory variables are used to measure the expected current ROA. 
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Differs from the measure of target capital ratio, the current period 
variables should be sufficient to predict the current period expected 
ROA, as long as the expected ROA does not contain the abnormal 
profits, the model will hold. We then plug the explanatory variables 
from equation (6) into equation (5), then the coefficient can be 
measured within one step. We use Fama-Macbeth regression to 
analyse the first stage partial adjustment model, while the estimated 
coefficients are further extracted for determining ROA*.  
Under the assumption of partial adjustment model, the adjustments 
will be conducted if there is a gap between the expected ROA and 
the actual ROA. Here we use GAP to define the difference between 
them:  
GAPit-1= ROA*it-ROAit-1                                                                      (7) 
In the basic formation of Partial adjustment model, the adjustment 
speed is fixed for all the banks across time. In another word, the 
persistence level for banks is firm and time-invariant. In order to test 
whether our competition measures could affect the profit persistence 
level, we need to relax the adjustment speed, and allow it to be firm 
and time variant. we therefore modify the partial adjustment model 
by inserting a vector of characteristics to allow the adjustment speed 
to become a dynamic indicator: 
ROAit-ROAit-1=( +!1it-1Z )GAPit-1+!-+.                       (8) λi
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Here we assume the lambda is dynamic, it can vary over time and 
banks. From equation(5), we know that the profit persistence is 
determined by the adjustment speed( ), and the persistence 
coefficients is calculated as (1- ), since we assume the partial 
adjustment speed can be influenced by the potential internal and 
external factors, similarly, we can obtain a set of different profit 
persistence coefficients that vary over year and bank.   
GAPit-1 is calculated as the result of ROA*it-ROAit-1, Z is a vector of 
the bank-level and macroeconomic characteristics. 1 is a vector of 
coefficients, it is the interaction term  directly tests how the 
adjustment speed is influenced by the bank’s particular variables 
representing market power(Lerner), deregulation index(IBBEA). 
The estimated coefficients represent the incremental mean reversion 
associated with those three particular indicators. The standard errors 
are clustered both in the firm and year levels to control for serial 
correlation.  To explore which factors are related to the bank-level 
differences upon the adjustment speed. Firstly, we estimate the 
expected ROA from equation(6) to get the GAP, which is calculated 
as ROA*it-ROAit-1. Secondly, we employ equation(8) to test the 
impact from the potential determinants on lambda.   
In addition to those two primary factors that we interested, several 
bank-level control variables and macroeconomic determinants are 
included. All variables are introduced as follows: 
Bank ΔLLP= change loan loss provisions. According to (Kilic, E., 
et al,2012), the bank's managers are able to use hedge derivatives 
and LLP to smooth income. After the SFAS 133, stricter standard 
λi
λi
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on accounting required the value of derivatives to be marked to 
market, so banks are inclined to reply more on LLP to smooth the 
profit. The changes in LLP can capture the behaviour of banks. It is 
also an indicator that the profit of persistence can be artificially 
affected by accounting methods. 
Bank size = log(total assets). Previous findings are ambiguous on 
the relationship between firms size and profit persistence. A big 
firm might have reached its present size because of constant 
superior performance; however, there is also evidence of the 
inefficiency of large firms (Yurtoglu, 2004; Gschwandtner, 2005). 
Bank risks = Z-score. We measure bank risk by the Z-score – the 
sum of ROA and equity to assets ratio divided by the standard 
deviation of ROA (the lower the Z-score value, the greater is the 
bank risk). Berger et al. (2000) suggest that high risk positively 
affects earnings persistence during economic expansion periods and 
negatively influences earnings persistence during economic 
recession periods. Firms with low profitability are forced to take 
risks to try to raise their profitability levels and firms with persistent 
profits seem to be associated with lower risk. Mueller (1986) finds 
that the profits of companies with persistently above-normal returns 
seem to vary less over the business cycle than do the profits of the 
average firm and the profits of persistently below-normal companies 
exhibit greater than normal pro-cyclical variability.  
Bank growth = growth rate of the bank assets. We expect a positive 
sign on the growth coefficient as suggested by Yurtoglu (2004). The 
positive relationship between can be explained because high growth 
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banks have better ability as management.  The return is normally 
upward trending, which makes bank easier to catch their target and 
make the return more persistent. 
Managerial Efficiency = cost to income ratio. With common 
wisdom, we expect that more efficient banks tend to have higher 
profit persistence. This is because higher managerial efficiency 
indicates the higher capability of banks to maintain their 
profitability. Please be noted, the Managerial Efficiency ratio is 
reversely correlated with the management. Because higher ratio 
indicates high cost related to income, therefore, we believe this ratio 
is negatively correlated with persistence rate. 
Diversification = non-interest income divided by total revenue, 
reflects a business expansion opportunity for banks, contributing to 
an increased ability of banks to sustain their profitability. By 
diversifying into non-traditional banking businesses, banks have 
more sources of income, such as fee or trading income, rather than 
solely relying on loan business. Hence, banks may have more ability 
to sustain their profits from previous year. However, theoretical and 
empirical evidence on this is not clear and never examined. 
Therefore, we have no expectation on this relationship. (De Young 
and Rice, 2004; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). 
For macroeconomic-level controls, we apply inflation (Angelini and 
Cetorilli, 2003; Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Boyd et al, 2001; 
Goddard et al., 2011), GDP growth and GDP per capita (Albertazzi 
and Gambacorta, 2009; Goddard et al., 2011). Goddard et al. (2011) 
find that inflation is positively related to earnings persistence of 
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banks because under a high inflation environment, the prices of 
financial services, such as interest rates, become less informative 
(Claessens and Laeven, 2004), thereby offering banks more pricing 
power as well as earning manipulation opportunities, resulting in 
higher earnings persistence. GDP growth and GDP per capita could 
help banks increase the persistence of their earnings because GDP 
growth provides banks more business opportunities (Albertazzi and 
Gambacorta, 2009; Goddard et al., 2011). 
The banking market is less likely to be competitive when it is 
subject to high inflation, as the prices of financial services, such as 
interest rates, are less informative (Claessens and Laeven, 2004), 
and will in turn exacerbate credit market frictions (Boyd et al, 2001). 
The banks can whether manager to reduce the GAP between the 
expected profit or maintain their current profitability, the impact of 
inflation can be two sides. A positive relationship is expected 
between real GDP growth and business opportunities for banks. The 
increased business opportunities may help banks to sustain their 
profits. Therefore an association might be expected between growth 
in GDP and the persistence of profit. On the other hand, the 
availability of business opportunities might lead to an intensification 
of competition, in which case a negative relationship would be 
expected between GDP growth and the persistence of profit. 
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4.5 Data 
To explore the impact of earnings management on earnings 
persistence, we combine data from several sources. We obtain bank-
specific data on banks’ balance sheets and income statements from 
Federal Reserve Report of Condition and Income (Call Reports). 
We link the bank-specific data to branching restriction index of each 
state (Johnson and Rice, 2008) and macroeconomic information 
from World Bank database. Finally, our full sample includes 15,546 
banks with a total of 226153 firm-year observations from 51 states 
over the period of 1986-2013.   
4.5.1 Measure of Earnings Management 
Earnings management is calculated using formula (1), and the 
results for regression results are shown in table 1. We found that 
Size has significant impact on loan loss provisions. The coefficients 
are positive and significant at 1% level. In column(1) and column(2) 
where the fixed effects are not controlled. The t-statistics are over 
80, showing that bigger bank has higher loan loss provisions. For 
example, if size increases by 1%, loan loss provision to total loans 
ratio will increase by 14.6% percent. In terms of other variables, we 
found that the Non performing loans at different timing windows 
also has positive relationship between loan loss provision.  
Column(3) and column(4) show the regression results after 
controlling bank fixed effects. We now found that on average the t-
statistics have reduced significantly, while the coefficients are still 
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significant at 1% level. By running different design of regression 
models, we get consistent analysis estimates. Then we use estimates 
from Colum(4) to analyze discretionary loan loss provisions. To be 
specific, the error term of the column(4) is collected and transferred 
into absolute value term to indicate the degree of earnings 
management. The reason for taking absolute value of error term is 
because bank can either use LLP to magnify(negative error) or 
hide(positive error) earnings. As a consequence, the absolute value 
of the error can effectively indicate the degree of earnings 
management. The estimated earnings management is summarized in 
the basic statistics section. 
Table 1 
Measure of Bank earning management 
This table presents the earnings management measure of banks. Using the Discretionary LLP model 
that following Beatty & Liao(2014), All the variables except Size in Equation (1) are deflated by the 
book value of total assets of each bank.    
Dependent Variable Loan Loss Provisions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sizeit 0.146*** 0.138*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 
 
(93.12) (87.88) (2.68) (2.68)    
D.Charge-offit 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 
(302.37) (307.56) (3.42) (3.42)    
D.loansit -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.009* -0.009*   
 
(-35.39) (-33.89) (-1.90) (-1.90)    
D.NPLit-1 0.126*** 0.140*** -0.007 -0.007    
 
(38.57) (42.46) (-0.09) (-0.09)    
D.NPLit 0.346*** 0.334*** 0.273** 0.273**  
 
(196.31) (190.26) (2.10) (2.10)    
D.NPLit+1 0.028*** 0.068*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 
 
(11.34) (16.70) (4.22) (4.22)    
Constant 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.006** 0.006**  
 
(22.62) (10.63) (2.35) (2.35)    
Time fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes 
Max VIF 6.10 7.21 7.43 5.67 
N 226153 226153 226153 226153 
adj. R-sq 0.4486 0.4607 0.3860 0.3860    
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         4.5.2 Summary statistics  
Table 2 displays summary statistics of variables based for the whole 
sample period which includes 15,546 banks with a total of 226153 
firm-year observations from 51 states over the period of 1986-2013. 
Appendix I shows the definitions of the variables. We winsorize all 
variables except Size at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the 
influence of outliers. The mean value of target ROA is 1.048% and 
the mean value of realized ROA is 0.974%, resulting in a positive 
GAP of 0.09%. These figures are consistent with studies that use 
Call Reports database (Beatty et al., 2002; Ellul and Yerramilli, 
2013). Branching Restriction Index ranges from zero to four and the 
mean value of this index is 2.06, indicating that the US states 
overall apply IBBEA but create on average two barriers for 
interstate branching. Adjusted Lerner Index is equal to 0.8, which is 
in line with that reported by Cohen et al. (2014) and Kothari et al. 
(2005). The absolute mean value of Discretionary Loan Loss 
Provisions (i.e., earnings management) is 0.44, indicating that 
earnings management accounts for 0.278% of total assets (= 0.44 
multiplied by the mean value of Loan to asset).  
The average Z-score of US banks is around 24. On average, US 
banks lend 63% of their assets as loans and hold 9.8% equity to 
assets ratio. The average size of US banks is 11.3 billion dollars, 
and the average asset growth is equal to 8.7%. The average value of 
costs to income ratio, a proxy for banks’ managerial efficiency, is 
equal to 79.2%. The US banks, on average, generate around 10% of 
total revenue from non-interest income. Both the GDP growth and 
Inflation range from 2% to 3%.  
!
!
137!
 
 
Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics include 15,546 banks with a total of 226153 firm-year 
observations from 51 states over the period of 1986-2013. ROA* is estimated using the first stage of 
the partial adjustment model, ROAit =λi"iXit-1 + (1- λi) ROAit-1+ -it, GAPit=ROA*it-1-ROAit-1.  ΔROA= 
ROAit-ROAit-1. We use Fama-Macbeth regression to estimate the ROA* in the first stage. Appendix 
presents the definitions of variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Name Observations Mean Std.dev Minimum Maximum 
Target ROA(ROA*) 226153 1.048 0.530 -2.834 2.424 
ROA 226153 0.974 0.723 -4.440 2.961 
GAP 226153 0.091 0.766 -2.908 4.520 
ΔROA 226153 0.030 0.682 -7.401 7.401 
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions 226153 0.435 0.270 0.011 1.319 
Adjusted Lerner Index 226153 0.793 0.085 0.557 0.962 
Z-score 226153 24.132 17.069 0.428 83.816 
Capital Ratio 226153 9.799 3.460 3.992 36.872 
Loan to Total Asset 226153 63.118 20.751 13.274 148.805 
Size 226153 11.339 1.296 8.679 15.734 
Total Assets Growth  226153 8.686 15.879 -18.691 125.575 
Managerial Efficiency 226153 79.205 8.741 54.076 104.290 
Income Diversification 226153 10.131 7.519 0.492 53.253 
Inflation 226153 2.463 0.763 0.879 3.793 
GDP Growth 226153 2.746 1.585 -3.109 4.869 
GDP Per Capita 226153 10.307 0.304 9.822 10.819 
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Table 3 
Correlation Matrix 
This table report the correlation covariance, Earnings Management is calculated by applying the discretionary loan loss provision model (Beatty & Liao, 2014). The absolute 
value of the error term is regarded as the discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP) and the degree of Earnings Management.  All other variables are defined in the appendix. 
*represents the significance level of 5%. 
  Earnings 
Management Z-score 
Leverage 
ratio 
Loan to 
total asset Size 
Total 
Assets 
Growth rate 
Managerial 
efficiency 
Income 
diversification 
GDP 
growth 
rate 
Inflation 
GDP 
per 
capita 
Earnings Management 1 
          Z-score -0.2256* 1 
         Leverage ratio 0.2161* -0.3399* 1 
        Loan to total asset 0.4713* -0.2200* 0.1978* 1 
       Size 0.1193* -0.0048* 0.1136* 0.3053* 1 
      Total Assets Growth rate 0.1413* -0.1356* 0.0901* 0.5595* 0.1605* 1 
     Managerial efficiency 0.1338* -0.1936* 0.2945* -0.1183* -0.2847* -0.0209* 1 
    Income diversification 0.0042* -0.1550* -0.0564* 0.0388* 0.2958* 0.0499* -0.1031* 1 
   GDP growth rate -0.2517* 0.0110* 0.0389* -0.0452* -0.1143* 0.0227* -0.0119* -0.0621* 1 
  Inflation -0.001 -0.0232* 0.1187* -0.0897* -0.1314* -0.0166* 0.2297* -0.1294* -0.0028 1 
 GDP per capita -0.2041* 0.0082* -0.2167* 0.2455* 0.3253* 0.0170* -0.3298* 0.2303* -0.3134* -0.3902* 1 
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4.6 First stage estimation 
We estimate the expect ROA via equation (6), and the GAPit-
1(ROA*it-ROAit-1) is obtained. Table 3 shows the results of the first 
stage regression results. In column (1), We follow Flannery (2006), 
Healy (2014) to use Fame-Macbeth regression to estimate ROA. 
Additionally, we use OLS estimation to test the first stage 
regression. In order to control for the bank level specific 
unobservable characteristics, we control for bank fixed effects and 
firm fixed effects using two different strategies. Finally, The fitted 
value of the regression has been obtained.  All the coefficients of 
ROA are positive and significant at 1% level, showing all the banks 
have a positive static profit persistent level. When using the Fama-
mecbeth strategy, the persistent degree is highest. On average, banks 
can maintain 51% of the profit. From column (2) and (3), the 
average profit persistent level is only 39%.   
Results from controls variables show that most bank individual 
factors have significant impact on ROA: Loans, Diversification, 
Managerial Efficiency, Total assets etc. For example, Revenue 
shows significant positive coefficient on ROA, the impact on 
average is statistical and economically significant at 1% level. 
Loans have negative impact on ROA, banks with loan business 
focused normally have lack of profitability. Interestingly, greater 
size will lead to lower profitability. On the other hand, we found 
that diversification is beneficial to bank profitability. Also, banks 
with higher Managerial Efficiency(lower cost to income ratio) 
would result in higher ROA. Finally, if a bank grows fast, the ROA 
will together show a growth trend.  Comparing to other two 
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columns, the sign of coefficients before variables are the same, 
while the magnitudes are slightly different. Overall, all these 3 
columns show similar outcomes. Then I only use the results from 
Fama-Macbeth to gauge the Target ROA. Please note, we also tried 
used regression results that applied in column 2 and 3 to get the 
fitted value of ROA to make a comparison, the estimated ROA is 
very similar, and therefore we mainly use Fama-Mecbeth results 
into our subsequent results. The estimates are presented in summary 
statistics.  
The first row of table 2 shows the basic summary statistics of Target 
ROA, Comparing Target ROA(the estimated expected ROA) to 
ROA(reported ROA), Target ROA has a slightly higher mean value 
than ROA(1.04% vs 0.97%). The Target ROA has a value between -
2.8% to 2.4%, while ROA has a wider range from -4.4% to 2.9%, 
this might be due to the random shocks. Thus, the ROA has a 
greater standard deviation than Target ROA (0.72% vs 0.53%).  
Based on the comparison between ROA* and realized ROA, we 
believe our estimation is accurate and efficient. Because (1) banks 
normally will set a higher target then the actually ROA, and the 
target is slightly higher than the realized one(mean: 1.04% vs 0.97%) 
shows that the target is not a random set. (2) the realized ROA has a 
wider bandwidth than the expected ROA, since in reality, 
performance can be affected by external random shocks, therefore it 
is reasonable that target ROA has a smaller range of values. (3) 
According to the profit persistence theory, the bank is willing to 
smooth ROA to keep a lower volatility on ROA, which in results 
show a lower standard deviation of ROA. In ideal situation, the 
abnormal return should be last as long as possible, therefore we 
observe that the target ROA has a lower standard deviation 
compared to the realized ROA.  
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After ROA and target ROA comparison, we move forward to the 
GAP and DROA, In detail, DROAit is calculated as ROAit-ROAit-1, 
and the GAPit-1 is calculated as Target ROAit-ROAit-1.  From table 4, 
GAP ranges from -2.9% to 4.5%, on the other hand, DROA has a 
value between -7.4% and 7.4%. Interestingly, DROA has a smaller 
standard deviation than GAP. At least half of DROA is below 0, 
however, less than 50% of GAP has a negative value. Furthermore, 
there is a significant constraint magnitude of mean value of DROA 
compared to GAP (0.03% vs 0.09%). This might be evidence that 
banks are smoothing their profits. However, the situation can be 
ambiguous since banks can be either objective to the 
target(TARGET ROA) or to the profit persistence. If the banks are 
operating worse than expectations, they should adjust fast to reach 
the target, conversely, if the banks are operating better than 
expectations, they might strive to smooth their profits.       
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Table 4 
First Stage Partial Adjustment Model 
This table reports the results of first stage partial adjustment model assuming a static earnings adjustment 
speed. ROAit =λi훽iXit-1 + (1- λi) ROAit-1+ 휀it, (1- λi) is the level of persistence of ROA. In column (1), We 
We follow Flannery (2006), Healy (2014) to use Fame-Macbeth regression to estimate ROA. Additionally, 
two additional analysis have been incorporated. We use OLS estimation to test the first stage regression. In 
order to control for the bank level specific unobservable characteristics, we controls for bank fixed effects 
and firm fixed effects using two different strategies. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 
10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. In this regression, we use the original values of these 
ratios instead of percentages. Appendix presents the definitions of variables.!
Dependent Variable ROAt+1 
  Fama-Mecbeth  OLS OLS 
    ROA 0.512*** 0.392*** 0.380*** 
 
(22.06) (64.21) (61.69) 
Revenue 0.001*   0.000*** 0.032 
 
(1.74) (3.99) (0.09) 
Leverage 0.021 0.008*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.37) (10.00) (5.69) 
Loans -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(-4.54)    (-33.47) (-24.84) 
Total Assets -0.001**  -0.001*** -0.000* 
 
(-2.21)    (-10.21) (-1.95) 
Diversification 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(3.42) (12.17) (11.4) 
Managerial Efficiency -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 
(-13.97)    (-42.56) (-37.22) 
Growth Rate of Total Assets  0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 
(6.11) (29.47) (21.62) 
Constant -0.001** 0.000 0.005*** 
 
(-2.02) (0.59) (11.26) 
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects No Yes Yes 
MAX VIF 5.29 4.38 4.35 
N 226097 226097 226097 
adj. R-sq   0.431 0.409 
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4.7 Second stage estimation 
In the second stage, we apply the model stated as equation(8) to 
estimate the impact from earnings management on earnings 
adjustment coefficients. Before the interaction with GAP, we further 
standardize all the variables for better interpretation.    
The main hypotheses: 
      1), Earnings Management increases profit persistence rate. 
To test the main hypotheses, we use the following modified model 
to estimate the impact from market power and earnings management: 
ROAit-ROAit-1=( +!"it-1Z )GAPit-1+!#$%                       (8) 
Here we assume the lambda is dynamic, it can vary over time and 
banks. From equation(5), we know that the profit persistence is 
determined by the adjustment speed( ), and the persistence 
coefficients is calculated as (1- ), since we assume the partial 
adjustment speed can be influenced by the potential internal and 
external factors, similarly, we can obtain a set of different profit 
persistence coefficients that vary over year and bank. Again, a high 
λi
λi
λi
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adjustment speed of earnings indicates a low degree of profit 
persistence. 
GAPit-1 is calculated as the result of ROA*it-ROAit-1, Z is a vector of 
the bank-level and macroeconomic characteristics. " is a vector of 
coefficients, it is the interaction term directly tests how the 
adjustment speed is influenced by the bank’s particular variables 
representing earnings management, is our main interest. The 
estimated coefficients represent the incremental mean reversion 
associated with those three particular indicators.  
Table 5 reports the regressions results for the second stage 
estimation of Equation (7). We standardize all variables in the 
regression. The coefficient of Earnings Management is negative and 
significant across all the 4 columns. A negative regression 
coefficient of Earnings management indicates that banks 
manipulated more earnings tend to slow their earnings adjustment 
speed. The coefficients are significant at 1% level. This result is in 
accordance with earnings management and profit persistence theory 
that banks tried to increase profit persistence by applying earnings 
management vehicles (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). In addition, the 
impact of earnings management on earnings adjustment speed 
remain strong after controlling bank level market power and risk. In 
particular, we input Lerner index into our regression analysis we 
control for potential bias occurred by the bank market power. For 
instance, a bank with higher market power might have stronger 
incentive to pertain a persistent ROA. Because the cost to 
manipulate earnings could be less compared to those with lower 
market power. In Table 5, results suggest a strong and negative 
correlation between Lerner index and earnings adjustment speed. 
The coefficient is both statistically and economically significant. A 
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one standard deviation increase in Lerner index would induce a 
decrease of 34.9 percent on the speed of earnings adjustment. These 
results show that bank earnings management is unassociated with 
competition when considering the earnings persistence.  
In addition, we find that the coefficients of Capital Ratio are 
significant and positive, indicating that banks with higher capital 
ratio adjust earnings faster. Size shows a significantly negative 
impact on the adjustment speed, suggesting that larger banks tend to 
have more persistent earnings than their smaller counterparts. Z-
score also has significant impact on profit persistence. It shows that 
regression results are safer banks can preserve more consistent 
earning stream. Similar results have been found in column (2). We 
also find that high managerial efficiency is beneficial to profit 
persistence.  
For instance, Efficiency helps smooth earnings in two ways, first, 
intensive management in accounting reports subjects in the financial 
reports enable managers to manipulate earnings, hence smooth 
earnings.  Second, active management in noninterest income reduce 
the overall risk of operations, unexpected losses and earnings might 
offset internal therefore the profits can be more persistence. In terms 
of assets structure, we find banks with more loans issued have a 
lower profit persistence level. In addition, larger banks have more 
persistent earnings, possibly because they usually have more market 
power.  In the regression we consistently control time and bank 
fixed effects, the R-square is around 70% showing that our 
regression model has considerable explanatory 
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Table 5 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed  
This table presents the OLS results for Partial Adjustment Model (ROAit - ROAit-1 = ( λi + γit-
1Z ) GAPit-1 + #it ,GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1). We assume that λi to be dynamic, so it varies 
among banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent variables. The Lerner index is a bank-
level indicator of bank competition, by adopting the stochastic frontier analysis approach, it is 
calculated as the difference between price and marginal cost as a percentage of prices, the detailed 
methodology of Lerner index measure is described in appendix. Earnings Management is 
calculated by applying the discretionary loan loss provision model (Liu and Ryan, 2006). The 
absolute value of the error term is regarded as the discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP) and the 
degree of Earnings Management.  All other variables are defined in the appendix. T-statistics are 
reported in the parentheses ,*, **, *** represents the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.  
Earnings Management -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.025*** -0.020*** 
 
(-4.28) (-4.28) (-5.87)    (-4.71)    
Lerner Index 
 
-0.349*** 
 
-0.365*** 
  
(-6.82) 
 
(-7.04)    
Z-score 
  
-0.066*** -0.063*** 
   
(-13.72)    (-13.06)    
Capital Ratio -0.178*** -0.185*** -0.195*** -0.173*** 
 
(-2.95) (-2.91) (-3.18) (-2.85) 
Loan to Total Asset 0.057*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.071*** 
 
(12.64) (12.33) (12.63) (12.6) 
Size -0.073*** -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.072*** 
 
(-13.51) (-11.09) (-10.78)    (-12.95)    
Total Assets Growth Rate -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
 
(-3.87) (-4.25) (-5.06)    (-5.03)    
Managerial Efficiency -0.326*** 0.026*** 0.025*** -0.342*** 
 
(-6.27) (7.58) (7.63) (-6.50)    
Income Diversification 0.010*** -0.001 0.000 0.010*** 
 
(2.73) (-0.19) (-0.03)    (2.82) 
GDP Growth Rate -0.062*** -0.071*** -0.085*** -0.070*** 
 
(-21.25) (-21.89) (-25.60)    (-21.46)    
Inflation -0.071*** -0.077*** -0.062*** -0.077*** 
 
(-21.95) (-22.55) (-17.77)    (-22.62)    
GDP Per Capita -0.261*** -0.265*** -0.376*** -0.275*** 
 
(-45.37) (-40.89) (-40.50)    (-39.28)    
Constant 0.672*** 0.680*** 0.841*** 0.680*** 
 
(184.43) (164.45) (85.75) (165.91) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Max VIF 3.98 4.55 6.78 6.47 
N 226097 226097 226097 226097 
adj. R-sq 0.707 0.707 0.710 0.708 
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4.8 Identification strategy  
Since the earnings management and earnings persistence are 
significantly correlated. But all the behaviors are firm internally 
stemmed, therefore it is possible that earnings management could be 
influenced by earnings persistence rather than the other way around. 
In order to solve this type of reverse causality issue, We then use the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) as a source of exogenous variation in 
firm earnings management. The increasing accounting scandals 
from the early 2000s indicates the prevalence of managers’ earnings 
management behaviors among public companies (Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006; Efendi et al., 2007). In order to alleviate this 
phenomenon, the clawback provision of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) enables the board to recover bonus or other incentive 
compensation paid to CEOs and CFOs when the firm is required to 
restate its financial reports. Several empirical studies indicate that 
this clawback provision is an effective means to prevent earnings 
management and increase accounting quality (Chan et al., 2012; 
Chan et al., 2013; DeHaan et al., 2013). Our identification strategy 
depends on the hypothesis that the SOX Act influenced the largest 
banks more than their smaller counterparts because clawback firms, 
i.e., firms that utilized the clawback provision, are larger than their 
non-clawback counterparts (Chan et al., 2013). 
We now investigate the link between changes in bank earnings 
management and changes in earnings persistence, using the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) as a source of exogenous variation in 
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions. Since U.S. Department of the 
Treasury (2009) mandatorily requires all financial firms to adopt the 
clawback provision, earnings management is expected to experience 
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a significant reduction. Therefore, we also use mandatory adoption 
of the clawback provision as an instrument of earnings management 
to further eliminate the endogeneity issue of earnings management. 
Chan et al. (2012), Chan et al. (2013) and DeHaan et al. (2013) find 
the evidence that the adoption of clawback provision is negatively 
related to the frequency of financial reporting restatements and 
positively associated with the credibility of accounting reports 
perceived by investors. 
According to Chan et al. (2013), clawback firms are in general 
larger than their non-clawback counterparts. Thus, we identify the 
banks whose total assets are among the top 10% of the cross-section 
of bank size distribution in 2002 as the largest banks and 
hypothesize that the largest banks are more likely to adopt the 
clawback provision and hence are more likely to reduce their 
earnings management than other banks. Our empirical strategy 
relies on the different sensitivity of the largest banks and other 
banks to the enactment of the SOX Act.  
We implement this approach through the following regression 
specifications: 
    DLLPit = β1The largest banksit + β2Introduction of SOX Actit + 
β3The largest banksit*Introduction of SOX Actit + εit;   (8) 
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 ROAit -ROAit-1 = (λi + β1Largest bankit+ β2Introduction of SOXActit  
+ β3The largest banksit*Introduction of SOX Actit   +!"it-1Z) GAPit-1 
+!#$%;                                             (9) 
In Column (1) of Table 6 A, we examine the effect of the SOX Act 
on earnings management of the largest and other banks using a ten-
year window around the clawback provision year, which refers to 
the ten-year period within which no more than five years deviate 
from the clawback provision year. Our main variable of interest is 
the interaction term of the variables The largest banks and 
Introduction of SOX Act. The largest banks is an indicator variable 
of 1 if the total assets of the banks fall in the top 10% of the size 
distribution, and 0 otherwise. Introduction of SOX Act is an 
indicator variable of 1 if it is after the year 2002, and 0 otherwise. A 
negative coefficient on this variable indicates that the largest banks 
reduce their earnings management more than other banks in the 
post-clawback provision period.  
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 A report the regressions result from 
the estimation of Equation (9) with the diff-in-diff estimator. The 
regression in Column (2) does not include time and bank fixed 
effects, while the regression in Column (3) includes both time and 
bank fixed effects, but the largest banks indicator and SOX Act 
indicator are both excluded from the regressions because they are 
invariant at the bank and time levels, respectively. The coefficients 
on the interaction term of The largest banks and Introduction of 
SOX Act are significant and positive in both columns, indicating that 
in the post-SOX Act period, the largest banks adjust their earnings 
at a faster speed than smaller banks.  
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In column(1), we found that the largest banks on general have more 
earnings management their counterparties. This finding is consistent 
with our previous analysis suggesting bank with higher market 
power tend to manipulate more earnings. We also see a negative and 
significant coefficient on SOX act, this suggests that banks on 
average tend to reduce earnings management after SOX. To validate 
our identification, we observe a negative and significant coefficient 
before the interaction term of large banks multiplied with SOX act 
dummy. The coefficient is -0.091 with a t-statistic of -4.98 showing 
that the gap of earnings management between large banks and other 
banks have been significantly reduced after SOX act. This finding 
proves our hypothesis that large banks have been affected more 
compared to small banks by SOX act.   
Then, we use SOX act as a validated exogenous shock to earnings 
management especially for greater banks. We use equation 9 to 
retest how earnings management affects bank earnings persistence. 
Column 2 indicates the standard difference in difference results, we 
found that largest banks after SOX, have a strong increase in 
earnings adjustment speed relative to small banks. This finding 
shows that due to reduced earnings management by largest banks 
after SOX, they lose their power to retain a persistent ROA, ending 
with a higher speed of earnings adjustment. The t-statistics are 
substantial (48.92), showing a strong statistical significance. In 
Column(3),  we further control for bank and year fixed effects. The 
largest banks and Introduction of SOX act, these two dummies have 
been consumed by bank fixed effects and time fixed effects, 
respectively.  
We still found a positive and significant coefficient on the 
interaction term. The t-statistic has been dropped from 48.92 to 3.62. 
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But it is still significant at 1% level. Again, it assures our hypothesis 
that earnings management significantly reduce earnings adjustment 
speed by any means. Hence, we could confirm that the relationship 
between earnings management and earnings adjustment speed is not 
endogenously connected. Earnings management has a casual impact 
on earnings adjustment speed. Overall, the results in this section 
provide further support on the causal impact of bank earnings 
management on earnings adjustment speed.  
In Table 6 B, we conduct an additional analysis that taking Auditing, 
analysts and state level tax into considerations. We extract the data 
of number of analysts, type of auditors and state tax rate from 
I/B/E/S and US Census Bureau. First of all, the coefficients of 
earnings management on earnings adjustment speed are negative 
and statistically significant, which are consistent with our baseline 
findings. In Column(1),  we find No of Analysts that following the 
bank have no significant impact on bank earnings adjustment speed, 
which implies that banks’ earnings persistence is insensitive to 
outsider analysts.  Results from column(2) describe the relationship 
between earnings adjustment speed and auditor type. Big4 is a 
binary variable that equals one if the underlying bank is audited by 
one of the big 4 auditors. The results show that high auditing 
standard would enhance bank earnings persistence. Column(3) 
includes the State level tax rates as an additional explanatory 
variable. The coefficient is insignificant. As a result, our result is 
robust to outsider auditors, analysts and other tax rates. 
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Table 6 A 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed:  
SOX ACT as a natural experiment of earnings management 
Column (1) of this table presents the result of difference-in-difference regression of earnings 
management within the clawback provision’s ten-year window, where DLLP = The largest banks + 
Introduction of SOX Act + The largest banks*Introduction of SOX Act + ε. The largest banks is a 
dummy variable, which equals 1 if the bank’s asset is among the top 10% of the size distribution. 
Introduction of SOX Act is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the year is later than 2001. The largest 
banks*Introduction of SOX Act is the interaction term. We assume λi is to be dynamic, so it varies 
across banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent variables plus The largest banks, 
Introduction of SOX Act and The largest banks*Introduction of SOX Act. Column (2) and (3) of this 
table present the OLS results for parameter Z in Partial Adjustment Model: (ROAit - ROAit-1 = ( λi + γit-
1Z ) GAPit-1 + #it ,GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1) within the clawback provision ten-year window. t-
statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
Appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Earnings 
Management 
Determinants of 
Bank Earnings 
Adjustment Speed 
Determinants of 
Bank Earnings 
Adjustment Speed 
The largest banks 0.047*** -0.257***  
 (36.90)    (-35.10)  
Introduction of SOX Act -0.050*** -0.020***  
 (-10.71)    (-2.84)  The largest banks* 
Introduction of SOX Act -0.091*** 0.354*** 0.068*** 
 (-4.98)    (48.92) (3.62)    
Z-score  -0.083*** -0.057*** 
  (-54.05) (-12.35)    
Capital Ratio  0.004*** -0.000    
  (6.04) (-0.06)    
Loan to Total Asset  0.044*** 0.050*** 
  (34.22) (11.91)    
Size  -0.079*** -0.071*** 
  (-54.87) (-11.12)    
Total Assets Growth   -0.006*** -0.011*** 
  (-5.84) (-3.31)    
Managerial Efficiency  0.040*** 0.026*** 
  (43.31) (7.81)    
Income Diversification  -0.008*** -0.000    
  (-11.40) (-0.11)    
Inflation  -0.061*** -0.075*** 
  (-48.38) (-25.14)    
GDP Growth   -0.087*** -0.056*** 
  (-69.50) (-16.72)    
GDP Per Capita  -0.155*** -0.353*** 
  (-69.25) (-43.52)    
Constant  0.686*** 0.819*** 
  (275.58) (86.15)    
    
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Max VIF 4.35 5.66 6.52 
N 74731 74731 74731 
adj. R-sq 0.0256 0.6939 0.8163 
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Table 6 B 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed: Robust test 
This table presents the OLS results for Partial Adjustment Model (ROAit - ROAit-1 = ( λi + γit-1Z ) 
GAPit-1 + #it ,GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1). We assume that λi to be dynamic, so it varies among 
banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent variables. The Lerner index is a bank-level 
indicator of bank competition, by adopting the stochastic frontier analysis approach, it is calculated as 
the difference between price and marginal cost as a percentage of prices, the detailed methodology of 
Lerner index measure is described in appendix. Earnings Management is calculated by applying the 
discretionary loan loss provision model (Liu and Ryan, 2006). The absolute value of the error term is 
regarded as the discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP) and the degree of Earnings Management.  All 
other variables are defined in the appendix. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses ,*, **, *** 
represents the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    
Earnings Management -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 
(-4.24) (-4.23) (-4.39) (-4.30)    
NO. of Analysts  -0.000 
  
-0.000*   
 
(-1.50) 
  
(-1.69)    
Big4 -0.021*** 
 
-0.021*** 
  
(-4.50) 
 
(-4.51)    
Tax rate 
 
0.000 0.000    
   
(0.15) (0.08)    
Z-score -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.063*** -0.064*** 
 
(-12.65) (-12.91) (-12.36) (-12.46)    
Capital Ratio -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003    
 
(-0.32) (-0.34) (-0.46) (-0.46)    
Loan to Total Asset 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 
 
(12.27) (12.21) (12.49) (12.29)    
Size -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.059*** -0.060*** 
 
(-11.11) (-11.28) (-10.61) (-10.82)    
Total Assets Growth Rate -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
 
(-4.22) (-4.21) (-4.29) (-4.21)    
Managerial Efficiency 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 
 
(7.53) (6.73) (7.74) (6.84)    
Income Diversification -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002    
 
(-0.20) (-0.47) (-0.28) (-0.56)    
GDP Growth Rate -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.072*** 
 
(-21.87) (-21.94) (-21.94) (-21.97)    
Inflation -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.078*** -0.077*** 
 
(-22.43) (-22.58) (-22.50) (-22.40)    
GDP Per Capita -0.265*** -0.263*** -0.267*** -0.266*** 
 
(-40.88) (-40.51) (-41.12) (-40.73)    
Constant 0.688*** 0.717*** 0.681*** 0.729*** 
 
(101.35) (75.80) (165.91) (64.78)    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Max VIF 5.42 4.42 4.19 5.59 
N 226097 226097 225972 225972    
adj. R-sq 0.7072 0.7078 0.7084 0.7091    
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4.9 Earnings Management on profit persistence: Positive and Negative Gaps 
Previously, we have found a casual impact from earnings 
management on earnings persistence. in this section we examine 
whether earnings performance affects the relationship between 
earnings management and the earnings adjustment speed of banks. 
We expect that when banks underperform (GAP > 0), they are prone 
to accelerate adjustment speed to close the gap. This is because 
banks want to avoid the increase of costs of debt brought about by 
negative earnings surprises (Dechow et al., 1996; Healy et al., 2014). 
In contrast, when banks perform better than their expectation (GAP 
< 0), they tend to maintain their profitable earnings and slow down 
the adjustment speed. The finding is intuitive, indicating a bank’s 
earnings persistence is a situational consequence by earnings 
management. If a bank has a lower ROA than expectation, 
smoothed earnings become meaningless to bank managers. By 
contrast, to achieve a higher return, banks will employ earnings 
management to close gaps between target and actual return. 
However, if a bank has a higher ROA then expectation, the result 
would be the opposite. As illustrated in column(2),  we find that 
banks that outperforming their target would strive to maintain their 
profitability, resulting a negative connection between earnings 
management and speed of earnings adjustment.  
The estimation results show a sharp contrast between the two 
earnings performance groups and meet our expectation. As shown 
in Table 8, when banks are underperforming, Discretionary Loan 
Loss Provisions has a significantly positive impact on adjustment 
speed. In contrast, when banks are outperforming, Discretionary 
Loan Loss Provisions has a significantly negative impact on 
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adjustment speed. On the other hand, the effect of branching 
restrictions index on adjustment speed is negative and significant 
across all the specifications, regardless of bank’s earnings 
performance. This result is in accordance with that reported in 
Healy et al. (2014).  In regards control variables, we observe Z-
score is only significant to earnings adjustment speed when Gap is 
negative. It implies that when banks have higher return than 
expected, more stable bank would result in more persistent earnings. 
This association is not found between Z-score and adjustment speed 
when ROA is lower than expected. Similarly, we found Capital ratio 
and Loan to total asset ratio are only statistically significant when 
GAP is greater than 0. For capital ratio, a negative and significant 
coefficient means higher capital ratio would lead to a more stable 
return when GAP>0. For loan to total assets, we found higher loan 
proportion would lead to more volatile ROA when GAP>0.  
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Table 7 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed Under Different Scenarios 
This table presents the OLS results for Partial Adjustment Model (ROAit - ROAit-1 = (λi + γit-1Z)GAPit + #it, GAPit = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1) by applying Branching Restriction Index regarding to different 
situations (GAP > 0 vs GAP < 0), positive GAP means underperformance and negative GAP means 
outperformance. We assume that λi to be dynamic, so it varies among banks and over time. Z is a 
vector of all independent variables. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 
1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
 (1) (2) 
  GAP > 0 GAP < 0 
Earnings Management 0.061*** -0.064*** 
 (9.66) (-10.21) 
Z-score -0.004 -0.116*** 
 (-0.68) (-12.46)    
Capital Ratio -0.441*** -0.148 
 (-5.81) (-1.48) 
Loan to Total Asset 0.062*** -0.003 
 (9.13) (-0.39)    
Size -0.051*** -0.074*** 
 (-5.34) (-9.65)    
Total Assets Growth  -0.023*** 0.021*** 
 (-5.52) (3.84) 
Managerial Efficiency -0.004 0.072*** 
 (-1.09) (11.99) 
Income Diversification 0.018*** -0.039*** 
 (5.45) (-6.43)    
GDP Growth  -0.049*** -0.068*** 
 (-8.49) (-11.91)    
Inflation -0.119*** 0.019*** 
 (-21.74) (3.38) 
GDP Per Capita -0.383*** -0.197*** 
 (-25.28) (-14.22)    
Constant 0.850*** 0.738*** 
 (54.33) (51.39) 
   
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Max VIF 4.98 5.23 
N 128584 97513 
adj. R-sq 0.659 0.613 
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Next, we analyse whether banks with the lowest profitability level 
are the least likely to manipulate their earnings. Previous studies 
document that during recessions, managers may report earnings 
downward at their maximum possible, or the so-called ‘big bath’ 
(Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004), where managers are motivated to 
use earnings management to discretely present an extreme drop in 
earnings during financial crisis periods. We thus expect that lowest 
profitable banks are the least likely to manipulate their earnings.  
To examine this relation, we categorize banks into quartiles 
according to their ROAs. Table 9 reports that, as expected, 
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions is negative but statistically 
insignificant for the banks whose ROA resides in the first quartile 
(<25%). The result indicates that bank managements are less likely 
to manipulate earnings upward for the banks with the lowest 
profitability level. In contrast, for all the other quartiles, 
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions exerts a highly significant 
impact on earnings adjustment. Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions 
increases the earnings persistence of banks located in the third 
(50%-75%) and fourth (>75%) quartiles, but decrease the earnings 
persistence of banks located in the second (25%-50%) quartile. 
These findings are in line with our expectation.  
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Table 8 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed and Profitability 
This table presents the regression results for Partial Adjustment Model (ROAit - ROAit-1 = (λi + γit-1Z ) 
GAPit + #it , where GAPit = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1) by applying Branching Restriction Index. We assume 
that λi to be dynamic, so it varies among banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent 
variables. We classify the sample into 4 subsamples according to profitability level to examine the 
impact of earnings management and competition on profit persistence. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, 
**, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the 
definitions of variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Subsample Analysis Profitability (ROA) 
  below 25% 25%-50% 50%-75% above 75% 
Earnings Management -0.005 -0.078*** -0.113*** -0.056*** 
 (-0.67) (4.82) (-10.62) (-6.22)    
Z-score -0.125*** -0.038*** -0.021*** -0.022*** 
 (-10.99) (-4.66) (-2.92) (-3.01)    
Capital Ratio -0.183* -0.065 -0.153 -0.184 
 (-1.81) (-0.35) (-1.04) (-1.42) 
Loan to Total Asset 0.068*** 0.111*** 0.119*** 0.041*** 
 (7.91) (11.64) (10.32) (4.77) 
Size -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.071*** -0.059*** 
 (-7.95) (-5.20) (-6.39) (-5.13)    
Total Assets Growth  -0.011* -0.037*** -0.046*** -0.007 
 (-1.79) (-5.96) (-5.03) (-1.08)    
Managerial Efficiency 0.023*** 0.053*** 0.045*** 0.019**  
 (3.09) (5.1) (3.98) (2.4) 
Income Diversification -0.004 0.000 0.003 0.012**  
 (-0.87) (-0.03) (0.34) (2.44) 
GDP Growth  -0.092*** -0.080*** -0.066*** -0.050*** 
 (-17.11) (-10.62) (-9.67) (-6.68)    
Inflation -0.074*** -0.086*** -0.070*** -0.034*** 
 (-11.32) (-11.51) (-9.67) (-5.16)    
GDP Per Capita -0.405*** -0.439*** -0.366*** -0.300*** 
 (-25.81) (-24.83) (-20.11) (-15.70)    
Constant 0.809*** 0.836*** 0.804*** 0.799*** 
 (37.46) (46.59) (56.24) (39.37) 
     
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Max VIF 4.35 6.55 5.56 4.80 
N 46038 56833 61482 61744 
adj. R-sq 0.760 0.745 0.743 0.626 
 
4.10 Earnings Management on profit persistence: Before and after SOX act 
As stated in the identification section, we believe the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) imposed significant impact on financial reporting 
therefore purified the accounting quality of all listed companies.  In 
this section, we split the sample using SOX as a special event to 
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check how earnings management influences earnings persistence. 
We suspect the relationship between earnings management and 
earnings persistence might be alleviated after 2002. After the act, 
the room for banks to earnings management is considerably 
squeezed, which might increase the opportunity cost for earnings 
smoothing.  
To test our expectation, we use secondary partial adjustment model 
on subsample of year before 2002 and year after 2001 respectively. 
Results are presented in table 9. Firstly, we found earnings 
management consistently draw negative and significant effect on 
earnings adjustment speed, showing that banks have a strong 
intention to smooth earnings. On the other hand, we interestingly 
found that the coefficient on earnings management is greater after 
the SOX act. It increases from 0.011 to 0.106. This result indicates 
the sensitivity of earnings management to earnings persistence 
amplified after the SOX act. One possible explanation is that the 
earnings smoothing behavior is more likely to be neglected in terms 
of financial reporting quality. Results showing that banks have 
switched their earnings manipulation aims on earnings persistence 
after the shock.  
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Table 9 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed and SOX act 
This table presents the regression results for Partial Adjustment Model (ROAit - ROAit-1 = (λi + γit-1Z ) 
GAPit + #it , where GAPit = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1) by applying Branching Restriction Index. We assume 
that λi to be dynamic, so it varies among banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent variables. 
We classify the sample into 2 subsamples to examine the impact of earnings management on profit 
persistence. We treat the introduction year of SOX(2002) as a split event. Column(1) uses subsample 
of year before 2002, and (2) uses subsample of year after 2001. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, 
*** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of 
variables. 
  (1) (2) 
Subsample Analysis Before SOX After SOX 
Earnings Management -0.011** -0.106*** 
 (-2.17) (-11.55)    
Z-score -0.044*** -0.023*** 
 (-9.06) (-4.46)    
Capital Ratio 0.009** 0.000    
 (2.39) (0.05)    
Loan to Total Asset 0.000 -0.026*** 
 (0.07) (-3.57)    
Size -0.056*** -0.020*** 
 (-7.64) (-3.34)    
Total Assets Growth  -0.004 0.009*   
 (-1.42) (1.85)    
Managerial Efficiency 0.024*** 0.029*** 
 (6.38) (6.58)    
Income Diversification -0.013*** -0.002    
 (-4.04) (-0.49)    
GDP Growth  -0.003 -0.119*** 
 (-0.76) (-15.86)    
Inflation 0.022*** 0.088*** 
 (6.60) (8.02)    
GDP Per Capita -0.047*** -1.077*** 
 (-4.69) (-57.74)    
Constant 0.894*** 1.886*** 
 (142.54) (72.56)    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Max VIF 5.44 4.75 
N 155516 69719 
adj.R-sq 0.8566 0.5223 
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4.11 Earnings Management on profit persistence: Financial Crisis 
In this section, we discuss whether financial crisis would have 
impact on the relationship between bank earnings management and 
earnings persistence. To perform this analysis, we split our sample 
into three different subsamples by time. Before Financial Crisis is 
the years before 2007, during financial crisis is from 2007 to 2009, 
while after financial crisis is years after 2009.  Table 10 describes 
the results; it shows earnings management is statistically negatively 
significant to earnings persistence before financial crisis, this result 
is consistent with our main finding. During financial crisis, the 
coefficient becomes positive and significant. This suggests that 
during financial crisis, banks are not going to use earnings 
management for the purpose of earnings persistence. By contrast, 
earnings management now increases earnings adjustment speed. A 
possible reason is that during financial crisis, banks have to reserve 
a large amount of loan loss provisions to defend huge systematic 
risk. Then earnings persistence is not a huge priority anymore. 
During financial crisis, ROA is more volatile than ordinary times, 
that might also be due to the earnings management issue. Banks 
might engage into more “big bath” during financial crisis, rather 
than earnings smoothing. After financial crisis, we didn’t find any 
statistical correlation between earnings management and earnings 
persistence. The coefficient is negative but insignificant, it could be 
suspected that earnings management starts to smooth earnings again.  
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Table 10 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed And Financial Crisis 
This table presents the regression results for Partial Adjustment Model (ROAit - ROAit-1 = (λi 
+ γit-1Z ) GAPit + #it , where GAPit = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1) by applying Branching Restriction 
Index. We assume that λi to be dynamic, so it varies among banks and over time. Z is a 
vector of all independent variables. We classify the sample into 3 subsamples to examine the 
impact of earnings management on profit persistence. We treat the financial crisis(2008-
2009) as a split event. Column(1) uses subsample of year before 2002, and (2) uses 
subsample of year after 2001. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of variables.  
  
Before Financial 
Crisis 
During Financial 
Crisis 
After Financial 
Crisis 
  (1) (2) (3)    
Earnings Management -0.009*** 0.072*** -0.010    
 
(-4.18) (3.56) (-0.84)    
Z-score -0.069*** -0.090*** -0.047*** 
 
(-9.23) (-6.32) (-9.00)    
Leverage Ratio 0.017*** 0.007 0.001    
 
(5.68) (1.15) (0.22)    
Loan to Total Asset -0.005 -0.029 0.027*** 
 
(-0.65) (-1.57) (3.05)    
Size -0.110*** -0.079*** -0.010    
 
(-12.68) (-6.47) (-1.62)    
Total Assets Growth 
Rate 0.003 0.021** -0.024*** 
 
(0.71) (2.43) (-3.46)    
Managerial Efficiency 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.013*** 
 
(8.73) (5.50) (2.93)    
Income Diversification -0.023*** -0.041*** 0.002    
 
(-3.80) (-4.61) (0.86)    
GDP Growth Rate -0.010* 0.050 0.099*** 
 
(-1.81) (0.77) (20.56)    
Inflation -0.001 -0.070 -1.175*** 
 
(-0.10) (-0.97) (-27.41)    
GDP Per Capita 0.017* 0.578*** 3.342*** 
 
(1.71) (9.31) (17.21)    
Constant 0.752*** 0.334*** -5.753*** 
 
(107.11) (190.26) (-17.46)    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Max VIF 6.34 5.44 3.46 
N 190795 18175 21896 
adj. R-sq 0.8037 0.7361 0.5234 
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4.12 Earnings Management on profit persistence: Cross-sectional Analysis 
So far, we have classified the data into different subsamples by time. 
It is a horizontal analysis that could test how banks change earnings 
management attitude by time. In this section, we run cross-sectional 
analysis to test whether different type of banks would use earnings 
management differently from earnings persistence. In this section, 
we split sample into sub-samples based on the median point of bank 
Size, Loan to total assets, Z-score, Diversification, Managerial 
Efficiency, and ROA, respectively.  
Table 11 display the results. We found the relationship between 
earnings management and earnings persistence does not vary 
regarding different Z-score and size of banks. In addition, banks 
with lower loan to total assets ratio tend to maintain earnings 
persistence more than others.  More diversified banks are prone to 
use earnings management to reduce earnings adjustment speed. 
Banks with lower managerial efficiency will engage more earnings 
manipulation towards earnings persistence. Similar, bank with 
higher profitability would sustain earnings persistence using 
earnings management more than low profitable ones. 
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Table 11 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed: Cross-sectional Analysis 
 This table presents the regression results for Partial Adjustment Model (ROAit - ROAit-1 = (λi + γit-1Z ) GAPit + !it , where GAPit = ROA*it-1 - 
ROAit-1) by applying Branching Restriction Index. We assume that λi to be dynamic, so it varies among banks and over time. Z is a vector of all 
independent variables. In this cross-sectional analysis, we spilt sample into different subsamples according to different firm characteristics, such 
as Z-score, Loan to total assets ratio, Size..etc. The cutting point is the median of each variable. For reading convenience, I have omitted all the 
results from control variables. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix 
presents the definitions of variables.  
  Z-score Loans/total asset Size 
 
Below Median Above Median Below Median Above Median Below Median Above Median 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Earnings management -0.014* -0.067*** -0.018** -0.004 -0.037*** -0.018*   
 
(-1.95) (-5.57) (-2.35) (-0.47) (-7.59) (-1.78)   
Controls  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Bank Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Max VIF 4.55 4.39 4.87 4.59 4.96 4.44 
N 110441 114794 112284 112951 113793 111442 
adj. R-sq 0.7094 0.5589 0.7199 0.6475 0.7997 0.5232 
  Diversification Managerial Efficiency ROA 
 
Below Median Above Median Below Median Above Median Below Median Above Median 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Earnings management -0.007 -0.011*** 0.002 -0.024*** -0.005 -0.055*** 
 
(-1.30) (-4.29) (0.17) (-3.49) (-0.78) (-4.18)    
Controls  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Bank Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Max VIF 5.18 3.86 4.86 4.58 5.29 4.87 
N 112472 112763 112673 112562 108468 116767 
adj. R-sq 0.7241 0.6542 0.4998 0.7579 0.7374 0.5959 
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4.13 Conclusion 
This article evaluates the impact of earnings management on earnings 
persistence in US banking, using bank-level data spanning 11 years. We 
document that earnings management has significant negative impact on 
bank profit persistence in a dynamic fashion.  By employing the SOX act as 
an exogenous shock, our design has successfully addressed the causal 
relationship between bank profit persistence and earnings management, and 
our measure of persistence innovatively allow for varying in terms of bank 
and time.  We found banks are less likely to manipulate earnings after SOX 
act. During financial crisis, banks are more likely to use earnings 
management as a big bath tool rather than for profit persistence goals.  
We contribute to bank and profit persistence literature streams in two ways: 
first, we investigate how profit persistence varies whether the profitability 
positively or negatively deviates from the expected return. Bank managers 
concern less on profit persistence when the banks’ returns are under the 
expected return, while stronger profit persistence has been found if the 
returns are above the expected return. 
Secondly, the partial adjustment statistical results show that earnings 
management have significant positive impact on profit persistence. Our 
findings assist the regulator in distinguishing, to what extend, the market 
power or the internal accounting techniques determine the profit persistence. 
From an academic point of view, this article introduces the artificial impact 
of traditional profit persistence researches.  
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Our findings are useful for scholars and practitioners, who seek to 
understand bank earnings persistence. The implication for policy makers is 
to pay attention to form a healthy competition environment for existing 
banks while at the same time encourage information disclosure quality.  
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Appendix 
Definition of Variables 
Variable Name Definition 
Earnings Management 
measure  
Discretionary Loan Loss 
Provisions 
The Earnings Management measures the discretionary loan loss 
provisions manipulated by each bank. It is obtained from the 
discretionary loan loss provision model (Cohen et al., 2014). We treat the 
absolute value of the error term as the earnings management indicator. 
The Higher the absolute residual value, the more earnings management 
the bank applied. 
 
  
Bank-controls  
Z-score 
The Z-score is an accounting-based bank-level indicator of financial 
stability. It is measured by the sum of return of total assets and capital 
ratio over the standard deviation of return of total assets. Higher Z-score 
indicates greater financial stability.  
Lerner Index 
The Lerner index is a bank-level indicator of bank competition. By 
adopting the stochastic frontier analysis approach, the Lerner index is 
calculated as the difference between price and marginal cost as a 
percentage of prices.  Higher Lerner index indicates greater market 
power. 
Capital Ratio The ratio of total equity to total assets 
Bank Size The natural logarithm of total assets 
Total Assets Growth  The yearly total assets growth rate 
Managerial Efficiency The ratio of total cost to total income 
Income Diversification The ratio of non-interest income to total operating income 
Loans to total assets.  The ratio of total loans to total assets 
Early Deregulation Index 
Early Deregulation Index represents the wave of deregulation before 
IBBEA.  This index equals two prior to the earlier of the year of intra- or 
inter-state deregulations, one if the state deregulates either full intra-state 
branching through acquisition and de novo branching or inter-state 
banking, and zero if the state deregulates both types of branching 
expansions. The years of these deregulations are gained from Kroszner 
and Strahan (1999). 
Macro-controls  
GDP Growth  Annual GDP growth rate 
Inflation Annual inflation growth rate 
GDP per capita GDP divided by the number of the people in the country 
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Chapter 5 
What are the key determinants of bank profit persistence: 
Competition or Earnings management? 
 
In this chapter, we try to compare the economic and statistical significance 
between competition and earnings management on earnings persistence. We 
use a battery of tests to check the economic impact of both competition and 
earnings management on bank profit persistence. We also introduce 
investment sentiment as an exogenous variation of market vitality to see 
how bank profit persistence changes. We find both competition and 
earnings management have significant impact on profit persistence. We also 
discovered that competition would increase earnings management.  
Then, if higher competition reduces earning persistence and increase 
earnings management. while, we also observe that higher earnings 
management would increase earnings persistence. Therefore, we conclude 
that the effect of competition on earnings persistence is not from earnings 
management. Furthermore, we find competition has stronger effects on 
earnings persistence than the one generated by earnings management. We 
additionally found that earnings management is sensitive to investment 
sentiment. 
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5.1 Competition and Earnings management 
So far, we have identified both competition and earnings management have 
statistical impact bank earnings persistence. However, it still remains 
unknown which factor impact on bank earnings persistence. To find out the 
major determinant, we first check the relationship between earnings 
management and competition.  Jiang (2018) stated competition may 
increase transparency, while Betty and Liao(2014) argue banks may 
increase earnings management due to high competition. 
The main hypotheses: 
      1), Competition has significant impact on Earnings Management. 
Table 1 presents the impact of competition on earnings management. The 
coefficients of both Branching Restriction Index and adjusted Lerner Index 
are significantly positive, indicating the positive impact of bank competition 
on earnings management. One inter-quartile increase of Branching 
Restriction Index leads to the increase of Discretionary Loan Loss 
Provisions by 0.008%. One standard deviation increase of bank competition 
leads to the increase of Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions by 0.085% 
(0.01*0.085). This result is not consistent with those reported in most 
studies that competition reduces earnings management by increasing the 
cost of misreporting (Graham et al., 2005; Burks et al., 2016; Jiang et al., 
2016). However, this result supports the recent growing studies which find 
that bank competition encourages bank earnings management (Dou et al., 
2016; Lin et al., 2016; Tomy et al., 2016).  
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Column (3) of Table 1, the coefficient of Discretionary Loan Loss 
Provisions is negative and significant, suggesting that banks with higher 
earnings management tend to have a slow earnings adjustment speed. 
Earnings adjustment speed will decrease by 4.8% (0.178*0.27) if 
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions rises by one standard deviation. This 
result also supports the widely documented opinion that the principle 
purpose of earnings management is to smooth earnings (Healy and Wahlen, 
1999; Dechow et al., 2010; Gaver et al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995). 
Overall, we fail to find a negative relation between bank competition and 
earnings management, although our results reveal a positive relation 
between earnings management and earnings persistence. Thus, competition 
could not indirectly reduce earnings persistence through the channel of 
earnings management.  We further control for auditors and analysts that 
following number. Both competition measures are still statistically 
significant at least 10% level. Further, we discover that number of analysts 
are negatively associated with earnings management. However, we do not 
find any significant association between auditor types and earnings 
management. Different tax rates in states have also no significant impact on 
bank earnings management.  In Table 1C, we further analyze whether the 
relationship between competition and earnings management vary in terms 
of positive and negative earnings management. As mentioned by Beatty and 
Liao(2014), if banks overstate LLP(positive EM), then the reported earnings 
will be reduced, but banks could report a higher capital ratio in this context. 
Since LLP is allowed to be accounted into equity. Hence, bank might 
reserve more precautionary capital when competition is high, which will 
lead to more positive EM (positive EM would result in high Equity). On the 
other hand, banks may also overstate earnings to brag their competitiveness 
when competition is high.  As reported in Table 1C, we find Branching 
Restriction Index has a positive and significant impact on both positive and 
negative EM. The coefficient is positive and significant in 1% level. This 
means banks will use both positive and negative EM to manipulate earnings. 
This finding is consistent with our initial results. 
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Apart from Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions model, we also use 
Available for sale securities as an alternative earnings management channel 
to test the robustness between competition and earnings management. We 
follow Beatty and Liao(2014), M.M Cornett et al(2009) to construct a new 
earnings management derived from available for sale securities: 
RSGLit=!0 + !1%&'(&) + !2+,%-.&) + /&) 
Where RSGL is the realized security gains and losses as a percentage of 
total assets, which incorporates realized gains and losses from available for 
sale securities and held-to-maturities. Size is the natural logarithm of total 
assets, URSGL is the unrealized gain and loss from available for sale 
securities to total assets ratio.  We do not lag all control variables, which 
allow us to make count in the impact of contemporary variations in URSGL 
and Size. We further derive the error term / out, and take the absolute value 
of it as our new measure of earnings management. Accruals from AFS 
could count for 15%-25% of total bank accruals. Comparing to accruals 
from loan loss provisions, which accounts for more than 50% of total bank 
accruals. The discretionary realized securities gains and losses is the second 
largest earnings management tool that banks could employ. 
Table 2 describes impact from competition on bank discretionary realized 
securities gains and losses. We found no empirical evidence showing 
competition would impact on Discretionary realized gain and loss on 
securities. This result supports our previous findings that showing 
competition have limited impact on competition. It also indicates that 
competition has less evidential impact on the variation of available for sale 
securities. Coefficients on Branching restriction index and adjusted Lerner 
index are both insignificant in Column (1) and (2). In addition, we found 
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safer banks are more likely to use DRSGL to manipulate earnings. Capital 
ratio remains insignificant to DRSGL, showing that banks do not apply 
DRSGL to influence capital ratio. Big banks tend to manipulate earnings 
more than small banks, while banks with more loans are less likely to 
manipulate earnings.  This finding assists our argument that competition 
influences earnings persistence through earnings management channel. Our 
empirical result suggests competition and earnings management is marginal 
connected and relationship is not statistically significant enough.  
The recent financial crisis draws attention on the dark side of bank financial 
accounting. Flannery et al (2013) find that banks are unusually opaque 
during the financial crisis.  The bank's equity trading behaviors are more 
volatile during the crisis period. Meanwhile, they discovered that banks’ 
financial accounting composition has significant impact on banks’ equity 
opacity. It is still difficult to discover which specific subject of accounting 
standard would explain this type of opacity. During the financial crisis 
period, market participants become unsure about the portfolios hold by 
financial institutions. They lose confidence in evaluating intrinsic value of 
portfolio based on traditional methods. Because during crisis, the 
insolvency risk rises as whole economy has a downward trend. For example, 
the market is extremely illiquid because the interbank lending market froze 
during financial crisis. A key issue in over-cautions about counterparty risk 
is opacity. When financial institutions are unable to read enough 
information about counterparties, the lending markets halt(Pritsker, 2010).  
Credit flows from banks to firms are not efficient when there is substantial 
amount of impaired assets in bank’s balance sheet. Because there is a strong 
asymmetric information problem between outsiders and insiders in terms of 
determining the asset value. In addition, this type of asymmetric 
information would lead market participants to undervalue banks’ assets pool 
overall, thus lowering the overall bank assets value. In result, this would 
!
!
173!
increase the cost of financing by overstating the underinvestment 
problem(Myers and Majlfuf, 1984). During the financial crisis, the US 
government implemented troubled asset relief program and public private 
investment program to increase the possibility that banks have enough 
reserve to keep credit flows. In addition, after 2009, a stress testing was 
implemented to particularly test the insolvency risk of the systemic 
important banks. After stress testing result release, market participants have 
stronger confidence in investing banks, which resulting a lower financing 
cost. Most large financial institutions are able to issue equities after the 
announcement of stress test results. Banks might issue equity to either meet 
regulatory requirements or as an extra reserve of capital. 
There is a possibility that bank opacity makes a huge contribution to the 
recent financial crisis. Recent studies show that rating agencies have more 
disagreement in terms of banks rather non financial firms (Morgan, 2002). 
Bank assets composition has a strong connection with rating disagreement. 
Some argue that disagreements increase because of different status of 
capital ratio. Also, Hirtle(2006) discovered a strong market reaction after 
CEOs have certified financial statements. Stock price increases significantly 
as they perceive this as a signal of reduction in opacity. Morgan(2010) state 
that banks are neither totally opaque nor totally transparent. In addition, 
rating agencies normally issue a lower credit rating for unsolicited banks 
compared to those solicited ones. Because it is much more difficult for 
rating agency to acquire information from unsolicited banks.  
Banks might have lots of earnings management during financial crisis, and 
indeed much of government’s interventions during financial crisis. Since 
government face difficulties in judging solvent and insolvent institutions. 
Flannery et al(2013) apply three different factors to test bank opacity. First, 
the bid and ask spread of a bank would reflect informative of an asset. Since 
a higher spread indicates that traders hold information that unknown to each 
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other. A market maker therefore quotes a wider spread to protect herself 
from losing money when engaging into uninformed counterparties. This 
bid-ask spread difference might be more significant for banks, since banks 
involve underwriting and loan monitoring, which is particularly difficult for 
external investors to observe. Second, they use the extent to which trades 
have a permanent effect on a stock’s price as an indicator of information 
opacity. If the trade is more transparent, then the price changes upon stock 
would less likely to reverse. Specifically, if traders are informed, they will 
move the stock price towards its intrinsic values. However, if the traders are 
not informed, they are not able to influence stock price permanently. In 
another word, if the information is more opaque, then its impact on stock 
price would be more permanent. Kyle(1985) states that insiders have more 
information about an asset’s future payoffs.  
Third, they employ trading volume to indicate opacity among banks. 
However, there is no expectation of the relationship between trading 
volume and financial accounting quality. When a bank is more opaque, the 
trading would increase, because there is more disagreement between traders. 
On the other hand, if more information is disclosed, trading can be stopped 
because price precisely reflects all information. 
Loan loss provisions are so far the most reliable subject in financial 
accounting to allow banks to manipulate earnings. The change in the effect 
of loan loss provision on regulatory capital calculations during the pre-
BASEL and BASEL period affect the bank earnings management in 
financial accounting.  In pre-BASEL period, there is an opposite effect of 
the loan loss provision on earnings vs capital requirement imposed by 
regulators. Thus, if a bank has low capital ratio they could easily increase 
loan loss provision to make a higher capital ratio, on the contrary, banks 
might report lower earnings. Beatty(1995) discovers a negative correlation 
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between capital ratio and loan loss provisions in the pre-BASEL period. 
This suggests that bank use loan loan provisions match capital requirement.  
The capital adequacy requirement was first adopted in early 1990, the initial 
requirement is only the minimum capital ratio. Since more loan loss 
provision was related to higher capital ratio. The regulatory capital counts in 
loan loss allowances. After BASEL enacting, loan loss allowance was not 
considered into capital adequacy calculation anymore. So Tier 1 capital 
decrease with loan loss provisions in the new regime, and loan loss 
allowance was counted into Tier2 capital. In this context, banks with low 
capital might reduce provisions to avoid violation of minimum capital 
requirement. The negative correlation between earnings management using 
discretionary loan loss provisions and regulatory capital is more pronounced 
after the BASEL accord. Also, Beatty et al(2002) found that public banks 
tend to use discretionary loan loss provisions more to beat earnings forecast. 
This indicates that banks have different incentives in terms of earnings 
manipulation. 
The change of financial reporting in banking has strong impact on earnings 
manipulation incentives. It makes the measurement of earnings 
management difficult across time. Most common widely applied model is 
discretionary loan loss provision model. There have been multiple models 
to estimate earnings management, most of them are cross-sectional models. 
But different models have different assumptions of control variables, which 
explain the variation of loan loss provisions. For example, some are 
considered loan charge-offs and loan loss allowance as exogenous variables 
that could explain the loan loss provisions. On the other hand, some are 
considered loan loss allowance and charge-offs as discretionary parts of 
banks. So far, there is no consensus on which model is the best measure 
earnings management. Discretionary loan loss provision model is the most 
prominent model in measuring earnings management. But it is still possible 
!
!
176!
that banks use other reporting discretion to manage reported earnings and 
regulatory capital. Also, it is possible that banks use gains and loss from 
available for sale securities to manipulate earnings. And the one time 
change in accounting for post retirement benefits also could provide an 
opportunity to find accounting discretions.  
Due to particularity of banks, earnings management for bank researchers 
has been mainly focused on discretionary loan loss provisions. But it is 
worth noting that banks could use other methods to manipulate earnings. It 
becomes increasingly popular to study earnings management from realized 
gain and loss from available for sale securities in banks. A on-going 
research by Barth et al.,(2017) show that banks use AFS realized gains and 
losses to manage earnings and regulatory capitals.  AFS is the largest 
category of securities on the balance sheet of a bank. Banks are detected by 
using AFS to avoid reporting losses, smoothing earnings and take a big bath 
if needed. This item has been widely showed that banks would also put their 
discretion and achieve target in someway. The opportunistically application 
of earnings management via AFS is a general phenomenon.  
Accounting Standard Codification (320) suggests a new treatment of 
available for sale securities in 1993.  Prior that time, investments securities 
were measured using amortization method. Upon that, each bank needs to 
disclose the fair value of all investment securities. But banks were not 
required to report their income or losses of those securities, they will be 
finally realized as the gain or loss into earnings. ASC 320 requires all 
entities, including banks, to separate securities into three different ways. 
First, banks need to report securities that plan to sell in the near future in to 
Trading securities. Secondly, banks need to report securities that plan to 
hold to maturity in to hold to maturity. Thirdly, banks need to report report 
securities that are not for trading or hold either as available for sale 
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securities. This act also allows banks to switch HTM securities to available 
for sale securities.  
Now, available for sale securities becomes the biggest securities categories.  
There are two parts of AFS: realized gains and losses are reported into 
income statement that would impact on financial earnings; unrealized gains 
and losses are reported in other comprehensive income that would not affect 
net income. The way of realization could be various, for example, banks 
could sell securities or dispose them. Securities could also be impaired that 
is deemed other than temporary. However, unrealized gains and losses of 
AFS would no affect final earnings of a bank. Regarding capital 
requirement, unrealized gains and losses from AFS debt or equities are not 
considered from Tier 1 capital but realized one does.  Therefore, it is 
possible that banks manipulate realized gains or losses from AFS to meet 
capital requirement. It is better for banks to manipulate earnings using AFS 
rather than trading or HTM. That is because trading category is measured at 
fair value and HTM is too costly and risky. 
After ASC 320, securities are now required to all reported as fair value, 
while they are subjected to changes in fair value recognition, and this 
recognition is realized in the comprehensive income rather than the income 
part. Therefore, ASC 320 does not disallow banks to manipulate earnings 
by selectively reporting realized gains and loses. The difference is that the 
realized gains and losses will go to net income directly or comprehensive 
income on the other hand. AFS does not only affect earnings through 
realization, but also affect regulatory capital. Barth et al(2017) find that 
banks with low regulatory capital will realize more net gains from AFS, in 
order to increase the capital. Furthermore, banks in general will use 
available for sale securities to manipulate earnings make it more persistent, 
which is consistent with traditional earnings management literature. It is 
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interesting to find out that banks will still smooth earnings disregard of high 
or low regulatory capital.  
Whether banks use AFS to take a big bath is also tested in their paper. 
Empirically, if banks are earnings positively, they would like to use AFS for 
smoothing earnings, while if they are losing earnings, AFS is more likely to 
be manipulated for a big bath. In addition, big bath has been constrained if 
banks have a low regulatory capital, thus indicating that a negative 
connection between capital requirement and earnings management.  
After the announcement of Accounting Standard Codification (ASC) 320, it 
is increasingly popular that banks use available for sale securities to manage 
earnings due to large size of this item and lower cost of managing this item 
(Nissim and Penman, 2007; Laux and Leuz, 2010). ASC 320 specifies that 
AFS securities be measured as fair value in the statement of financial 
position, with changes in fair value recognized in other comprehensive 
income. Following Barth et al. (2015) and Dong and Zhang (2015), we also 
use realized gains and losses of AFS securities model to measure bank 
earnings management.  
  AFS securitiesit = !0Net Incomeit + !1 Competitionit+ !2 Net Income х 
Competitionit + !3Discretionary Loan Loss Provisionsit +!4Z-scoreit + !5Capital Ratioit +!6 Loan to Total Assetit + !7Sizeit  +8!9Total Assets 
Growth Rateit + !0:Managerial Efficiencyit  + !00Income Diversificationit + !01GDP Growth Rateit   + !02Inflationit + !03GDP Per Capitait + ε<=               
(4) 
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where AFS securities are realized gains and losses on AFS securities and 
Net Income is net income before taxes and gains and losses on AFS 
securities, both deflated by beginning-of- quarter total assets. Competition 
is IBBEA Index or Adjusted Lerner Index. If banks employ AFS securities 
to maintain persistent earnings, the coefficient on Net Income !0, should be 
negative and if banks under more competition realize more gains from AFS 
securities, the coefficient on Competition, !1 , is positive. Our interested 
coefficient is !2 , the interaction variable, Net Income X Competition. It 
tests whether earnings smoothing is more pronounced for banks under 
higher competition. A negative !2 implies that competition would directly 
intensify banks earnings smoothing behavior.  
Prior research documents that banks tend to use the item of AFS securities 
to smooth earnings (Barth et al., 2015; Dong and Zhang, 2015). AFS 
securities are the largest category of banks’ securities and contain a sizable 
proportion of bank assets (Nissim and Penman, 2007; Laux and Leuz, 2010). 
Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) Topic 320 specifies that AFS 
securities be measured as fair value in the statement of financial position, 
with changes in fair value recognized in other comprehensive income. 
Hence, the accounting treatment for gains and losses from AFS securities 
provides banks a chance to engage in earnings management by selling these 
securities and realizing selected gains and losses. Realizing gains and losses 
on AFS securities is an attractive way to smooth earnings due to its lower 
cost compared with accruals or real activity manipulation (Barth et al., 
2015).  
In Appendix of this Chapter, we show the Barth model, and check whether 
competition influence earnings management via AFS model.  In table A1, 
we found that banks are not going to use earnings management via AFS if 
the competition is high and they missed their target ROA. It is also 
interesting to show that banks use more earnings management via AFS if 
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the performance is above their target. It shows that banks use different 
fundamentals to manipulate earnings into smoothing behavior. It is also 
worth mentioning that we also find negative coefficient before the 
interaction term NI*Adjusted Lerner index. It again manifests our 
hypothesis that competition impacts on earnings management based on 
banks’ individual circumstance.  
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Table 1 
The Impact of Competition on Bank Earnings Management 
This table presents the OLS results between competition and earnings management with the full 
sample. The dependent variable, earnings management, is measured by Discretionary Loan Loss 
Provisions. As to independent variable, competition is measured by Branching Restrictions Index in 
Column (1) and Lerner Index in Column (2).t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 
5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions 
Branching Restrictions Index 0.00008**   
 
(1.97)     
Adjusted Lerner Index  0.010*** 
 
 (4.34) 
Z-score -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-10.20)    (-9.97) 
Capital Ratio -0.001 -0.001 
 
(-1.14)    (-1.11) 
Loan to Total Asset 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(131.77) (133.42) 
Size 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(8.56) (6.51) 
Total Assets Growth  -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-70.73)    (-71.70) 
Managerial Efficiency 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(13.86) (15.31) 
Income Diversification 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(4.99) (6.2) 
GDP Growth  -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-89.79)    (-89.06) 
Inflation -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
(-185.22)    (-186.82) 
GDP Per Capita 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 
(52.89) (53.02) 
Constant -0.456*** -0.446*** 
 
(-52.25)    (-49.48) 
   
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Max VIF  4.36 4.56 
N 214403 214403 
adj. R-sq 0.776 0.776 
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Table 1 B 
Competition and Earnings Management: Robust test 
This table presents the OLS results between competition and earnings management with the full sample. The 
dependent variable, earnings management, is measured by Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions. As to 
independent variable, competition is measured by Branching Restrictions Index in Column (1) and Lerner Index 
in Column (2).t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of variables.  
  (1) (2)    
Dependent Variable Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions 
Adjusted Lerner Index 0.010***  
 
(4.34)  
Branching Restrictions Index  0.00009** 
  (2.37)    
No. of Analysts -0.000** -0.000**  
 
(-2.40) (-2.41)    
Big 4 -0.000 -0.000    
 
(-1.34) (-1.38)    
Tax rate 0.000 0.000    
 
(0.66) (0.66)    
Z-score -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-10.00) (-9.99)    
Capital Ratio -0.001 -0.001    
 
(-1.13) (-1.12)    
Loan to Total Asset 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(133.45) (133.72)    
Size 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(6.53) (6.57)    
Total Assets Growth Rate -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-71.73) (-72.03)    
Managerial Efficiency -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-3.73) (-3.76)    
Income Diversification 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(6.20) (6.19)    
GDP Growth Rate -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-89.09) (-89.06)    
Inflation -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
(-186.84) (-186.90)    
GDP Per Capita 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 
(53.03) (53.02)    
Constant -0.446*** -0.446*** 
 
(-49.45) (-49.43)    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Max VIF 5.68 4.93 
N 214403 214304    
adj. R-sq 0.7766 0.7767    
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Table 1 C 
Competition and Earnings Management: Positive vs Negative EM 
This table presents the OLS results between competition and earnings management with the full sample. The 
dependent variable, earnings management, is measured by Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions. As to 
independent variable, competition is measured by Branching Restrictions Index and Lerner Index.t-statistics are 
in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the 
definitions of variables.   
  Positive EM Negative EM 
  (1) (2)    
Branching Restriction Index 0.000012*** 0.00018*** 
 
(3.21) (8.96)    
No of analysts -0.000 -0.000    
 
(-1.06) (-0.59)    
Big 4 -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-2.95) (-3.31)    
Tax rate 0.000*** 0.000    
 
(2.80) (0.79)    
Z-score -0.000*** 0.000    
 
(-3.52) (1.59)    
Capital Ratio -0.000 0.001*** 
 
(-0.21) (2.64)    
Loan to Total Asset 0.009*** 0.001*** 
 
(80.31) (27.87)    
Size 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(5.47) (8.35)    
Total Assets Growth Rate -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-14.20) (-21.42)    
Managerial Efficiency 0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(6.43) (-2.82)    
Income Diversification 0.000*** 0.000    
 
(2.76) (1.24)    
GDP Growth Rate -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-17.28) (-15.91)    
Inflation -0.003*** -0.000*** 
 
(-36.73) (-22.83)    
GDP Per Capita 0.045*** 0.005*** 
 
(32.50) (20.92)    
Constant -0.477*** -0.057*** 
 
(-28.07) (-21.31)    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Max VIF 5.90 4.91 
   N 214304 214304    
adj. R-sq 0.4133 0.1281    
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Table 2  
The Impact of Competition on Bank Earnings Management 
This table presents the OLS results between competition and earnings management with the full sample. The 
dependent variable, earnings management, is measured by Discretionary Realized gain and loss on AFS. As to 
independent variable, competition is measured by Branching Restrictions Index in Column (1) and Lerner Index 
in Column (2).t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
Dependent Variable DRSGL 
  (1) (2)    
Branching Restrictions Index -0.00000 
 
 
(-0.19) 
 Adjusted Lerner Index 
 
0.00147 
  
(1.39) 
Z-score 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 
 
(2.95) (2.86)    
Capital Ratio 0.00017 0.00016    
 
(0.80) (0.77)    
Loan to Total Asset -0.00007* -0.00008**  
 
(-1.88) (-2.14)    
Size 0.00002** 0.00002*** 
 
(2.26) (2.90)    
Total Assets Growth Rate 0.00000 0.00000    
 
(1.02) (1.31)    
Managerial Efficiency 0.00000*** 0.00002    
 
(5.35) (1.57)    
Income Diversification 0.00000 -0.00000    
 
(0.10) (-0.51)    
GDP Growth Rate -0.00000 -0.00000    
 
(-0.50) (-0.63)    
Inflation -0.00001 -0.00001    
 
(-1.21) (-1.10)    
GDP Per Capita 0.00003 0.00004    
 
(0.79) (1.11)    
Constant -0.00067* -0.00230* 
 
(-1.79) (-1.85) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Max VIF 5.92 4.96 
N 125815 125815 
adj. R-sq 0.0156 0.0157 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
!
185!
5.2 Pure impact from earnings management on earnings persistence 
Since we have discovered a direct channel impact from competition on 
earnings persistence. It is still unknown the relationship between earnings 
management and earnings persistence when excluding the influence from 
competition. In this section, we employ orthogonal earnings management 
from competition to analyse the pure impact of earnings management on 
earnings persistence. We primarily use Branching restriction index to 
orthogonize earnings management, since we believe inter state deregulation 
is a more robust exogenous competition estimate. Table 3 present the results, 
showing how purely derived earnings management, which is independent of 
competition, influence on earnings persistence.  
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Table 3  
Bank earnings persistence and Orthogonal EM 
This table presents the OLS results for Partial Adjustment Model (ROAit - ROAit-1 = ( λi + γit-1Z ) GAPit-1 
+ >it ,GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1). We assume that λi to be dynamic, so it varies among banks and over 
time. Z is a vector of all independent variables. We use Branching restriction index to Orthogonal bank 
earnings management. Followed by Rice and Strahan(2010), Branching Restrictions is an index that captures 
the level of interstate branching restrictions, which is an alternative indicator of competition. Lerner index is 
an alternative measure of competition. The Lerner index is a bank-level indicator of bank competition, by 
adopting the stochastic frontier analysis approach, it is calculated as the difference between price and 
marginal cost as a percentage of prices, the detailed methodology of Lerner index measure is described in 
appendix. All other variables are defined in the appendix. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses ,*, **, 
*** represents the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.       
Dependent Variable Earnings Adjustment Speed 
  (1) (2)    
Orthogonal EM -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 
(-4.78) (-4.58)    
Adjusted Lerner Index 0.363*** 
  
(6.98)    
Z-score -0.059*** -0.059*** 
 
(-12.53) (-12.53)    
Leverage Ratio -0.003 -0.003    
 
(-0.46) (-0.46)    
Loan to Total Asset 0.071*** 0.071*** 
 
(12.60) (12.60)    
Size -0.072*** -0.072*** 
 
(-12.91) (-12.91)    
Total Assets Growth Rate -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 
(-5.05) (-5.05)    
Managerial Efficiency -0.342*** -0.342*** 
 
(-6.47) (-6.47)    
Income Diversification 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 
(2.83) (2.83)    
GDP Growth Rate -0.070*** -0.070*** 
 
(-21.42) (-21.42)    
Inflation -0.077*** -0.077*** 
 
(-22.63) (-22.63)    
GDP Per Capita -0.276*** -0.276*** 
 
(-39.15) (-39.15)    
Constant 0.680*** 0.680*** 
 
(165.42) (165.42)    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Max VIF 4.55 6.94 
N 225235 225235 
adj. R-sq 0.7071 0.7071 
 
 
 
 
!
!
187!
We found earnings management still has a strong impact on bank earnings 
adjustment. The coefficient is 0.20 at significant at 1% level. This indicates 
that banks earnings management increase earnings persistence disregard to 
the impact of competition. Economically, if there is none competition, a one 
standard deviation increase in earnings management will cause banks to 
reduce earnings adjustment speed by 5.4%. We see the pure earnings 
management itself still have strong impact on bank earnings persistence. 
This result also supports the widely documented opinion that the principle 
purpose of earnings management is to smooth earnings (Healy and Wahlen, 
1999; Dechow et al., 2010; Gaver et al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995). In 
column(2), we insert Adjusted Lerner index as an endogenous competition 
measure, and regression result of Orthogonal earnings management still 
remains negative and significant. The economic magnitude remains 
unchanged.  
We so far documented that earnings management itself has pure negative 
and significant impact on bank earnings persistence. However, most studies 
only focus on the connections between discretionally loan loss provision 
perspective. We now innovatively use Discretionary realized gain and loss 
on available for sale securities to see whether banks smooth earnings using 
securities purchase and selling.    
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Table 4  
Bank earnings persistence and DRSGL 
 This table presents the OLS results for Partial Adjustment Model (ROAit - ROAit-1 = ( λi + γit-1Z ) GAPit-1 + >it ,GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1). We assume that λi to be dynamic, so it varies among banks and over time. 
Z is a vector of all independent variables. We use DRSGL as our alternative earnings management measure, 
which is derived from the AFS model from Beatty and Liao(2014), The Lerner index is a bank-level indicator of 
bank competition, by adopting the stochastic frontier analysis approach, it is calculated as the difference between 
price and marginal cost as a percentage of prices, the detailed methodology of Lerner index measure is described 
in appendix. All other variables are defined in the appendix. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses ,*, **, 
*** represents the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.     
Dependent Var Earnings Adjustment Speed 
  (1) 
AFS 0.538*** 
 
(4.19) 
Z-score -0.056*** 
 
(-11.35) 
Leverage Ratio -0.010*** 
 
(-2.82) 
Loan to Total Asset 0.050*** 
 
(8.85) 
Size -0.045*** 
 
(-7.69) 
Total Assets Growth Rate -0.013*** 
 
(-2.88) 
Managerial Efficiency 0.030*** 
 
(7.43) 
Income Diversification -0.006 
 
(-1.54) 
GDP Growth Rate -0.134*** 
 
(-30.19) 
Inflation -0.021*** 
 
(-2.85) 
GDP Per Capita -0.529*** 
 
(-51.15) 
Constant 1.017*** 
 
(85.29) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes 
Max VIF 5.33 
N 137162 
adj. R-sq 0.5724 
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In table 4, we use discretionary realized securities gains and losses(DRSGL) 
as an alternative of earnings management to test the relationship between 
earnings management and bank earnings adjustment using partial 
adjustment speed model. Results show that DRSGL has strong positive and 
significant impact on bank earnings adjustment speed. It means banks do 
not use realized gain and loss on AFS to smooth earnings, on the contrary, 
DRSGL would continuously close the GAP between target ROA and actual 
ROA.  
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Table 5 
The Impact of Competition on Bank Earnings Management: 
GAP>0 vs GAP<0 
This table presents the OLS results between competition and earnings management with the full sample when 
the bank is above or below its ROA target (GAP<0 or GAP>0). The dependent variable, earnings management, 
is measured by Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions. As to independent variable, competition is measured by 
Branching Restrictions Index Adjusted Lerner Index. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 
5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
Dependent variable Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions 
 Below target Above target Below target Above target 
 GAP>0 GAP<0 GAP>0 GAP<0  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Branching Restrictions Index 0.00000 0.00002**   
 (0.77) (2.32)        Adjusted Lerner Index  0.00377 0.01188*** 
   (1.32) (4.01) Z-score -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (-1.52) (-14.93) (-1.59) (-15.24) Leverage Ratio 0.002** -0.003*** 0.002** -0.003*** 
 (1.98) (-3.29) (2.00) (-3.44) Loan to Total Asset 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (108.44) (94.53) (106.65) (97.32) Size 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (3.41) (7.71) (4.32) (9.67) Total Assets Growth Rate -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-49.13) (-53.47) (-48.86) (-55.27) Managerial Efficiency -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (-0.89) (-3.81) (11.30) (3.36) Income Diversification 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (6.23) (4.07) (5.97) (3.06) GDP Growth Rate -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-49.22) (-49.38) (-49.64) (-49.50) Inflation -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (-177.35) (-95.00) (-176.89) (-94.81) GDP Per Capita 0.037*** 0.044*** 0.037*** 0.044*** 
 (30.66) (34.03) (30.62) (33.94) Constant -0.388*** -0.457*** -0.391*** -0.469*** 
 (-29.25) (-31.92) (-30.27) (-33.49) Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Max VIF 4.71 4.20 5.28 5.89 
     N 128584 97513 128584 97513 
adj. R-sq 0.778 0.771 0.778 0.771 
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Effect from competition on earnings management now are not consistent. 
For example, we found competition have marginal positive and significant 
impact on discretionary loan loss provisions. However, we do not find 
statistical relationship between competition and DRSGL. Further, we divide 
sample into positive and negative GAPs to see how competition would 
influence bank earnings management. Table 5 presents the results between 
competition and Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions, we found competition 
continues to induce bank earnings management, but only under the situation 
of GAP<0(ROA above target). The coefficients of Branching restriction 
index and Adjusted Lerner index are statistically insignificant when GAP>0 
and statistically significant at 1% when GAP<0. It shows that the 
correlation between competition and earnings management is conditional on 
bank earnings performance.  
In this section, we test how pure earnings management would influence 
earnings persistence. Since competition would impact on earnings 
management therefore the relationship between earnings management and 
earnings persistence would be biased. We use competition to orthogonalize 
discretionary loan loss provisions to estimate a new earnings management 
measure that is independent to competition. We then use the newly 
estimated variable into main specification, we found consistent results 
showing earnings management have strong effect in smoothing earnings 
persistence. This result also supports the widely documented opinion that 
the principle purpose of earnings management is to smooth earnings (Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow et al., 2010; Gaver et al., 1995; Holthausen et 
al., 1995). 
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5.3 Dynamic effect of Interstate branching deregulation on earnings persistence 
In this section, we check the dynamic effect of interstate branching 
deregulation on earnings persistence. According to Bertrand and 
Mullianathan(2003), and  Thomas J. Chemmanur, Shan He and Debarshi K. 
Nandy(2010), this method could effectively capture the dynamic variation 
of difference between treatment and control group around a particular event. 
Here, we treat the introduction year of IBBEA for each state as our event 
year. we use the following model to test the dynamic impact of IBBEA on 
earnings adjustment speed: 
ROAit - ROAit-1=(∑Beforet+∑Aftert+γit-1Z) GAPit-1+ >it, 
Where GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1, Beforet(Aftert) is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for t years before(after) the introduction of deregulation of a state. 
For example, Before5 equals 1 for year 5 before a particular state’s 
deregulation introduction year, and 0 otherwise. The results are available 
ainTable 6 Column(4) to Column(6). We found that coefficients on After1, 
After2, After3, After4 are positive and statistically significant. This result 
shows that after the introduction of deregulation, banks accelerate earnings 
adjustment speed. This effect is most pronounced 2 and 3 years after the 
introduction year. Before 5 and Before 4 are also sstatisticallysignificant. It 
suggests that banks tend to preserve more earnings before the state started to 
deregulate. We use bank level cluster, state level cluster and state year level 
cluster for column(4), (5) and (6) respectively. All three columns show 
consistent results, which further asserts our basic findings. In addition, we 
employ these three different clustering methods on Branching restriction 
index. Column(1) to (3) describe the results, we found results remain 
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positive and significant, the difference is that t-statistics decreases as the 
cluster levels sstartfrom bank to state and state-year level. 
Table 6 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed: Robust test!
!We assume λi to be dynamic, so it varies across banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent 
variables. This table presents the OLS results for parameter estimates on Z in the Partial Adjustment Model. 
Column (1) to (3) follow baseline model using Branching Restrictions Index as interested variable. Column 
(4) to (6) use the event DID results. [ROAit - ROAit-1=(∑Beforet+∑Aftert+γit-1Z) GAPit-1+ >it, GAPit-1 = 
ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1], Beforet(Aftert) is a dummy variable equal to 1 for t years before(after) the 
introduction of deregulation of a state. For example, Before5 equals 1 for year 5 before a state’s first time 
deregulation, and 0 otherwise. All columns apply OLS regression. Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions are 
the proxy for earnings management across all columns. For Column(1) and (4), standard errors are clustered 
at bank level. For Column(2) and (5), standard errors are clustered at state level.  For Column(3) and (6), 
standard errors are clustered at state-year level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
Branching Restrictions 
Index 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 
   
 
(12.01) (3.80) (4.74) 
   Before 5 
   
-0.037** -0.037*** -0.037**  
    
(-2.57) (-2.68) (-2.27)    
Before 4 
   
-0.031* -0.031* -0.031    
    
(-1.82) (-1.68) (-1.48)    
Before 3 
   
0.006 0.006 0.006    
    
(0.37) (0.27) (0.25)    
Before 2 
   
-0.020 -0.020 -0.020    
    
(-1.21) (-1.29) (-0.96)    
Before 1 
   
0.011 0.011 0.011    
    
(0.90) (0.76) (0.55)    
After 1 
   
0.034*** 0.034** 0.034*   
    
(2.59) (2.15) (1.67)    
After 2 
   
0.258*** 0.258*** 0.258*** 
    
(4.02) (12.64) (14.30)    
After 3 
   
0.1190* 0.1190*** 0.1190*** 
    
(1.78) (7.31) (8.51)    
After 4 
   
0.032** 0.032** 0.032**  
    
(2.56) (2.52) (2.19)    
After 5 
   
0.008 0.008 0.008    
    
(0.61) (0.49) (0.53)    
Discretionary Loan Loss 
provisions -0.126** -0.126* -0.126*** -0.113* -0.113 -0.113**  
 
(-2.32) (-1.89) (-2.63) (-1.89) (-1.45) (-2.11)    
Constant 0.7025*** 0.7025*** 0.7025*** 0.7585*** 0.7585*** 0.7585*** 
 
(19.55) (21.07) (16.69) (112.92) (95.80) (127.02)    
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes No No Yes No No 
Level of Standard Errors 
Clustering Bank  State State-year Bank  State State-year 
Max VIF 4.86 4.78 5.11 4.14 4.55 5.10 
N 77929 77929 77929 59377  59377  59377  
adj. R-sq 0.7379 0.7979 0.7979 0.6870 0.7870 0.7870    
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5.4 Investment sentiment and bank earning persistence 
Investment sentiment has recently attracted considerable attention in finance 
research. As mentioned by Baker and Wurgler’s (2007), stocks price is not 
solely determined by the firm cash flows and investment risks by the facts 
at hand. In the presence of investor sentiment, managers will respond to 
investors’ sentiment-driven expectations by manipulating the firms’ current 
assets into a most appealing way to the potential investors. One of the 
obvious ways to such manipulation is earnings management.  In 
Simpson’s(2013) study, a strong connection between earnings management 
and investor sentiment is found, showing that managers prone to use 
discretionary accruals to fit with investor sentiments. For example, 
managers inflate earnings when investor sentiment is high to attract more 
attention. On the other hand, managers will report more conservatively 
when the market is under low sentiment. This evidence shows that 
managers intentionally use earnings management in the need for increased 
attention from investors.  
However, the relationship between investor sentiment and earnings 
persistence is yet researched. And none prior studies have focused on 
banking side. Similar to traditional industries, banks’ managers might also 
manipulate earnings responding to different investor sentiment.  
There is a possibility that banks smooth earnings for market performance. 
Then, bank earnings manipulation towards more persistent earnings should 
be affected by different market situations. We then introduce investment 
sentiment measure into earnings persistence model to see whether banks 
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react differently when market is under different sentiment. Our sentiment 
index is borrowed from Lee (2014), then we split the market timing into 
high sentiment(index>0) and low sentiment(index<0) period. By running 
the subsample analysis, we could check whether banks changed earnings 
management target responding to different situations of investment 
sentiment. From table 7 panel A column (1) and (2), coefficients on 
earnings management show different outcomes. Specifically, when market 
has a positive sentiment, banks have no interest in manipulating earnings 
persistently. On the other hand, when market has a negative sentiment, 
earnings management becomes negative and significant to earnings 
adjustment speed. The coefficient is -0.049 and it is statistically significant 
at 1% level. It indicates a one standard deviation increase of earnings 
management would increase earnings adjustment speed by 1.35%.  
Results show that banks manipulate earnings to persistence level based on 
market situations. We further test subsample regression based on crisis 
period or non-crisis period to check whether our findings are consistent. In 
table7 panel A column (3) and (4), results show that banks are reluctant to 
use earnings management to smooth earnings when market is under 
unhealthy circumstance, the coefficient is positive but insignificant in 
column (3). While during non-financial crisis period, coefficient before 
earnings management is negative and significant at 1 % to earning 
adjustment speed.  The magnitude of coefficient is 0.4, which in term 
generate 1.08% adjustment reduction. The economic impact is similar 
during low sentiment and financial crisis. 
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Table 7 Panel A 
Investment Sentiment and Bank earnings persistence  
Dependent variables ΔROA=ROAt-ROAt-1. The unit of analysis is the firm-year. EM is earnings management indicator, by 
applying the discretionary loan loss provision model (Liu and Ryan,2006), the absolute value of the error term is regarded as 
the discretionary loan loss provision(DLLP) and the degree of Earnings Management. The Lerner index is a bank-level 
indicator of bank competition, by adopting the stochastic frontier analysis approach, the Lerner index is calculated as the 
difference between price and marginal cost as a percentage of price. All other variables are defined in the appendix.  
Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings Adjustment Speed 
Sentiment and 
Crisis 
Sentiment 
>0 
Sentiment
<0 
  2007-2009   Other   
  High   Low   During   No   
  Sentiment   Sentiment   Crisis   Crisis   
  Coefficien
t 
t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficien
t 
t-value Coefficien
t 
t-value 
         
GAP 0.756*** 69.43 0.750*** 156.73 1.630*** 4.73 0.657*** 152.2 
Earnings 
Management 
-0.006 (-0.99) -0.049*** (-8.29) 0.013 0.88 -0.040*** (-9.33) 
Market 
Power(Lerner 
Index) 
-0.096 (-1.20) -0.290*** (-5.13) 0.117 0.59 -0.275*** (-5.26) 
Z-score -0.055*** (-8.02) -0.045*** (-9.63) -0.065*** (-6.32) -0.051*** (-11.46) 
Leverage ratio 0.010* 1.85 0.002 0.58 0 0.05 0 0.05 
Loan to total 
asset 
0.037*** 3.5 0.014** 2.11 -0.008 (-0.43) 0.072*** 12.94 
Size -0.088*** (-9.22) -0.066*** (-11.30) -0.072*** (-5.37) -0.068*** (-11.09) 
Total Assets 
Growth rate 
-0.015** (-2.23) 0.001 0.22 0.005 0.44 -0.026*** (-6.43) 
Managerial 
efficiency 
-0.091 (-1.14) -0.268*** (-4.66) 0.142 0.71 -0.262*** (-4.97) 
Income 
diversification 
-0.013** (-2.20) 0.006 1.49 -0.039*** (-3.24) 0.018*** 5.41 
GDP growth 
rate 
0.045*** 5.24 -0.047*** (-11.81) -0.261** (-2.56) 0.032*** 8.3 
Inflation 0.057*** 10.1 -0.126*** (-31.04) 0.287** 2.24 -0.046*** (-12.07) 
GDP per 
capita 
-0.053*** (-3.58) -0.352*** (-46.75) -0.729** (-2.20) -0.281*** (-42.08) 
Constant 0.009*** 4.36 0 1.12 -0.002*** (-32.79) -0.000* (-1.71) 
Time fixed 
effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Bank fixed 
effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Max VIF 4.51  6.10  4.18  5.35  
N 65736  160718  26325  200129  
adj. R-sq 0.8541  0.6605  0.793  0.7191  
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Table 7 Panel B!
Investment Sentiment and Bank earnings persistence: GAP>0 or GAP<0 
Notes: This table presents the OLS results for Partial Adjustment Model by splitting the sample by considering investment 
sentiment. The unit of analysis is the firm-year. EM is earnings management indicator, by applying the discretionary loan 
loss provision model (Liu and Ryan, 2006). The absolute value of the error term is regarded as the discretionary loan loss 
provision (DLLP) and the degree of Earnings Management. The Lerner index is a bank-level indicator of bank competition, 
by adopting the stochastic frontier analysis approach. The Lerner index is calculated as the difference between price and 
marginal cost as a percentage of price. All other variables are defined in the appendix. *, **, *** represents the significance 
level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Determinants of  Profit 
Adjustment Speed 
                
    
GAP>0 
  
   
GAP<0 
  
  
  Sentiment
>0 
  Sentiment
<0 
 Sentiment
>0 
  Sentiment
<0 
  
  Coefficien
t 
t-value Coefficien
t 
t-value Coefficien
t 
t-value Coefficien
t 
t-value 
         GAP 0.845*** 37.45 0.788*** 79.71 0.759*** 53.87 0.714*** 74.1 
Earnings Management 0.036*** 3.93 0 (-0.02) -0.064*** (-5.94) 0.111*** 12.2 
Market Power(Lerner 
Index) 0.360** 2.34 -0.274*** (-2.96) -0.460*** (-4.05) -0.252*** (-2.78) 
Z-score 0.014 0.75 -0.010* (-1.75) -0.112*** (-9.00) -0.090*** (-7.75) 
Leverage ratio 0.006 0.68 -0.002 (-0.41) 0.016*** 6.44 0.006 1.22 
Loan to total asset 0.030** 2.31 0.031*** 3.29 -0.023* (-1.66) -0.048*** (-4.16) 
Size -0.083*** (-4.48) -0.050*** (-5.45) -0.120*** (-8.88) -0.075*** (-7.92) 
Total Assets Growth rate -0.015* (-1.91) -0.016*** (-2.79) 0.019** 2.47 0.043*** 5.52 
Managerial efficiency 0.323** 2.12 -0.279*** (-3.00) -0.377*** (-3.27) -0.182** (-1.99) 
Income diversification -0.022*** (-2.93) 0.025*** 5.29 -0.007 (-0.62) -0.037*** (-4.86) 
GDP growth rate 0.064*** 3.04 -0.021*** (-3.06) 0.002 0.11 -0.046*** (-6.56) 
Inflation 0.022** 2.47 -0.183*** (-25.87) 0.144*** 12.82 -0.056*** (-7.16) 
GDP per capita -0.023 (-1.09) -0.397*** (-29.92) 0.060*** 3.34 -0.243*** (-18.00) 
Constant -0.011*** (-3.66) -0.001*** (-10.68) 0.027*** 13.2 0.004*** 15.52 
Time fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Bank fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Max VIF 4.19 
 
4.81 
 
5.24 
 
5.51 
 N 31625  34111  97133  63585 
 adj. R-sq 0.84  0.73  0.57  0.56 
  
Based on current findings that bank only smooth earnings during low 
sentiment period, we further split the sample into positive and negative 
GAPs to test whether banks have different functionality in terms of earnings 
management decisions. We find that earnings management has a strong 
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connection with bank earnings persistence when GAP <0 and investment 
sentiment is greater than 0. Intuitively, banks have a strong incentive to 
persistent earnings when their return is bigger than the original target, also 
when the market shows a high investment sentiment. In addition, when 
GAP>0 and sentiment>0, earnings management are positively correlated to 
earning adjustment speed, showing that banks want to catch up with target 
ROA strongly if market has a high sentiment. It is intuitive that if banks 
would like to keep themselves beating their target if they sense the market is 
energetic and sensitive to firm performance. When market is booming, 
investors are more active in seeking for good investment opportunities, 
thereby evaluating financial information deeper, which would drive banks 
to have a greater incentive to generate nicer financial performance. In this 
context, bank managers use greater earnings management to boost ROA, 
thereby attracting more investment.  
Interestingly, if sentiment is low, even banks are outperforming their target, 
earnings management was applied to reduce profit persistence. It is possibly 
because lack of incentive to smooth earnings when macro situation is bad. 
In contrast, they would increase profitability mean reverting process by 
increase earning adjustment speed using earnings management. This is 
consistent to the big bath story(Dou et al., 2016; Lin et al., 2016; Tomy et 
al., 2016), when market is under adverse condition, firms are more likely do 
a big bath and reserve earnings for future. 
 
 
!
!
199!
5.5 Investment sentiment and earnings management 
In the last section, we show that relationship between earnings management 
and earnings persistence would vary depending on different investment 
sentiment. The main idea is that banks might change their earnings 
management strategy solely based on investment sentiment. Therefore, we 
regress earnings management on investment sentiment to check the 
relationship between sentiment and earnings management.  Table 8 presents 
the results. In panel A, we use DLLP as earnings management, we found 
investment sentiment is strongly negatively connected to earnings 
management. This indicates that banks apply fewer earnings management in 
high investment sentiment period. It is not only statistically but also 
economically significant. And this effect is insensitive to positive or 
negative GAPs, which means high market sentiment is beneficial to bank 
transparency overall. In table 8 panel B, we change our dependent variable 
to discretionary realized gain and loss on available for sale securities. A 
consistent relationship is found between earnings management and 
investment sentiment, showing that AFS manipulation reduces as 
investment increases. Therefore, we could conclude that a good market 
sentiment would increase transparency and discipline banks behaviour.  
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Table8 Panel A 
Investment Sentiment and Bank earnings Management: DLLP 
This table presents the OLS results between earnings management and investment sentiment with the full 
sample. The dependent variable, earnings management, is measured by Discretionary loan loss provisions 
(DLLP).t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
Appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
Dependent Variable  DLLP 
  All Sample GAP>0 GAP<0 
  (1) (2) (3)    
Investment Sentiment -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 
(-62.27) (-36.50) (-36.59)    
Z-score -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (-10.29) (-1.58) (-14.93)    
Leverage Ratio -0.001 0.002** -0.003*** 
 (-1.14) (2.00) (-3.29)    
Loan to Total Asset 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 
 (131.75) (106.66) (94.53)    
Size 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (8.63) (4.32) (7.71)    
Total Assets Growth Rate -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-70.69) (-48.86) (-53.47)    
Managerial Efficiency 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (13.91) (11.30) (-3.81)    
Income Diversification 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (4.95) (5.96) (4.07)    
GDP Growth Rate -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-53.45) (-27.00) (-24.56)    
Inflation -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
 (-184.72) (-179.04) (-90.60)    
GDP Per Capita -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.025*** 
 (-54.23) (-34.17) (-27.08)    
Constant 0.255*** 0.246*** 0.288*** 
 (54.60) (34.40) (26.78)    
Time fixed effects yes yes yes 
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes 
Max VIF 4.19 4.27 4.66 
N 213545 119985 93560    
adj. R-sq 0.7764 0.7783 0.7717    
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Table8 Panel B 
Investment Sentiment and Bank earnings Management: DRSGL 
This table presents the OLS results between earnings management and investment sentiment with the full 
sample. The dependent variable, earnings management, is measured by Discretionary realized gain and loss from 
available for sale securities(DRSGL).t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
Dependent Variable  DRSGL 
  All Sample GAP>0 GAP<0 
  (1) (2) (3)    
Investment Sentiment -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** 
 
(-9.01) (-5.57) (-8.02)    
Z-score 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000*** 
 (3.09) (1.64) (3.21)    
Leverage Ratio 0.0002 0.0000 0.0004    
 (0.82) (0.14) (1.49)    
Loan to Total Asset -0.0001*** -0.0000* -0.0001**  
 (-3.42) (-1.74) (-2.22)    
Size 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0000*   
 (2.07) (1.85) (1.65)    
Total Assets Growth Rate 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000    
 (1.61) (1.29) (0.61)    
Managerial Efficiency 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000    
 (5.33) (2.41) (0.57)    
Income Diversification 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000    
 (0.11) (0.48) (-0.43)    
GDP Growth Rate 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000    
 (0.46) (0.17) (1.53)    
Inflation -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0001*** 
 (-5.56) (-2.61) (-5.25)    
GDP Per Capita -0.0010*** -0.0010*** -0.0012*** 
 (-7.18) (-4.68) (-4.63)    
Constant 0.0107*** 0.0103*** 0.0115*** 
 (6.75) (4.38) (3.66)    
Time fixed effects yes yes yes 
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes 
Max VIF 4.10 4.51 5.22 
N 125815 78491 47324    
adj. R-sq 0.0156 0.0126 0.0221    
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5.6 Discussion 
In this supplement chapter, we further discussed whether competition itself 
would impact on earnings management. We use a battery of tests to check 
the economic impact of both competition and earnings management on bank 
profit persistence. We also introduce investment sentiment as an exogenous 
variation of market vitality to see how bank profit persistence changes. We 
find both competition and earnings management have significant impact on 
profit persistence. We also discovered that competition would increase 
earnings management. Then, if higher competition reduces earning 
persistence and increase earnings management. while, we also observe that 
higher earnings management would increase earnings persistence. Therefore, 
we conclude that the effect of competition on earnings persistence is from 
earnings management. Furthermore, we find that competition impacts on 
earnings persistence is strong enough to overcome the marginal effect that 
boosted from earnings management due to high competition. We 
additionally found that earnings management is sensitive to investment 
sentiment. 
We reveal a positive relation between earnings management and earnings 
persistence. Our further analysis in this sub-section does not find a negative 
relation between bank competition and earnings management. We found 
earnings management still has a strong impact on bank earnings adjustment. 
This indicates that banks earnings management increase earnings 
persistence disregard to the impact of competition. We see the pure earnings 
management itself still have strong impact on bank earnings persistence. 
This result also supports the widely documented opinion that the principle 
purpose of earnings management is to smooth earnings (Healy and Wahlen, 
1999; Dechow et al., 2010; Gaver et al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995). In 
column(2) , we insert Adjusted Lerner index as an endogenous competition 
measure, and regression result of Orthogonal earnings management still 
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remains negative and significant. The economic magnitude remains 
unchanged.  
we test how pure earnings management would influence earnings 
persistence. Since competition would impact on earnings management 
therefore the relationship between earnings management and earnings 
persistence would be biased. We use competition to orthogonalize 
discretionary loan loss provisions to estimate a new earnings management 
measure that is independent to competition. We then use the newly 
estimated variable into main specification, we found consistent results 
showing earnings management have strong effect in smoothing earnings 
persistence. This result also supports the widely documented opinion that 
the principle purpose of earnings management is to smooth earnings (Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow et al., 2010; Gaver et al., 1995; Holthausen et 
al., 1995). 
Thus, our evidence suggests that competition does not reduce earnings 
persistence indirectly through the channel of earnings management. we also 
tested relationship between earnings management and earnings persistence 
would vary depending on different investment sentiment. The main idea is 
that banks might change their earnings management strategy solely based 
on investment sentiment. Therefore, we regress earnings management on 
investment sentiment to check the relationship between sentiment and 
earnings management. Our results suggest that earnings management are 
subjective outside market sentiment. When the market is under high 
sentiment, banks are less likely to manipulate earnings. This help us identify 
that banks use earnings management differently, then competition effect on 
earnings persistence is more pronounced, comparing to earnings 
management on earnings persistence.  
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Appendix 
Table A1 
The Impact of Competition on Bank Realized gains/losses of AFS: GAP>0 vs GAP<0 
This table investigates whether competition induces banks earnings management using realized gains/losses of 
available for sale securities, when the bank is above or below its ROA target (GAP<0 or GAP>0). The 
dependent variable is Realized gains/losses of AFS scaled by total assets. NI is net income before tax and 
realized gains/losses of AFS scaled by total assets. The Branching Restrictions index measure is a state level 
competition measure. The Adjusted Lerner index is a bank-level competition measure. The detailed 
methodology of Lerner measure is described in the appendix. Earnings Management is calculated by applying 
the discretionary loan loss provision model (Liu and Ryan, 2006). The absolute value of the error term is 
regarded as the discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP) and the degree of Earnings Management. All other 
variables are defined in the appendix. *, **, *** represents the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.  
Dependent Variable  Realized gains/losses of AFS 
  Below target Above target Below target Above target 
  GAP>0 GAP<0 GAP>0 GAP<0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NI -0.012*** -0.008*** -0.012*** -0.010*** 
 
(-24.04) (-18.07) (-16.56) (-14.28)    
Branching Restrictions Index 0.000001* 0.000 
  
 
(1.69) (1.04) 
  NI*Branching Restrictions Index 0.000 0.000 
  
 
(0.53) (1.46) 
  Adjusted Lerner Index 
 
-0.001 -0.001 
   
(-1.16) (-0.93)    
NI*Adjusted Lerner Index 
 
-0.003 -0.007*** 
   
(-1.34) (-3.58)    
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions 0.001 0.059*** 0.001 0.051*** 
 
(1.19) (6.36) (1.30) (6.87)    
Z-score -0.000* 0.000 -0.000* 0.000    
 
(-1.87) (1.39) (-1.78) (1.26)    
Capital Ratio -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** 
 
(-0.47) (3.20) (-0.59) (3.20)    
Loan to Total Asset -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
 
(-7.51) (-8.48) (-6.92) (-8.29)    
Size 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 
 
(9.52) (6.42) (8.10) (5.13)    
Total Assets Growth Rate 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000    
 
(4.59) (1.43) (3.76) (0.60)    
Managerial Efficiency -0.007*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.005*** 
 
(-22.31) (-14.51) (-1.34) (-2.83)    
Income Diversification -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000**  
 
(-5.38) (-3.89) (-3.89) (-2.54)    
GDP Growth Rate 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 
 
(1.19) (3.91) (1.47) (4.26)    
Inflation -0.009*** -0.003*** -0.009*** -0.003*** 
 
(-6.73) (-3.55) (-6.82) (-3.56)    
GDP Per Capita -0.008*** -0.000** -0.003*** 0.000    
 
(-5.48) (-1.98) (-4.40) (1.06)    
Constant -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 0.000    
 
(-9.50) (-5.42) (-0.35) (0.95)    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Max VIF 5.12 4.91 3.89 5.41 
     N 78491 47324 78491 47324    
adj. R-sq 0.079 0.081 0.079 0.081   
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Chapter 6  
Conclusion 
This thesis studies two primary determinants of bank profit persistence. 
Persistent profit is a natural outcome of earnings management, as largely 
suggested by accounting literature. However, mean reverting theory 
suggests that profit persistence is a not a usual phenomenon under intensive 
competition. Economic scholars define that any abnormal return that above 
equilibrium will fade away quickly if competition is high. Chapter 2 studies 
literature on these two main stream topics and provides a background of 
bank opacity. This thesis tries to reconcile these two strand literature 
particularly on banking sector.  
Chapter 3 studies the economic theory on competition and bank profit 
persistence. It evaluates the impact of competition on profit persistence in 
US banking, using bank-level data spanning 11 years. We document that 
competition has significant negative impact on bank profit persistence both 
at market level and individual level in a dynamic fashion.  Our design has 
successfully addressed the causal relationship between bank profit 
persistence and competition, and our measure of persistence innovatively 
allow for varying in terms of bank and time. We contribute to bank and 
profit persistence literature streams in two ways: first, we investigate how 
profit persistence varies whether the profitability positively or negatively 
deviates from the expected return. Bank managers concern less on profit 
persistence when the banks’ returns are under the expected to return, while 
stronger profit persistence has been found if the returns are above the 
expected return.  
!
!
206!
Secondly, the partial adjustment statistical results show that both market 
power and IBBEA index have significant positive impact on profit 
persistence. Our findings assist the regulator in distinguishing, to what 
extend, the market power or the internal accounting techniques determine 
the profit persistence. From an academic point of view, this article 
introduces the artificial impact of traditional profit persistence researches.   
Our findings are useful for scholars and practitioners, who seek to 
understand bank earnings persistence. The implication for policy makers is 
to pay attention to form a healthy competition environment for existing 
banks while at the same time encourage information disclosure quality. As a 
result, investors could obtain more valuable information regarding banks 
performance and the banking industry could become more stable, 
contributing to the stability of the financial system.  
Chapter 4 studies the accounting theory on earnings management and bank 
profit persistence. This article evaluates the impact of earnings management 
on earnings persistence in US banking, using bank-level data spanning 11 
years. We document that earnings management has significant negative 
impact on bank profit persistence in a dynamic fashion.  By employing the 
SOX act as an exogenous shock, our design has successfully addressed the 
causal relationship between bank profit persistence and earnings 
management, and our measure of persistence innovatively allow for varying 
in terms of bank and time.  We found banks are less likely to manipulate 
earnings after SOX act. During financial crisis, banks are more likely to use 
earnings management as a big bath tool rather than for profit persistence 
goals.  
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We contribute to bank and profit persistence literature streams in two ways: 
first, we investigate how profit persistence varies whether the profitability 
positively or negatively deviates from the expected return. Bank managers 
concern less on profit persistence when the banks’ returns are under the 
expected return, while stronger profit persistence has been found if the 
returns are above the expected return. Secondly, the partial adjustment 
statistical results show that earnings management have significant positive 
impact on profit persistence. Our findings assist the regulator in 
distinguishing, to what extend, the market power or the internal accounting 
techniques determine the profit persistence. From an academic point of 
view, this article introduces the artificial impact of traditional profit 
persistence researches. Our findings are useful for scholars and practitioners, 
who seek to understand bank earnings persistence. The implication for 
policy makers is to pay attention to form a healthy competition environment 
for existing banks while at the same time encourage information disclosure 
quality.  
Chapter 5 studies the relationship between earnings management, 
competition and profit persistence in banking. In this supplement chapter, 
we further discussed whether competition itself would impact on earnings 
management. We use a battery of tests to check the economic impact of 
both competition and earnings management on bank profit persistence. We 
also introduce investment sentiment as an exogenous variation of market 
vitality to see how bank profit persistence changes. We find both 
competition and earnings management have significant impact on profit 
persistence. We also discovered that competition would increase earnings 
management. Then, if higher competition reduces earning persistence and 
increase earnings management. while, we also observe that higher earnings 
management would increase earnings persistence. Therefore, we conclude 
that the effect of competition on earnings persistence is from earnings 
management. Furthermore, we find that competition impacts on earnings 
persistence is strong enough to overcome the marginal effect that boosted 
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from earnings management due to high competition. We additionally found 
that earnings management is sensitive to investment sentiment. 
We reveal a positive relation between earnings management and earnings 
persistence. Our further analysis in this sub-section does not find a negative 
relation between bank competition and earnings management. We found 
earnings management still has a strong impact on bank earnings adjustment. 
This indicates that banks earnings management increase earnings 
persistence disregard to the impact of competition. We see the pure earnings 
management itself still have strong impact on bank earnings persistence. 
This result also supports the widely documented opinion that the principle 
purpose of earnings management is to smooth earnings (Healy and Wahlen, 
1999; Dechow et al., 2010; Gaver et al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995). we 
test how pure earnings management would influence on earnings 
persistence.  
Since competition would impact on earnings management therefore the 
relationship between earnings management and earnings persistence would 
be biased. We use competition to orthogonalize discretionary loan loss 
provisions to estimate a new earnings management measure that is 
independent to competition. We then use the newly estimated variable into 
main specification, we found consistent results showing earnings 
management have strong effect in smoothing earnings persistence. This 
result also supports the widely documented opinion that the principle 
purpose of earnings management is to smooth earnings (Healy and Wahlen, 
1999; Dechow et al., 2010; Gaver et al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995). 
Thus, our evidence suggests that competition does not reduce earnings 
persistence indirectly through the channel of earnings management. we also 
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tested relationship between earnings management and earnings persistence 
would vary depending on different investment sentiment. The main idea is 
that banks might change their earnings management strategy solely based 
on investment sentiment. Therefore, we regress earnings management on 
investment sentiment to check the relationship between sentiment and 
earnings management. Our results suggest that earnings management are 
subjective outside market sentiment. When the market is under high 
sentiment, banks are less likely to manipulate earnings. This helps us 
identify that banks use earnings management differently, then competition 
effect on earnings persistence is more pronounced, comparing to earnings 
management on earnings persistence.  
Our work has put efforts in contributing earnings management in banking 
by studying how banks smooth earnings under different levels of 
competition. Earnings management could produce opacity in banks, which 
creates barriers for outsider investors to value banks. However, unlike 
ordinary firms, it could be beneficial for banks to maintain certain level of 
opacity. For example, the privacy of loans information could help banks 
increase financial stability as each loan on the balance sheet will be 
maintained as face value. A further disclosure requirement on banks may 
induce instability of banks. Then a further question arises, as to what extend 
banks need to disclose financial information. Is there an optimal point for 
disclosure? In addition, our study main focuses on information asymmetry 
that induced by loan loss provisions. Is that a regulatory capital effect from 
loan loss provisions?  
Several limitations of our study are also worth noting. First, research 
models in earnings management of banking could be strengthened. Loan 
loss provisions have been widely examined as a predominant tool of 
earnings management. However, managers have several other feasible 
vehicles to manipulate earnings, it includes available for sale securities, 
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securitizations, off balance sheet grants and so on. This study only 
incorporates loan loss provisions and available for sale securities. Second, a 
further research into competition and earnings management could be 
helping. Thirdly, this study use time fixed effects to rule out the effect of 
regulators on banks earnings management. Does financial reporting 
discretion would improve during the BASEL evolutions? Finally, this study 
calls for attention on earnings persistence, which could be an important 
factor that banking scholars have been neglected.  
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